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Abstract 
When responses to an environmental value survey are used to inform 
sustainability policy, the integrity of the policy framework requires the survey 
interpretation to have an acceptable level of validity.  The thesis explores three 
interrelated research themes that examine challenges facing psychologists and 
economists who measure community environmental values with quantitative survey 
designs. 
The first research theme examines the ambiguity and contested nature of the 
environmental value concept.  In the sustainability domain, it is common practice for 
both psychologists and economists to administer an environmental value survey to a 
diverse population and then to only consider a single theoretical survey interpretation.  
Such an approach ignores the possibility that the survey questions will elicit response 
motives that are not formally accounted for by the researcher‘s theoretical framework.  
A review of the conservation psychology, environmental & resource economics and 
ecological economic literature reveals that each of these fields of inquiry put forward a 
different conceptualisation of environmental value.  By formally describing the 
ambiguous and contested nature of the environmental value concept, the thesis outlines 
some caveats of a research approach that focuses primarily on assessing the face 
validity of a single interpretation.          
The second research question explores the challenges confronting researchers 
who empirically assess the validity of environmental value survey interpretations.  
When an environmental survey is administered in a quasi-experimental design, research 
conclusions are likely to be subject to various validity threats that reduce the ability of 
researchers to make an empirically informed conclusion about the validity of a 
particular survey interpretation.  Furthermore, the very act of assessing validity involves 
making subjective decisions as to what evidence to consider and how to weigh up the 
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overall body of evidence.  When quasi-experimental survey responses are empirically 
assessed against only a single set of environmental value interpretation criteria, a 
combination of the subjectivity of the validity assessment process and reduced 
experimental control increases the vulnerability of researchers to the confirmation bias. 
The third research question explores empirical approaches to examining the 
validity of environmental value survey interpretations and ways of minimising 
vulnerability to the confirmation bias.  Three empirical studies are presented.  One of 
the empirical studies examines the validity of the mainstream ―value orientation‖ 
interpretation of the Awareness of Consequence scale, which is widely administered by 
conservation psychologists.  Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses support an 
alternative interpretation that posits that the Awareness of Consequence scale measures 
beliefs about the consequences of environmental action/inaction rather than supporting 
the mainstream ―value orientation‖ interpretation.  The final two empirical studies 
formally examine the validity of three interpretations of contingent valuation: the 
economic interpretation, the contribution model interpretation and the value pluralism 
interpretation.  Both empirical studies support the value pluralism interpretation, which 
implies that economists in some circumstances would be better served by measuring 
community environmental values with a pluralism-as-a-methodology approach rather 
than insisting upon methodologies that measure community environmental values in 
monetary terms only.    
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Psychological and Economic Definitions of 
Environmental Value 
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Chapter 1 
Overview 
 ―Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be 
counted‖.  Quote hanging on Albert Einstein‘s door outside his Princeton office. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the thesis research questions.  The 
growing importance of environmental policy has coincided with an increased demand 
for environmental value indicators.  The environmental policy community are becoming 
increasingly reliant on the results of survey-based measures of environmental value.  
Accordingly, this thesis aims to explore the validity of conservation psychology surveys 
and economic survey instruments that are designed to measure environmental value, 
with the overarching goal of demonstrating that the descriptive validity of survey 
measures can be improved by examining more than one theoretical interpretation.  This 
introductory chapter serves to provide a general overview of the research problems 
contained in this thesis including a synopsis of how the thesis will be structured to 
address the research questions.  A discussion of conservation psychology and economic 
definitions of environmental value is germane to this outline.  Conservation 
psychologists relate environmental value to individual cognitions/emotions/behaviour, 
while economists relate environmental value to resource usage.  Furthermore, there are 
some economists who define environmental value solely in monetary terms, while other 
economists argue that the environment can also be valued with non-monetary 
frameworks.    
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1.2 The need for environmental policy  
Although the term ‗value‘ often applies to the environment being valued in its 
own right, the policy community often has a preference for the use of natural 
environments to be valued in monetary terms.  In this section, the needs of the 
environmental policy community are considered.    
Socially acceptable behaviours performed daily by millions of people around the 
globe have been identified as contributing to global warming, the loss of the earth‘s 
protective ozone, diminishing biodiversity, the depletion of the world‘s fisheries, acid 
rain, toxic pollution and freshwater scarcity.  Many scientists are forecasting a bleak 
future unless we modify our environmentally damaging practises within the next couple 
of decades (e.g. DCC, 2009; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1990; Flannery, 2005, 2008; Hadley 
Centre, 2004; IPCC, 2007a, 2007b; Mason, 2003; Metz & van Vuuren, 2006; Pittock, 
2005).  It is now widely agreed that future prospects of humanity will be better served 
by modern and developing societies smoothly transitioning to a more environmentally 
friendly way of life (Socolow, 2006).   
The concept of environmental sustainability has existed for well over 200 years.  
Since the 19
th
 century prominent economic thinkers have examined the long-term 
consequences of limits to growth and overpopulation (e.g. the physiocrats, Adam Smith, 
Reverend Malthus) (Heilbronger, 2000; Spash, 1999).  The concept of environmental 
sustainability has also been used by ecological activists to justify the implementation of 
policies designed to prevent the loss of valued ecosystems.  For example, during the 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries trepidation about the irreversible loss of valued wilderness 
resulted in western governments passing legislation to protect many environmentally 
significant locations (Nash, 1982).  The modern idea of sustainability, however, only 
emerged about half a century ago.  Current definitions of sustainability refer to the 
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premise that humans make a living off the finite resources of planet earth and if 
biophysical limits are not respected our species will eventually suffer (Boulding, 1966; 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987).   
Over the last half century populations living in industrialised societies have 
developed a much greater awareness and concern about the health of their local 
surroundings and the impact that human actions have upon the global environment.  
This conservation social movement began during the 1960s and 1970s when a small 
number of environmentally concerned citizens/researchers (e.g. Carson, 1965; Daly, 
1974; Ehrlich, 1968; Meadows, Meadows, Randers & Brerems, 1972) successfully 
politicised issues such as pollution, population growth, environmental quality and the 
limits of industrial growth.  By the late 1970‘s a new environment-person philosophy 
had become established which has since been called the ―New Environmental 
Paradigm‖ by Dunlap and Van Liere (1978).  By the beginning of the 1980‘s issues 
such as energy supply and the risks associated with nuclear energy had captured the 
interests of the general public.  While mainstream western society may have expressed 
concern about specific environmental issues from the 1960s to the 1980s it has only 
been recently, in the last couple of decades, that modern societies have accepted that 
there is a pressing need to protect our planet with sustainability policies (Uzzell & 
Räthzel, 2009).   
Moreover, if modern societies are to make a successful transition to a more 
environmentally friendly way of life, the general public must accept the need for 
significant monetary investment in a range of sustainability initiatives.  For 
sustainability projects to be worth the financial outlay there must be clarity about which 
environmental conditions and resources are highly valued and in need of protection or 
cultivation.  A major challenge for the environmental policy community is to 
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strategically align sustainability investment with community environmental values.  The 
neoclassical economics school proposes that market mechanisms should be used to 
efficiently allocate monetary resources to various sustainability initiative options.  
Heterodox ecological economists propose that societies should financially invest in the 
development of non-market institutions that are designed not only for efficient 
outcomes, but also for socially fair and ethical outcomes.  Conservation psychologists 
propose that sustainability policies will be more successful at modifying maladaptive 
behaviours if money is invested in designing incentives that are compatible with basic 
human needs and community perceptions of environmental value.   
It is clear that modern societies do place a high value on the environment and are 
willing to invest in sustainability initiatives.  Over the last couple of decades it has 
become politically acceptable for governments to spend significant amounts of taxpayer 
money on the development and implementation of a variety of sustainability strategies.  
For example, based on mid-1990s figures, it has been estimated that organisations 
worldwide spent around US$6 billion on managing protected environmental sites 
(Alexander, Gaston & Balmford, 2001).  Lerner, Mackey and Casey (2007) estimated 
that the United States federal and state governments spent a total of US$32 billion on 
land conservation between 1992 and 2001.  Figure 1.1 demonstrates that the Australian 
Federal Government has been willing to increase expenditure on sustainability 
objectives, with the amount of money spent on environmental issues more than 
doubling over a seven year period at a rate consistent with GDP growth.  There is also 
potential for the Australian government to spend a higher portion of GDP on 
environmental issues if the voting public are willing to support efforts to significantly 
reduce carbon emissions, to secure water resources or to develop alternative energy 
supplies. 
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Figure 1.1:  Australian Federal Government spending on environmental issues 
(Department of the Environment and Water Resources, 2007) 
Note: The Australian Federal Government has not published whole-of-government 
expenditure on the environment since 2008 
 
Although it is widely agreed that the path towards sustainability requires new 
infrastructure, adaptive/fair institutional rules and incentives for people/organisations to 
behave in a more environmental friendly manner, bitter academic and political debates 
often contest the basic objectives of conservation policy.  Indeed, there is no commonly 
agreed definition of ―sustainability‖ or firmly established criteria to assess 
environmental value (Johnston, Everard, Santillo & Robèrt, 2007; Pezzy, 1992; 
Redclift, 1993).  ―Sustainability‖, it appears, has emerged as an umbrella concept 
beneath which a myriad of interrelated issues related to environment and human 
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development can fall (Dovers & Handmer, 1993; Marshall & Toffel, 2005), as has the 
term ―environmental value‖ (Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2005; Spash, 2009).   
It is clear with respect to the rhetorical question of how we should value the 
environment that researchers and the policy community should recognise that people 
can draw upon fundamentally different and incommensurable ―value‖ criteria (Brennan, 
1992; Common, Blamey & Norton, 1993).  A proposed environmental change can be 
valued according to criteria of economic efficiency, social equity, ecosystem integrity, 
intergenerational ethics or behavioural effectiveness.  An environmental change 
proposal classified as being of high value when assessed by one criterion (e.g. economic 
efficiency) may not be rated positively when assessed according to another criterion 
(e.g. intergeneration ethics or behavioural effectiveness).  Environmental value can also 
be conceptualised in terms of the cognitive or emotional connections individuals have 
with nature (e.g. Schultz, 2001; Stern, Dietz & Kalof, 1993).  Conservation 
psychologists argue that a good theoretical understanding of how people 
psychologically value the environment can help the policy community develop more 
effective behaviour change incentives, green marketing campaigns and environmental 
education curricula.  The way in which environmental value is institutionally defined 
profoundly influences policy decisions relating to infrastructure investments (e.g. 
investment on clean coal energy, nuclear energy or solar energy), new institutional rules 
(e.g. carbon trading or carbon tax) and behavioural incentives (water restrictions or 
higher water pricing).   
The choice of sustainability or environmental value definition is never value-free 
and is often heavily influenced by the demands of politics.  Whether a definition of 
sustainability or environmental value is deemed to be legitimate ultimately depends 
upon one‘s personal perspective or objectives.  What constitutes a legitimate measure of 
environmental value is also highly subjective, being heavily influenced by an 
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interaction between a researcher‘s worldview assumptions and the requirements of 
environmental policy frameworks.  The global pursuit of sustainability in public policy 
where there are numerous and competing objectives has catalysed the growth of 
sustainability indicators (Hezri & Dovers, 2006).  In order to be policy relevant, it is 
common practise for researchers from different backgrounds to actively promote the 
legitimacy and validity of their particular environmental value measurement approach, 
while often actively downplaying the relevance or validity of rival environmental value 
measures.     
The thesis will critique the approach undertaken by psychologists and 
economists who measure policy-relevant environmental value indicators with survey-
based designs.  As environmental value is an ambiguous concept there is always the 
possibility that the meanings participants formulate when responding to an 
environmental value survey will not be consistent with the researcher‘s interpretation 
(Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2005; Vatn, 2004).  Accordingly, examples put forward in 
the thesis will demonstrate a tendency on the part of both economists and psychologist 
to only examine environmental value survey responses according a single theoretical 
interpretation, which, in some instances results in the participant‘s survey response 
motives being partially or totally ignored.   
 
1.3 Environmental policy frameworks and the demand for 
environmental value indicators  
Environmental decision-makers regularly face the prospect of formulating 
policies for multifaceted, complex and politically contested sustainability issues.  
Sustainability strategies regularly fail to satisfy all of the relevant stakeholders or meet 
all key policy objectives.  An abundance of research (e.g. Gigerenzer, Todd & ABC 
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Research Group, 1999; Janis & Mann, 1977; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Sagristano, 
Trope & Liberman, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) demonstrates that humans, 
including expert policymakers, are often poorly equipped to take into account all 
relevant considerations when making decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty/complexity.  It is common practise for environmental decision-makers to 
employ scientific researchers to gather measureable information that can be used to 
simplify the sustainability policy problem.  The indicators measured by scientists can 
act as a bridge and natural composite between knowledge and policy (Hezri & Dovers, 
2006).  From a policy perspective, it is easier to justify policy decisions to the general 
public that are founded upon measureable objectives performed by ―independent‖ 
researchers.  Environmental value indicators can also clarify the objectives of 
sustainability policy while ensuring a level of transparency and accountability (Failing 
& Gregory, 2003).  As governments, organisations and communities move towards 
formal standards for sustainability policy, environmental value indicators can also be 
used to track policy performance.   
Schwarz, Beloff and Beaver (2002) argue that the policy community have a 
strong preference to be presented with indicators that are simplified numbers directly 
relevant to the formal decision process which can be easily understood by a variety of 
audiences.  There are also demands for indicators to be cost-effective, reproducible, 
robust and respectful of confidentiality requirements.  Expectations are often placed 
upon applied researchers to develop measures of environmental value that suit specific 
policymaker needs.  For example, Hammond et al. (1995) argued that it is important for 
researchers to contribute to public policy by measuring easily understood indicators that 
are useful for the intended policy audience.  The theoretical development and practical 
use of indicators have been a major research consideration for many disciplines that are, 
or wish to be, in close proximity to policy making (Hezri & Dovers, 2006).   
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When expectations are placed upon researchers to ensure compatibility between 
indicators and formal policy frameworks, this can encourage an empirical approach 
where the validity of measurement instruments is only assessed against the policy-
defined theoretical interpretation.  A researcher who is funded to measure policy 
objectives may not be inclined to invest time and research money into improving the 
descriptive validity of measurement instruments if a new interpretation could render 
research conclusions less policy relevant.  Many researchers are acutely aware of the 
tendency of policymakers to employ researchers with the primary objective of justifying 
their actions.  If challenged, policymakers can be extremely reluctant to let well 
meaning researchers reduce their power by redefining or questioning the mainstream 
policy framework (Fischhoff, 1990).   
Both social and natural scientists are employed by the policy community to 
measure indicators of environmental value.  Natural scientists measure a range of 
indicators related to the concept of environmental value, including  biodiversity 
indicators, ozone depletion and carbon emission indicators, land degradation indicators 
and fishery health indicators (Dovers, 1995). This thesis, however, will focus on issues 
regarding the measurement of community environmental values by survey instruments 
administered by economists and conservation psychologists.  The growth of the 
conservation psychology programme and the legal ratification of contingent valuation 
by the court system have resulted in the policy community becoming more willing to 
draw upon the results of economic and conservation psychology surveys when 
developing environmental policy.  The thesis will argue that although environmental 
value surveys can provide valuable insights, there is also a lot of scope for 
environmental value surveys to be poorly or incorrectly interpreted.  A number of 
challenges facing both conservation psychologists and economists measuring 
environmental value indicators with general public survey designs will be examined.   
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A major issue with using survey methodologies to measure environmental value is 
the fact that many environmental issues are complex and the terminology used to 
describe sustainability issues in environmental value surveys is inherently ambiguous 
and vague (Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2005).  For nearly every environmental value 
survey statement there is the possibility of there being more than one common sense 
interpretation.  For example, Vatn (2004) points out the ambiguity of the term 
―environment‖, noting that: 
―from one perspective, the environment is basically a system of interrelated 
biological, chemical and geological processes developed over billions of 
years.  These relationships are fundamental to the health of ecosystems and 
to their ability to provide important life support functions.  From another 
perspective, the environment is a set of aesthetic elements, which forms the 
scenery or landscape in which humans undertake their activities.  From yet 
another perspective, it is a set of items to be protected or utilized for human 
consumption‖ (p.5). 
 
When environmental value survey statements are ambiguous there is always the 
possibility that the general public will interpret the survey in a way that is not 
compatible with the researcher‘s theoretical interpretation.  If conservation 
psychologists and economists are not open to improving the descriptive validity of their 
survey instrument, then they will be insensitive to the possibility that the general public 
can value the environment in a legitimate way which is not accounted for by their 
conceptual framework.  Just because a survey is able to generate numbers compatible 
with the policy framework, does not necessarily mean that the numbers are a good 
representation of environmental value (Spash, 2008b).   For example, it is possible that 
monetary estimates of environmental value obtained from a hypothetical survey 
instrument may not reflect what people are actually willing to pay for an environmental 
change under real monetary exchange conditions, yet the monetary estimate may still be 
used to inform policy because the survey methodology is defended by the courts and the 
estimate ―looks about right‖ (Spash, 2008a).  The thesis will put forward the argument 
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that economists and psychologists conducting applied survey research are more likely to 
make a positive contribution to policy if they are explicitly aware of their own 
assumptions and the possibility that there may be a more descriptively valid 
interpretation of the survey data.  The thesis will examine the application of survey 
methodologies to measure environmental value that are employed by neoclassical 
economists, ecological economists and conservation psychologists. 
 
1.3.1   The economic interpretation of environmental value surveys  
The neoclassical economic framework is built upon utilitarian principles that 
prescribe Cost-Benefit-Analysis (CBA) procedures as being the methodological 
approach that allows for the most ―rational‖ decisions.  The CBAs employed by 
neoclassical economists usually assess various consequences according to a unifying 
utility principle, where a higher level of some resulting end state – monetary profit, 
pleasure, happiness, welfare – is deemed to be the objective (Spash, 1993a).  The 
approach employed by neoclassical economists is regarded as being highly relevant by 
many policymakers.  For example, Ken Henry, the secretary of the Australian 
Department of the Treasury, suggests that:  
―in a world with readily available market measures of things like income and 
employment, the lack of similarly accepted measures of value of the 
environment creates the risk that government policies and project processes 
will fail to get the balance right‖ (Henry, 2010, p.4).   
 
Spash and Hanley (1995) point out that neoclassical environmental and resource 
economists have determined money to be the universal utility metric, which means there 
is a requirement for all relevant costs and benefits of a proposed environmental change 
to be assigned a monetary value.  Policymakers who assess sustainability options 
according to economic efficiency criteria often employ neoclassical economists to 
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provide estimates of costs and benefits of an environmental change in a monetary 
format.   
The neoclassical approach is tractable where costs and benefits reflect traded or 
market values and thus a known monetary estimation of value are available.  However, 
many environmental assets, such as a scenic view or the existence of a wildlife species, 
have no such ―revealed preference‖ in the market.  Thus, a major challenge for the 
neoclassical economic community is to measure the monetary value of proposed 
environmental changes where no reliable ―revealed preference‖ market information is 
available.   Non-market methodologies such as travel cost, hedonic pricing, production 
function analysis and survey methodologies such as the Contingent Valuation Method 
(CVM) and choice modelling have been developed to price an environmental change in 
the absence of reliable market data (Hanley & Spash, 1993; Spash, 2008a, 2008b).   
With a focus on assessing the validity of environmental value surveys, the thesis 
will examine the validity of CVM.  Widely accepted by the policy community, CVM is 
a ―stated preference‖ survey methodology that asks participants to assess the benefits of 
an environmental proposal on a monetary scale.  The most common CVM approaches 
involve a questionnaire that asks respondents about their personal willingness to pay 
(WTP) for an environmental improvement or their willingness to accept (WTA) 
compensation for a loss or degradation of environmental assets or quality.  A major 
benefit of CVM is that it generates monetary estimates compatible with the needs of 
many environmental policy frameworks. 
The validity of the neoclassical interpretation of CVM estimates has been 
questioned by some neoclassical economists (e.g. Diamond & Hausman, 1994; 
McFadden & Leonard, 1993), by prominent ecological economists concerned about 
social equity and ethical issues being ignored (e.g. Norgaard, 1989; O'Neill & Spash, 
2000; Spash, 2000a; Spash, 2006) and by psychologists who question the descriptive 
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validity of CVM survey responses (e.g. Baron & Greene, 1996; Kahneman & Knetsch, 
1992; Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz & Grant, 1993).  All of 
these criticisms question whether the CVM approach can provide a legitimate economic 
estimation of an environmental change.  The neoclassical empirical literature partially 
acknowledges these criticisms and has explored the validity of CVM with the goal of 
developing state-of-the-art methodologies that produce better estimations of ―true‖ 
economic value, which has in turn resulted in a number of CVM guidelines being 
published (e.g. Arrow et al., 1993; Bateman et al., 2002; Mitchell & Carson, 1989).  At 
the same time, the CVM approach has been rejected outright by some prominent 
ecological economists on the philosophical basis that CVM is designed to measure too 
narrow a definition of environmental value (e.g. Norgaard, 1989; Söderbaum, 1999, 
2007).  In particular there are concerns that the neoclassical premise that all costs and 
benefits are commensurable in terms of money can render invisible important ethical 
debates and power relations between stakeholders.  For example, it has been argued that 
the neoclassical interpretation of CVM cannot account for the possibility of a significant 
proportion of the population believing that a species has an inalienable right to survive 
that is not negotiable and cannot be traded with anything else (Spash et al., 2009).  The 
neoclassical interpretation of CVM can also reduce the importance of social issues such 
as intragenerational and intergeneration equity (Hendrickx & Nicolaij, 2004; Price, 
1993; Spash, 1993a, 1993b).   
Ecological economists with a value pluralism perspective argue that there are a 
range of different social and ethical perspectives related to the concept of environmental 
value that are incommensurable and therefore cannot be justifiably reduced into 
monetary units (e.g. Martinez-Alier, Munda & O'Neill, 1998; Munda, Nijkamp & 
Rietveld, 1994; Norgaard, 1989; O'Neill & Spash, 2000; Spash, 2007a).  Ecological 
economists who promote the concept of value pluralism and the benefits of exploring 
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ethical and social issues have traditionally not devoted research energy towards 
examining the meaning of CVM from the perspective of respondents as these 
researchers have already in principle rejected the CVM methodology.  Vatn (2004) 
notes that only a small number of empirical studies (e.g. Ajzen, Rosenthal & Brown, 
2000; Brown, Champ, Bishop & McCollum, 1996; Jorgensen & Syme, 2000; Schkade 
& Payne, 1994; Spash, 2000c, 2002b, 2006), have attempted to learn more about the 
way people value the environment by exploring the possibility that CVM data is a 
measure of both economic and non-economic motives.  Spash (2008c) notes that the 
body of empirical evidence suggests that various CVM response motives cannot be 
reconciled or reduced into a single unifying metric, and that such CVM findings are 
supportive of the ecological economics argument that a value pluralism framework 
should be used to value the environment. 
 
1.3.2   The psychological approach to measuring environment value with surveys 
The thesis will focus specifically on the conservation psychology approach to 
conceptualising environmental value.  Section 2.2.1 will note that the field of 
conservation psychology has emerged from the much broader environmental 
psychology programme.  While environmental psychologists have a broad and flexible 
definition of environmental value (e.g. the value of building design, the value of 
improved information environments and the value of environments that enhance 
personal safety), it will be proposed that conservation psychologists apply a more 
narrow perspective.  Section 2.2.1 will argue that a defining feature of the conservation 
psychology approach is the conceptualisation of environmental value as referring to the 
cognitive or emotional connections that individuals have with animals, places, 
ecosystems, the biosphere or a proposed environmental change.  The thesis will focus 
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specifically on the conservation psychology approach to conceptualising environmental 
value (related to sustainability and perceptions of nature), as an examination of the all 
the environmental psychology approaches would be beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Section 2.2.2 suggests that a major goal of the conservation psychology program 
is to understand how psychological perceptions of environmental value influence the 
tendency of people to perform sustainability behaviours.  Section 2.2.3 argues that for 
the discipline of conservation psychology to be able to provide policy advice that is 
consistent with the principles of science, it must be possible for the key theoretical 
cognitive constructs outlined in behavioural models to be validly measured.  Although 
some researchers highlight the benefits of examining environmental perceptions with 
qualitative methodologies (e.g. Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2005; Werner, Brown & 
Altman, 2002), the majority of conservation psychologists measure environmental value 
constructs with quantitative survey methodologies.  In contrast to the economic domain, 
there is much less controversy in conservation psychology circles about whether 
psychological definitions of environmental value can be measured with survey 
methodologies.  As this thesis will examine, this does not mean that the conservation 
psychology programme is less subject to the methodological issues that economists face 
when they administer CVM methodologies.   
Conservation psychologists commonly draw upon psychological models of 
behaviour when offering policy advice on how to encourage particular conservation 
behaviours (Gifford, 2007a, 2008).  Conservation psychology behavioural models often 
propose that stable perceptions about the general environment have either a direct or 
indirect influence on behaviour (e.g. Grob, 1995; Homburg & Stolberg, 2006; Ohtomo 
& Hirose, 2007; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano & Kalof, 1999).  In order to claim that a 
behavioural model has scientific standing, conservation psychologists devise 
measurement strategies to empirically assess each variable outlined by the behavioural 
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model.  The empirically-based conservation psychology literature, however, has 
reported questionable psychometric validity statistics for many environmental value 
scale, and especially for environmental value scale designed to measure stable  
environmental value perception constructs (for examples refer to Dunlap, Van Liere, 
Mertig & Jones, 2000; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010; Perrin & Benassi, 2009; Snelgar, 
2006).  This suggests that a re-examination of the interpretation of some widely 
administered trait-based environmental value scales may constitute an appropriate 
research strategy.   
The current thesis proposes that conservation psychologists may benefit from 
examining environmental value survey responses with a mindset that is open to the 
possibility of alternative interpretations.  Such an approach requires conservation 
psychologists to ask ―How do the environmental value survey responses suggest that 
people cognitively or emotively value the environment?‖ rather than focusing only on 
exploring ―How closely do the survey results match my interpretation of the way people 
value the environment?‖.  Moving on from merely using environmental value scales for 
the purpose of measuring predefined behavioural model variables, the thesis proposes 
that results of environmental value scales should be actively used to better understand 
how people form environmental value perceptions, which in turn could result in the 
development of new and/or more descriptively valid behavioural models. 
 
1.3.3   Scientific paradigms and normal science 
 The thesis proposes that the interpretation of environmental scales is a subjective 
process influenced by normative expectations from within one‘s research community.  
Throughout the thesis the domains of conservation psychology, environment & resource 
economics and ecological economics will be described as being a ―discipline‖, a 
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―community‖ and a ―programme‖.  These terms are used to highlight that members of 
each of these research domains share normative worldview assumptions and a social 
experience beyond just holding a common interest in a similar topic. 
 This thesis will examine whether psychologists and economists who employ 
psychometric scales to measure environmental value would benefit from questioning 
some of their key assumptions and methodological practises.  Kuhn (1962) argued that 
science does not progress via a linear accumulation of new knowledge, but undergoes 
periodic revolutions which he labels ―paradigm shifts‖.  The thesis proposes that many 
environmental researchers are in what Kuhn describes as a normal science stage.  In a 
normal science stage research questions are examined within the context of the 
dominant paradigm.  This thesis will outline the theoretical assumptions that currently 
underpin the fields of conservation psychology, environment & resource economics and 
ecological economics, and will then examine anomalies that emerge when the 
mainstream theoretical assumptions are used to interpret responses to environmental 
value scales.  The thesis proposes that if enough evidence can be gathered questioning 
the validity of the mainstream interpretation of widely administered environmental 
scales then it is worthwhile exploring whether an alternative interpretation can offer a 
more valid description of the environmental value survey response patterns.   
  
1.4  Overview of thesis research questions 
The thesis aims to explore two interrelated topics with an interdisciplinary 
framework examining both psychological and economic perspectives.  The first topic to 
be explored is the relationship between research worldview/ideology and the definition 
of environmental value.  Söderbaum (1999) suggests that within the world of applied 
academia ―words such as ‗worldview‘ or ‗ideology‘ are more or less forbidden, it 
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appears, except perhaps in political science where these matters cannot be avoided‖ 
(p.162).  The thesis will put forward an argument that the definition of environmental 
value for conservation psychologists and economists is influenced by both ideology and 
narrow worldview assumptions.  At the most basic level economists assess the concept 
of environmental value in order to develop recommendations on how society should use 
resources, whereas psychologists define environmental value as being a cognitive or 
emotional perception that influences the likelihood of individual actors performing 
sustainability behaviours.  Chapter 2 will compare the conceptualisation of 
environmental value by (i) conservation psychologists, (ii) neoclassical environmental 
and resource economists and (iii) ecological economists.   
While the discipline of conservation psychology defines environmental value as 
referring to cognitions, emotions and/or behaviour, there are different worldview 
frameworks that conservation psychologists can draw upon to describe the person-
environment interface.  Chapter 4 will describe four competing person-environment 
worldviews described by Altman and Rogoff (1987), which are the trait-based, 
interactional, organismic and transactional frameworks.  Each of these worldviews 
frameworks is based upon a different set of assumptions about the nature of the 
environment-person interface.  These worldview frameworks can be used to describe 
different ways in which conservation psychologists can define environmental value.  It 
is most common for conservation psychologists to employ interactional worldview 
assumptions when conceptualising how people cognitively/emotionally/behaviourally 
value the environment.  The trait-based conceptualisation of environmental value, 
however, is becoming increasingly more popular with conservation psychologists who 
are interested in the hypothesis that people hold stable perceptions of environmental 
value.  It is less common for conservation psychologists to draw upon organismic or 
transaction worldview assumptions.  Chapter 5 will focus on presenting evidence that 
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suggests conservation psychologists who design and administer trait-based 
environmental value scales are often insensitive to the possibility of alternative 
interpretations.  A literature review will highlight the questionable descriptive validity 
of several widely administered environmental value scales designed according to 
specific trait-based assumptions.    
There are also differences in how the Ecological Economics (EE) community 
and the Environmental & Resource Economics (E&RE) community define 
environmental value.  A number of prominent ecological economists (e.g. Funtowicz & 
Ravetz, 1991; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Munda, 1996; Norgaard, 1989; O'Neill, 1998; 
O'Neill & Spash, 2000; Söderbaum, 1999; Spash, 2008a, 2008b; Vatn, 2004) have been 
highly critical of the neoclassical assumptions that guide the research of environmental 
and resource economists.  The journal of Ecological Economics, however, still 
publishes neoclassical manuscripts that value the environment in monetary terms.  It is 
therefore not clear whether criticisms of monetary reductionism and concerns about 
CVM reflect the views of a few prominent ecological economists or the field of EE in 
general.  Chapter 7 will provide an empirical comparison of the environmental value 
assumptions of the EE and E&RE communities and will also examine how these two 
economic communities assess the validity of a range of environmental valuation survey 
methodologies.  The thesis will present the results of a survey administered to an E&RE 
sample and an EE sample who were asked to assess the importance of environmental 
value concepts and the validity of different environmental value survey methodologies.  
Differences between the E&RE sample and the EE sample in the rating of the validity 
of environmental valuation methodologies will support the thesis argument that the 
validity of environmental survey interpretations are assessed according to ideology 
rather than objective empirical evidence. 
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The second topic explored by the thesis is an examination of the limitations 
facing researchers who are interested in assessing the descriptive validity of an 
environmental value survey instrument.  Both psychologists and economists administer 
surveys to obtain a measure of how a general public sample values the environment, 
although as just mentioned these two disciplines put forward very different definitions 
of environment value.  Finding a strong body of evidence that demonstrates an 
acceptable match between a specific theoretical interpretation and survey responses 
collected outside a controlled laboratory setting can be extremely challenging.  Chapter 
3 will explore why examining the meaning of quantitative survey responses from the 
perspective of participants is a demanding enterprise.  A number of barriers to assessing 
the validity of quasi-experimental survey designs will be described.  Because of 
inherent difficulties in assessing the validity of an interpretation of quasi-experimental 
data, it is proposed that when a community survey has been administered for policy 
purposes, researchers can lack incentives to examine the descriptive validity of more 
than one interpretation of the survey responses.  The confirmation bias literature 
suggests that when researchers only examine a single interpretation of survey data they 
can be highly susceptible to selectively ascribing undue weight to evidence that 
supports their position while neglecting to gather or discounting evidence that does not 
support their proposed interpretation (Nickerson, 1998; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).     
The topic which examines the different worldview assumptions used to define 
environmental value will be formally aligned with the topic examining the challenges of 
measuring a definition of environment value with survey designs.  As stated above, the 
overarching goal of the thesis is to demonstrate that the descriptive validity of survey 
measures can often be improved by examining more than one theoretical interpretation.  
Descriptive validity should be a major goal whenever a researcher aims for the 
environmental value survey results to guide policy recommendations.  The more valid 
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the interpretation of survey data, the greater the likelihood that research conclusions and 
policy advice based upon the survey data will also be valid.  The thesis therefore aims to 
demonstrate the benefits of psychologists and economists formally examining the 
descriptive validity of more than one interpretation of widely administered 
environmental value survey instruments, which is not currently a common practise for 
either the conservation psychology or economic research communities.    
A secondary goal of the thesis is to demonstrate that the descriptive validity of 
the Awareness of Consequence (AC) scale (Stern et al., 1993) and the descriptive 
validity of CVM can be improved by researchers examining more than one theoretical 
interpretation.  Accordingly, the thesis will explore the validity of the AC scale (Stern et 
al., 1993), a psychological scale that was designed according to the assumption that 
stable beliefs about the environment called ―value orientations‖ causally influence 
beliefs about adverse environmental consequences.  A number of studies (e.g. Gärling, 
Fujii, Gärling & Jakobsson, 2003; Hansla, Gamble, Juliusson & Gärling, 2008; 
Joireman, Lasane, Bennett, Richards & Solaimani, 2001; Snelgar, 2006; Stern et al., 
1993; Stern, Dietz, Kalof & Guagnano, 1995b) have reported statistical results that 
suggest the value orientation interpretation of the AC scale has poor validity.  The AC 
scale has reported psychometric statistics that are so problematic that the current thesis 
proposes that the value orientation interpretation of the scale should be questioned.  The 
conservation psychology literature has not yet seriously explored the possibility of an 
alternative explanation of the AC scale.  Questioning the AC scale interpretation in turn 
questions commonly held and policy relevant assumption held by conservation 
psychologists that value orientations directly influence the tendency of people to believe 
sustainability related marketing and education material (discussed by authors such as 
Collins, Steg & Martine, 2007; Ibtissem, 2010; Jansson, Marell & Nordlund, 2010; 
Nilsson, von Borgstede & Biel, 2004).  It will also be noted that a reinterpretation of the 
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AC scale also directly questions the validity of the policy relevant and widely used 
Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) model (Stern, 2000b; Stern et al., 1999). 
If there are polarised views by the E&RE community and the EE community 
about the validity of CVM, this suggests there is a need to understand more about the 
meaning of CVM from the perspective of CVM respondents.  There is a possibility that 
simultaneously examining competing interpretations of CVM could shed light on what 
CVM responses actually measure.  Such a research agenda should examine the 
descriptive validity of the neoclassical interpretation of CVM while also remaining open 
to alternative interpretations.  Two empirical chapters will therefore explore the 
meaning of CVM responses from the survey participant‘s perspective.  Chapter 8 will 
examine whether responses to the monetary scale provide an economic valuation or a 
psychological measure of attitude.  Chapter 9 will investigate the value pluralism 
argument that people with different environmental ethical standards respond to the 
monetary scale with different and incommensurable motives.       
It is argued that simultaneously assessing the validity of two distinguishable 
interpretations of an environmental value survey can improve the descriptive validity of 
a survey instrument if two interpretations that are conceptually mutually exclusive are 
both found to be partially valid.  Under such a scenario a new and improved 
interpretation of survey responses could formally account for both interpretations.  
Figure 1.2a diagrammatically depicts this scenario, suggesting that researchers aiming 
for a more complete understanding of survey responses should consider both 
interpretations A and B.  The scenario presented in Figure 1.2a provides a possible 
explanation of why the debate about the validity of the economic interpretation of CVM 
is currently unresolved.  Proponents and critics of CVM may both be putting forward 
partially valid interpretations of CVM response data, and highlighting evidence that 
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supports their interpretations while discounting evidence supporting the alternative 
interpretation.   
If two interpretations of survey results are simultaneously examined it is also 
possible for evidence to be gathered that indicates that one of the interpretations is 
clearly more valid.  Figure 1.2b demonstrates a scenario where interpretation C 
represents a partially valid depiction of the meaning of environmental value survey 
responses, while interpretation D offers a description that possesses poor validity.  If 
there is clear empirical evidence that one of the interpretations of survey responses has 
higher descriptively validity than an alternative interpretation, then researchers should 
be encouraged to use the superior interpretation when describing the data to the policy 
community.  If the policy community insists on using the inferior or invalid 
interpretation of survey data because it is more compatible with the policy framework, 
then it is clear that the policy framework is not based upon the principles of good 
science.          
If an environmental scale is ambiguous it is possible that different stakeholder 
groups may have distinctive interpretations of the scale, resulting in survey response 
data that demonstrates population heterogeneity.  Figure 1.2c diagrammatically depicts 
a scenario where different interpretations are required to validly describe the response 
motives of a heterogeneous population.  When evidence of population heterogeneity is 
found it may not be appropriate to aggregate all the survey responses and then present a 
single interpretation of the data to the policy community.  This type of reductionist 
approach could lead to discrimination or marginalisation against stakeholder groups 
whose motives are not accounted for by the researcher‘s conceptual framework.  If 
empirical evidence suggests there are incommensurable motives underlying survey 
responses by different stakeholder groups, then proponents of the value pluralism 
approach would argue that this incommensurability should be formally acknowledged 
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by both the research and policy community (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; Jorgensen & 
Syme, 2000; Spash, 2008b, 2008c).      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2a:  A diagram depicting a combination of two interpretations explaining a higher 
portion of survey response variance than any individual interpretation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2b:  A diagram that depicts interpretation C being able to account for a large amount of 
variance in responses to an environmental value survey, while interpretation D in not able to 
account for a significant amount of variance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2c:  A diagram that depicts interpretation E being a valid description of the 
environmental value survey responses of group A but not for group B, while interpretation F is 
valid for the environmental value survey responses of group B but not for group A 
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Getzner, Spash and Stagl (2005) argue that environmental value surveys are 
only defensible in terms of having a political role, not a scientific role, unless 
researchers can provide evidence that their interpretation of the survey is descriptively 
valid.  While every survey indicator of environmental value is inevitably a flawed 
representation of how people value nature, as is the case with any indicator, there is 
much to be gained by examining the descriptive validity of more than one survey 
interpretation.  Mitchell (1999) notes that ―because science is a cognitive enterprise, 
because scientific methods are fallible methods, and because all scientists are fallible 
cognisers, the making of error is par for the course in science‖ (p.xi).  Understanding 
some of the systematic errors that researchers can make when interpreting 
environmental value surveys is of more than passing interest because it demonstrates 
both the potential and limitations of using survey methodologies to value the 
environment, as well as providing insights as to how to improve the descriptive validity 
of some widely employed environmental valuation methodologies.   
 
1.5  Definitions of Value 
Conservation psychologists, environmental and resource economists and ecological 
economists offer different definitions of environmental value.  The thesis will focus on 
conservation psychologists defining environmental value in terms of ―value 
orientations‖ and ―attitudes‖, environmental and resource economists defining 
environmental value in terms of ―instrumental value‖, ―utilitarian ethics‖ and ―monetary 
reductionism‖, and ecological economists defining environmental value in terms of 
―value pluralism‖, ―incommensurability‖ and ―deontological ethics‖.  Definitions of 
these key concepts have been provided below.  
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Conservation Psychology 
Value orientations:  General cognitive organising principles that direct an individual‘s 
attention to certain possible outcomes or actions under consideration and thereby 
simplify the cognitive choice process. 
 
Attitudes:  A psychological evaluative tendency towards a specific object or proposal 
that can be favourable or unfavourable. 
 
Environment & Resource Economics value terms 
Instrumental value – A philosophy that argues that value flowing from the 
consequences of a positive outcome is good, while a lack of positive consequences is 
bad. 
 
Utilitarian ethics:  An ethical theory that holds that the proper course of action is the 
one that maximises instrumental value.  The utilitarian ethics approach also assumes 
that the instrumental value can be described in terms of a unifying principle such as 
monetary profit, pleasure, happiness or welfare.  
 
Monetary Reductionism – A philosophy proposing that all relevant instrumental value 
can be measured in monetary units. 
 
Ecological Economics value terms 
Value pluralism:  A philosophy that argues there can be multiple legitimate perspectives 
that may be equally correct and fundamental, yet in conflict with each other.    
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Incommensurability: The absence of a common standard of measurement (e.g. money) 
across pluralistic values. 
 
Deontological ethic:  A non-utilitarian ethical stance that proposes that an object has 
value in itself or for its own sake.  An individual with a deontological ethic will refuse 
to make judgements in instrumental value terms. 
 
1.6    Research questions and thesis structure 
1.6.1  Research questions 
In summary the thesis seeks to address two research topics, namely: 
Topic 1:  How do the disciplines of economics and psychology define environmental 
value? (Addressed in Chapters 2, 4, 7 & 8) 
Topic 2:  What are the challenges to assessing the descriptive validity of an 
environmental value survey interpretation? (Addressed in Chapters 3, 5 & 7) 
As both of these topics are interrelated, the thesis also seeks to address the following 
research question that is a combination of Topic 1 and Topic 2: 
Topic 3:  How can the descriptive validity of environmental value survey 
interpretations be improved? (Empirical examples presented in Chapters 6, 9 
& 10) 
 
In order to examine how the descriptive validity of interpretations of 
environmental value surveys can be improved three empirical studies will be presented 
which will raise additional research questions.  These additional research questions are:    
  
29 
 
 How valid is the trait-based interpretation of the Awareness of Consequence 
scale (Stern, et al., 1993) that is commonly employed by conservation 
psychologists?  Is there a more valid interpretation of this scale? (Chapters 5 
& 6) 
 How valid is the economic interpretation and the contribution model 
interpretation of CVM surveys?  Can the descriptive validity of CVM surveys 
be improved? (Chapters 8, 9 & 10) 
 
1.6.2  Scope and limitations 
As the research questions listed above address interdisciplinary issues, the thesis 
will review a wide range of topics.  Economic, psychological theory and a literature 
related to the interpretation of survey instruments will be examined in order to 
specifically address the research questions outlined in the previous section.  Some of 
these topics raised, however, will not be explored in depth even though there is potential 
to do so.  The aim of the thesis is not to provide a comprehensive outline of all the 
issues that will be raised, as it is simply not possible to explore all of the issues related 
to environmental value survey measurement that have been raised in the psychological 
literature, economic literature or by the psychometric and survey methodology 
literature.  For example, a number of important topics related to the field of 
conservation psychology (e.g. qualitative approaches), E&RE (e.g. other non-market 
valuations such as choice experiments and hedonistic modelling) and EE (e.g. debate 
regarding biophysical limitations, ethics issues related to intergeneration equity 
arguments, pluralism-as-a-methodology approaches) will only be briefly discussed even 
though there is potential to explore each of these issues in more depth.  Due to the 
limitations of presenting multi-disciplinary research the thesis will only provide an in-
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depth exploration of topics that is deemed to be directly related to the research questions 
listed on the previous page.  
 
1.6.3  Publication of thesis chapters and acknowledgement of collaboration with 
Clive Spash 
Before, proceeding to the main body of the thesis, I would like to acknowledge 
my collaboration with Clive Spash and in particular his input in the shaping four thesis 
chapters, some of which reflect or are drawn from co-authored work.  It is important to 
acknowledge Clive‘s contribution at this point because although he was a member of 
my thesis panel, he was not my primary supervisor, although he became the key 
collaborator as the thesis topic evolved.  I worked closely with Clive when he was 
employed as his research assistant at the Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial 
Research Organisation (CSIRO) in Canberra between 2006 and 2009.  
Chapter 6 is based upon a modified version of a manuscript which has been 
accepted for publication by the Journal of Applied Social Psychology (see Ryan & 
Spash, In Press).  Anthony Ryan (the author of this thesis) is the primary author on the 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology article and was responsible for all statistical 
analyses and the primary literature review.  I would like to acknowledge that I worked 
closely with Clive Spash in understanding the meaning of these results presented in 
chaper 6.       
Chapter 7 presents the results of a ―conference survey‖ that I developed and 
administered in close collaboration with Clive Spash.  A working paper (see Spash & 
Ryan, 2010) has been published based upon an analysis of the survey results, and a 
version of this working paper has also been submitted to the Cambridge Journal of 
Economics (Spash & Ryan, Under Review) with minor revisions being requested.  
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Chapter 7, however, addresses a different research question and performs a different set 
of analyses to both the working paper article and the Cambridge Journal of Economics 
submitted paper where results from the conference survey have been presented.  
Although my ideas for chapter 7 have been shaped by my communications with Clive 
Spash, Clive did not make any direct contribution to the materials presented in Chapter 
7.  
Chapter 9 is a modified version of a working paper (see Ryan & Spash, 2010).  
A version of Chapter 9 has also been recently accepted by the  Journal of Economic 
Psychology, with Anthony Ryan being the primary author. Anthony Ryan was 
responsible for all the statistical analyses and the primary literature review presented in 
chapter 9.  I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Clive Spash in helping 
interpret the results and in contributing to the writing of materials used in chapter 9.   
Chapter 10 is based upon an article that was the result of discussions between 
Clive Spash and Anthony Ryan prior to Clive resigning from CSIRO.  Anthony Ryan 
was responsible for the literature review, statistical analysis and entire writing of the 
material presented in chapter 10.  I would like to acknowledge that I have had many 
face-to-face discussions with Clive Spash about the results presented in chapter 10.  
Due to Clive being heavily committed with a new role outside Australia, the material in 
chapter 10 has been submitted without his review, although it is expected that this 
chapter will eventually develop into a publication with Clive.   
I would also like to acknowledge Clive Spash for allowing me access to the 
datasets that were analysed in Chapter 6, 9 & 10.  In terms of the thesis as a whole, the 
overall coherence and contribution is mine, and the contribution of Clive Spash is that 
of a closely invovled supervisor.  
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1.6.4  Thesis structure 
In order to address the topic of how the descriptive validity of interpretations of 
environmental value surveys can be improved, the thesis will jump back and forth 
between a discussion of research worldviews and a discussion of survey methodology 
issues.  Figure 1.3 provides a diagrammatic depiction of the topics that will be 
addressed by the thesis and how these topics are related to one another. 
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Figure 1.3:   The thesis structure 
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value (Chapter 7) 
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trait-base AC scale (Chapter 6) 
Topic 2:  Limitations to measuring environmental value with survey 
methodologies   (Chapter 3) 
The subjective nature of validity and quasi-experimental validity threats 
increases the vulnerability of researchers to the confirmation bias   
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The thesis will be organised into five sections.  Each section represents a part of 
the thesis where the subject matter is closely related.  When a new section begins, the 
subject matter of the upcoming chapter will not form a linear progression from the 
previous chapter.  For example, Section 1 includes Chapter 1 & 2, as both of these 
chapters discuss how conservation psychologists and economists define environmental 
value.  Chapter 3 represents the beginning of Section 2, which discusses the challenges 
to finding validity evidence of an interpretation of data collected from outside a 
controlled experimental setting.   Readers should be aware that the thesis will 
reorientate from discussing conservation psychology perspectives of environmental 
value in Chapter 6 (last chapter of Section 3) to a discussion about the economic 
definition of environmental value in Chapter 7 (first chapter of Section 4).     
 
Sequential Organisation of Thesis  
Section 1:  Psychological and economic definitions of environmental value 
Chapter 1:  Introduction & Overview 
Chapter 2:  The psychological and economic frameworks of environmental value (Topic 
1) 
 
Section 2:  Barriers to assessing the descriptive validity of a survey interpretation   
Chapter 3:  Barriers to assessing the validity of environmental value surveys 
administered to the general public (Topic 2) 
 
Section 3:  A critique of the psychological approach to measuring environmental 
value with survey designs   
Chapter 4:  Psychological worldviews employed to conceptualise environmental value  
(Topic 1) 
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Chapter 5:  Prominent trait-based environmental value scales with debated 
interpretations (Topic 2) 
Chapter 6:  An examination of the validity of the trait-based Awareness of Consequence 
scale (Topic 3) 
 
Section 4:  A critique of the economic approach to measuring environmental value 
with survey designs 
Chapter 7:  Empirical comparison of E&RE community perceptions and EE community 
perceptions of the validity of environmental value survey methodologies 
(Topic 2) 
Chapter 8:  Three possible interpretations of CVM (Topic 3) 
Chapter 9:  Is Willingness to Pay an attitudinal measure or a measure of economic 
value? (Topic 3) 
Chapter 10:  A value pluralist examination of the Contingent Valuation Method:  An 
economic valuation for some, a symbolic contribution for a good cause for 
others? (Topic 3) 
 
Section 5:  Thesis Conclusions 
Chapter 11: Overall Conclusions  
 
1.6.5  Data sets used in chapters 6, 9 & 10 
 The empirical chapters 6, 9 and 10 examine two CVM datasets that were made 
available by Clive Spash, who was the project leader of both CVM studies.  The first 
CVM study was administered to Scottish participants and was designed to estimate the 
amount that participants would personally be willing to pay to improve the biodiversity 
of the river Tummel catchment area.  The second CVM project was administered across 
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the United Kingdom and assessed individual WTP for a proposal to convert a small area 
of Cambridgeshire farmland into a wetland ecosystem.  In both study designs a CVM 
presentation and a number of survey questions (e.g. CVM question, psychological 
scales, demographics) were verbally administered by market research representatives.   
The thesis will use the two data sets to examine specific research questions 
raised in Chapter 6, 9 and 10.  As these chapters are modified versions of published 
chapters, each of these chapters will describe the two studies in the method section and 
will highlight the dataset variables that will be used to address the specific research 
questions.  Furthermore, all relevant variables will be explicitly presented within the 
chapter or in the appendix section. Because the author of the thesis does not have access 
to the CVM presentation scripts or materials (e.g. participants were given a presentation 
about the CVM scenarios before responding to the survey questions that make up the 
datasets), this information has not been included in the appendix section.  The aim of 
the thesis, however, is to examine the scales that were administered as part of the CVM 
designs rather than to conduct an economic analysis of the CVM scenarios. 
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Chapter 2 
The psychological and economic frameworks of 
environmental value  
2.1 Introduction 
To understand how worldviews and ideologies influence the interpretation of 
environmental value survey responses, it is necessary to explore the environmental 
value assumptions of different schools of thought.  The conservation psychology 
community, the Environmental & Resource Economics (E&RE) community and the 
ecological economics (EE) community all put forward fundamentally different 
theoretical assumptions about how people value the environment.  Chapter 2 will 
describe how each of these communities defines environmental value, noting historical 
developments that have influenced current definitions.  It will be proposed that although 
each of these three disciplines are organised around different guiding principles, it is 
common practise for researchers from these fields of inquiry to measure community 
perceptions of environmental value with survey-based methodologies.   
 
2.2 The conservation psychology definition of environmental 
value 
2.2.1 The emergence of the conservation psychology programme 
The field of conservation psychology is an off-shoot of the environmental 
psychology research programme, although environmental psychology is not a research 
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field developed out of interests directly related to the conservation movement.  The 
original environmental psychologists were geographers, sociologists and psychologists 
who in the 1940s and 1950s were interested in examining the influence of the physical 
surrounds on behaviour and perceptions.  What bound these eclectic environment 
psychology pioneers was an interest in conducting studies outside the laboratory.  The 
initial impetus of the environmental psychology programme was provided by the 
emerging responsiveness of post-war architectural designers and planners to take into 
account the requirements of future users of their creations (Canter & Craik, 1981).  
Architects and planners building large scale projects began to recognise that humans 
needs were as important as structural needs (Langdon, 1966), especially for public 
buildings such as hospitals and shopping malls.  In addition, new technologies in these 
buildings, such as lighting and air conditioning, also relied on empirical research to 
ergonomically match function with human needs.  Over the years, environmental 
psychology topics expanded beyond the architectural domain to other issues ranging 
from environmental stress and coping, learning environments, informational 
environments and sustainability-related topics.   
The low initial priority of conservation-orientated research within the 
environmental psychology programme prior to the 1990s was exemplified by a lack of 
publications in the initial issues of the two primary environmental psychology journals:  
The Journal of Environmental Psychology and Environment and Behavior.  The 
inaugural issue of Environment and Behavior was launched in 1969, with the 
investigation of topics such as perceptions of mental maps, architecture and city 
sensations.  It was not until the 7
th
 issue of Environment and Behavior that the first 
conservation related papers were published by Mitchell (1971) who examined 
environmental resource usage and by O‘Riodan (1971) who investigated public opinion 
about air quality standards. The Journal of Environmental Psychology came into 
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existence in 1981 after several environmental problems had become widely recognised.  
Once again, it was not until the 7
th
 issue that the Journal of Environmental Psychology 
published the first conservation related paper, which examined attitudes towards nuclear 
energy (Van Der Pligt, Van Der Linden & Ester, 1982).  During the 1980s public 
interest towards the promotion of environmental conservation slowly increased, as did 
the amount of psychological research examining perceptions of environment topics and 
conservation behaviour (e.g. Cone & Hayes, 1980; Heberlein, 1981; Kantola, Syme & 
Campbell, 1982, 1984; Stern & Gardner, 1981a, 1981b; Stern & Oskamp, 1987; Syme, 
MacPherson, & Fry 1987).  While new conservation psychology topics continued to 
emerge in the 1980s and the early 1990s some key conservation psychologists of this 
time period were still concerned about the lack of growth of their profession compared 
to domains such as health psychology and community psychology (Altman, 1987; 
Stokols, 1995). 
Since the mid-1990s, the amount of sustainability based research being 
conducted within environmental psychology circles has grown to the point that some 
researchers have proposed that a new discipline called ―conservation psychology‖ or 
―ecopsychology‖ be formally declared to differentiate research promoting 
environmental conservation from the research being conducted on built environment 
topics such as urban design and architecture (Brook, 2001; Myers, 2001; Reser, 1995, 
2001).  These authors propose that the conservation psychology programme refers 
specifically to sustainability-related topics and has the prescriptive goal of promoting 
environmentally friendly behaviours.  The increasing popularity of the conservation 
psychology programme since the 1990s is demonstrated by the steady rise in the 
number of conservation related submissions and publications by psychologists.  The 
editor of the Journal of Environmental Psychology, Robert Gifford, notes that each year 
an increasing number of conservation related submissions are being received from 
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various locations including the Middle and Far East, South America and Eastern Europe 
(Gifford, 2007a).  Top ranked journals such as the Journal of Social Issues and 
American Psychologist have devoted special issues to topics covering conservation 
related topics and in September 2008 the Australian Psychological Society (APS), at 
their 43
rd
 Annual Conference, held a climate change forum for the general public.   
Figure 2.1 plots the number of sustainability related articles published each year 
by the Journal of Environmental Psychology, providing evidence of the steady growth 
of the conservation psychology programme.  Articles that examine sustainability issues 
(e.g. perceptions of nuclear risks, resource management issues such as water 
conservation, public transport usage, climate change, etc) or perception of the natural 
environment (e.g. the wilderness) are classified as being conservation psychology 
papers.  Journal of Environmental Psychology papers that examine any other topic (e.g. 
cognitive mapping, wayfinding, stress related to physical setting, urban design, leisure 
and tourism behaviour in relation to physical setting, perception of noise, social use of 
space, etc) are not classified as being conservation psychology papers.  Prior to 1999 
there were only two years in which more than five conservation related articles were 
published.  In 1990 an issue containing 7 articles was dedicated to perceptions of the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, while in 1995 the Journal of Environmental Psychology 
published a special ―green psychology‖ issue.  Since 1999, however, there has been a 
yearly average of 7.5 conservation articles published by the journal.   
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Figure 2.1:  Number of conservation related articles published by the Journal of 
Environmental Psychology (Classification conducted by Anthony Ryan in Feb 2011) 
Note: Book reviews, obituaries, erratum, editorials, editorial board announcements, 
announcements, discussions and comments were not classified. 
 
While Figure 2.1 demonstrates a growth in conservation psychology publications over 
the last three decades, there has also been more articles published by the Journal of 
Environmental Psychology over this period.  For example there were 20 articles 
published in 1981 compared to 60 articles published in 2010.  Figure 2.2 displays the 
percentage of conservation related articles published each year by the Journal of 
Environmental Psychology and demonstrates that since 2003 this journal has published 
a higher proportion of conservation related articles.   Both Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 
suggest that the conservation psychology programme is currently experiencing a stage 
of growth.  Therefore it is currently a prime time to challenge conservation psychology 
assumptions that do not stand up to empirical testing.       
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Figure 2.2:  Percentage of conservation related articles published by the Journal of 
Environmental Psychology (Classification conducted by Anthony Ryan in Nov 2011) 
Note: Book reviews, obituaries, erratum, editorials, editorial board announcements, 
announcements, discussions and comments were not classified. 
 
 
2.2.2 The conservation psychology programme: An exploration of how people 
psychologically value the natural world  
The conservation psychology programme is based upon clear guiding principles.  
Nearly all conservation psychologists (e.g. Bonnes & Bonaluto, 2002; Clayton & 
Brook, 2005; Oskamp, 2000; Reser, 2002; Stern & Oskamp, 1987) are upfront about 
their goal to promote environmental sustainability and environmentalism.  Saunders 
(2003) describes the conservation psychology programme as covering two broad 
themes.  The first theme has the descriptive goal of examining cognitions and emotions 
related to the natural world.  The second theme has the more prescriptive goal of 
exploring the drivers of environmentally-friendly behaviour.   
Schultz (2002) notes that a primary goal of the conservation psychology 
programme is to explore how people perceive the human-environment relationship.  
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Examining the cognitive and emotional connection people have with nature involves 
exploring the concept of environmental value at a psychological level.  Conservation 
psychologists conceptualise environmental value at the level of individual perceptions 
by examining psychological constructs such as beliefs, attitudes or value orientations.  
Value orientations represent perceptions related to environmental value that are more 
stable and generalised than attitudes and belief constructs.  Although thought to largely 
stem from value orientations, attitudes relate to specific objects or situations and the 
number of attitudes that an individual can hold is enormous (Ajzen, 2001; Grube, 
Maybeton & Ball-Rokeach, 1994).  Beliefs about adverse environmental consequences 
are also proposed to be influenced by stable value orientations (Stern et al., 1999; Stern 
et al., 1993).  Conservation psychologists can also explore the concept of environmental 
value at the level of group attachment (e.g. social norms) or the level of higher-order 
principles (e.g. ethical decision-making criteria).   
A prescriptive goal for conservation psychologists exploring perceptions of 
nature is to understand more about how people can be encouraged to develop a higher 
appreciation and more harmonious relationship with the world around them.  
Understanding psychological perceptions of nature is a topic of growing policy 
importance because of the increasing number of international and domestic declarations 
and conventions which are proposing to combat environmental problems (Nath, 2005).  
Many of these declarations will only be formally agreed upon if the majority of the 
general public support the sustainability initiatives.  A general assumption held by 
conservation psychologists is that people are more likely to support expensive 
sustainability policies in financially difficult times if a close connection with nature has 
been developed (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Schneider & Ingram, 1990; Stern, 2000b; 
Stern et al., 1993).     
  
44 
 
There are different environment-person assumptions that can be drawn upon by 
conservation psychologists to conceptualise how people cognitively or emotionally 
value the environment.  Four environment-person worldviews originally proposed by 
Altman and Rogoff (1987) are: (i) the trait-based worldview, (ii) the interactional 
worldview, (iii) the organismic worldview and (iv) the transactional worldview.  
Chapter 4 will review how each of these four worldview frameworks can be used to 
conceptualise environmental value at a psychological level.  Conservation psychologists 
who draw upon a trait-based framework assume that the way that people value the 
environment is stable unless viewed over the long term.  An example of a trait-based 
theory is the biophilia hypothesis (Kellert & Wilson, 1995) that posits humans have 
developed a strong and genetically inheritable attachment to healthy and diverse natural 
environments because our species has evolved in the company of other life forms.  The 
thesis will explore trait-based assumptions in depth in Chapters 5 and 6.   
The interactional worldview, which is the framework that underpins most 
conservation psychology research, assumes that the way in which people value the 
environment is influenced by other explanatory variables (e.g. context, demographics, 
or other psychological constructs such as perceived behavioural control).  Conservation 
psychologist can apply organismic framework assumptions to posit that environmental 
values are controlled by higher-order goals, principles or ethics.  An organismic 
worldview assessment of environmental value would focus on different types of higher-
order goals being associated with fundamentally different environmental value 
perceptions.  For example, an individual might support environment protection because 
he/she holds a higher-order principle that proposes nature has an intrinsic right to exist 
above and beyond human needs; or because they hold a utilitarian higher order principle 
that proposes the benefits of environmental protection outweigh the costs.  The final 
environment-person worldview outlined by Altman and Rogoff (1987) is the 
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transactional framework that conservation psychologists can draw upon to assume that 
there are no universal explanatory principles, higher-order principles or underlying 
essences that influence individual environmental value perceptions.  Conservation 
psychologists who draw upon transactional framework assumptions will posit that 
perceptions of environmental value are the result of contextual, temporal, physical and 
psychological factors that are both interrelated and inseparable. The transactional 
worldview approach is most likely to be applied by conservation psychologists who 
examine environmental value topics with a qualitative research design.   
The second conservation psychology topic described by Saunders (2003) 
involves exploring the drivers of environmentally-orientated behaviour.  Conservation 
psychologists usually argue that an assessment of what motivates people to perform 
environmentally sustainable behaviour is inadequate without an understanding of how 
people cognitively value the environment (Mweemba & Wu, 2010).  Governments and 
community organisations are currently setting targets for citizens to change a number of 
widespread and socially acceptable behavioural practices.  Many of the environmental 
behavioural strategies will require a broad and extensive array of policies and measures 
sustained over an extended period of time (Metz & van Vuuren, 2006).  Strategies to 
modify environmental behaviour in modern western societies, however, have to 
recognise that citizens are volitional beings who are free to ignore the warning signs of 
stressed ecosystems and that many citizens may choose to do nothing even if that means 
they are breaking the law (Howard, 2000; Jackson, 2008).  While governments and 
organisations can set environmental targets, policies and laws that encourage 
environmentally friendly behaviours, such policies can only be described as being a 
success if actual behavioural change occurs.  In the 20
th
 century many conventional 
environmental policy-making efforts based on compulsion and restricting choice have 
failed, being unable to account for a range of difficulties associated with encouraging 
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behaviour change (examples discussed by McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; Syme, Nancarrow & 
Seligman, 2000; Uzzell & Räthzel, 2009).  For environmental strategies to be successful 
they must be acceptable and efficacious to individual and community values (Gifford, 
2008).   
Conservation psychologists propose that a more sophisticated understanding of how 
people value the environment at a psychological level has the potential to greatly 
improve the effectiveness of policy geared towards transiting communities to a more 
environmentally sustainable way of life.  There is a broad consensus among 
psychologists that perceptions of environmental value are intricately related to 
environmental behaviour (Bamberg, 2003; Gifford, 2007b; Heberlein, 1981; Heberlein 
& Black, 1976; Milfont & Duckitt, 2004; Poortinga, Steg & Vlek, 2004; Steg & De 
Groot, 2008; Stern, 2008).  The influence of environmental perceptions upon behaviour 
are theorised to be especially relevant when there are no structural barriers (cost, space, 
legal constraints) preventing the desired behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; Stern, 2000a).  The 
stance of many conservation psychologists is summarised by Deaux (2001), who states 
that: 
―There is no question that the analysis of human choice and action and the 
design of appropriate interventions can change trends that promise further 
destruction.  We need to know about the beliefs and values that people hold 
with respect to their environment.  We need to know more about the carrots 
and sticks, the incentives and fears, that affect decision-making and that can 
be used to alter non-productive behaviour.  And we need to know more about 
the role that group norms, superordinate goals, and commitment to the larger 
community can play in this domain‖ (p.9).     
 
  
47 
 
2.2.3 Conservation psychology methodological approaches for measuring 
environmental value 
For conservation psychologists to be able to fulfil the expectations of the policy 
community, funding organisations and environmental decision-makers, it must be 
possible to validly measure key theoretical constructs.  If the theoretical concepts 
proposed by behavioural models cannot be satisfactorily measured, then conservation 
psychologists can only provide a literary, not scientific, contribution to sustainability 
policy.  While the domain of conservation psychology has only recently developed into 
an organised discipline, prominent conservation psychologists, such as Oskamp (2000) 
and Stern (2000a) argue that the field of psychology offers a variety of methodological 
techniques that can help policymakers develop a better understanding of how people 
value nature at a psychological level.  Psychological perceptions unlike attributes such 
as weight, length, time and actual behaviour cannot be directly measured.  Conservation 
psychologists therefore seek out proxy measures of environmental value.   
Interviews and surveys are the two most commonly utilised conservation 
psychology methodologies.  While open-ended and semi-structured interviews are 
methodological options that have been proposed to provide legitimate proxy measures 
of perceptions (Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2005), the most popular and accepted 
psychological approach to measuring environmental value is to administer close-ended 
psychometric scales.  Compared to the open-ended and semi-structured interview 
options, environmental scales are much more cost-effective to administer, especially 
when the research is interested in examining a large representative sample.   
Conservation psychologists (e.g. Kaiser, Wölfing & Fuhrer, 1999; Milfont & 
Duckitt, 2010) have noted that environmental attitude constructs has been included in 
over half of the conservation psychology studies and the overwhelming majority of 
these studies measure environmental attitudes with a closed-ended survey methodology.  
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Other cognitive environmental value variables such as norms (e.g. Nilsson et al., 2004; 
Thøgersen, 2006), environmental beliefs (Corral-Verdugo, Bechtel & Fraijo-Sing, 2003; 
Olofsson & Öhman, 2006; Van Der Pligt et al., 1982) and value orientations (e.g. De 
Groot & Steg, 2007; Steg & De Groot, 2008) are also commonly measured with closed-
ended psychometric scales.  
Another methodological option available to conservation psychologists that 
offers a proxy measure of environmental value is the measurement of actual behaviour.  
Conservation psychologists have at their disposal several techniques to measure actual 
behaviour.  Unobtrusive and naturalistic observation is an option when behaviour is 
performed within the public sphere (e.g. littering behaviour or the number of people 
using public transport), although this type of methodological approach is more widely 
applied by environmental psychologists investigating built environments than by 
conservation psychologists.  Another behavioural measurement technique is to 
physically look for evidence of conservation behaviour after the event.  For example, 
household waste (Oskamp, Burkhardt, Schultz, Hurin & Zelezny, 1998), or whether 
participants opt for a green purchase option (Bamberg, 2003), can sometimes be 
systematically measured after the behavioural event.  Behavioural indicators are 
sometimes available from government sources (e.g. Australian Bureau of Statistics), 
from reading water meters (Gregory & Di Leo, 2003) or from electricity meters 
(Kantola et al., 1984).  When direct behavioural evidence is not available, self-report 
methods offer an alternative approach is examining whether an individual has 
performed sustainability-related behaviours.  Examples of self-report methodologies 
include asking participants to diarise their own or their households conservation related 
behaviours (e.g. Corral-Verdugo, 1997; Corral-Verdugo et al., 2003; Verplanken, Aarts, 
Knippenberg & Moonen, 1998), or asking participants to indicate whether they have 
previously/currently engaged in a conservation behaviour (e.g. Karp, 1996; Ryan, Spash 
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& Measham, 2009).  This thesis will explore survey based, rather than behavioural 
based measures of environmental value.   
   
2.2.4 Conservational psychologists and the validity of closed-ended 
environmental value scales 
Conservation psychologists often administer closed-ended environmental value 
scales with the goal of using the results to justify a behaviour change strategy or an 
opinion modification policy.  Under such circumstances, conservation psychologists 
typically design their environmental value scale items based upon pre-specified 
theoretical notions.  Designing a valid set of survey items based upon a particular 
theoretical definition, however, is rarely an easy task.  The original conservation 
psychologists regularly expressed great frustration at the inability of environmental 
scales to satisfactorily measure their theoretical constructs (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; 
Edgell & Nowell, 1989; Heberlein, 1981; Syme et al., 1987; Van Der Pligt et al., 1982).  
A position statement released by the Australian Psychological Society points out that 
―sensitively measuring and monitoring changes in perceptions, motivations, attitudes 
and concerns relating to the natural environment‖ and developing a ―better 
understanding, measuring and monitoring of individual and community perceptions and 
appraisals of impacts on and changes to natural environments‖ is still one of the major 
challenges confronting the conservation psychologists of the early 21
st
 century (Reser, 
2002, p.6).  Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will explore some of the difficulties facing conservation 
psychologists who measure environmental value with survey-based methodologies.    
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2.3 The economic definition of environmental value 
While psychologists are interested in exploring how individuals form 
perceptions of environmental value and how environmental value perceptions influence 
sustainability behaviour, economists are primarily interested in the relationship between 
resource use options and the way economic agents/institutions/society value the 
environment.  Patterson (1998) notes that theories of value have been at the theoretical 
core of every major school of economic thought.  Compared to conservation psychology 
programmes, the field of economics has a much longer and more diverse history of 
theorising about how society, institutions and people value the environment.  There are 
many different theoretical perspectives that have been put forward by economists as to 
how the environment should be valued, with different economic assumptions often 
resulting in profoundly different policy advice.  The dominant economic perspective of 
environmental value over the last century has been the neoclassical paradigm, while the 
field of EE which has proposed alternative perspectives of environmental value 
emerged about two decades ago.   
This section will offer a very general comparison of how the neoclassical E&RE 
community and the EE community conceptualise environmental value.  As there is 
diversity within each school of thought such comparisons can only be made by 
generalising.  Some of the generalisations made below, however, will be empirically 
examined later in Chapter 7.  Chapter 7 will examine how delegates attending an E&RE 
conference and delegates attending EE conferences assess the validity of different 
environmental valuation survey methodologies.   
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2.3.1 A very brief history of economic approaches to valuing the environment 
prior to the 1950s  
The first well developed economic theories of environmental value where 
posited by the 18
th
 century physiocrats, who proposed that the wealth of nations was 
derived solely from the value of land agriculture (Heilbronger, 2000).  The physiocrats 
movement, whose central figures were Anne-Rober-Jacques Turgot and Francois 
Quesnay, developed economic theories before the industrial revolution had gained full 
momentum so it is no surprise their theories did not address the issue of global 
sustainability.  Living in a world primarily driven by agrarian production, the 
physiocrats proposed the major constraint of national wealth to be the natural limits of 
land productivity.  Turgot and Quesnay were particularly concerned with the issue of 
overpopulation, and their theories strongly influenced assumptions that were later put 
forward by the classical economists.   
Like the physiocrats, the classical economists also acknowledged human 
societies as being embedded in nature through harmonious agriculture and husbandry 
(Proops, 1989).  Economists such as Adam Smith, Reverend Malthus and David 
Ricardo were interested in how limitations to land productivity could reduce the 
potential for human prosperity.  While classical economists theorised about sustainable 
agricultural production, their conceptualisation of sustainability differed vastly from the 
modern economic schools of thought that are currently calling for sustainable 
development (Spash, 1999).  While classical economists were aware that industrial 
machines cannot produce without appropriate materials and sources of power, they did 
not have the modern day understanding that land production also requires a flow of 
materials and energy in order to create human wealth over the long-term (Christensen, 
1989).   
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As the industrial revolution matured, human societies became more dependent 
upon the resources that fuelled industrial production.  Spash (1999) notes that the 
Victorian economists John Stuart Mill, Stanley Jevons and Alfred Marshall explored the 
concept of ecological limits by examining topics such as integrating economics with 
ethics; non-renewable resources acting as economic constraints; the threat of 
unrestrained economic growth for natural wilderness; and limits to growth due to coal 
depletion.  Spash (1999) discerns that the writings of Victorian economists, who were 
also the forefathers of numerous concepts that were later to become axioms of the 
neoclassical paradigm, have been selectively read by modern day neoclassical 
economists who deny the existence of limits to growth.     
The general approach of economics in the first half of the twentieth century 
ignored topics such as resource constraints, environmental degradation and limits to 
material or energy throughput (Spash & Ryan, 2010; Spash & Ryan, Under Review).  
After the turn of the century the neoclassical paradigm became the dominant school of 
economic thought and the central figures of this paradigm were simply not concerned 
with environmental sustainability or limits to resources.  The emergence of neoclassical 
economics coincided with a period of history when the western world was finally 
industrialised and a new mindset emerged which construed humans as being the 
creators of both environments and value (Proops, 1989).  Neoclassical economists prior 
to the 1960s posited that environmental resources are naturally sustainable and therefore 
were not concerned about any limits to growth.  Ehrlich (1989) points out that 
traditionally neoclassical researchers have assumed that if one resource is utterly 
destroyed, there will always be another resource that can be used as a substitute for 
profit.  During this period, neoclassical economists were also reluctant to explicitly 
consider topics such as politics, ethics and social relations (Spash, 2002a).  Only a 
specialised group of neoclassical economists pre-World War II were interested in 
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sustainability issues such as agricultural topics (e.g. soil erosion) and a theoretical 
approach to non-renewable resource use (e.g. optimal depletion).   
Neoclassical economics is distinguished from classical theory by the wholesale 
shift away from a production and growth focus, with the neoclassical focus of inquiry 
being a static analysis of an exchange economy driven by aggregated individual 
preferences (Christensen, 1989).  To address the problem of how to achieve an efficient 
allocation of resources, neoclassical economists assume that the consumer preferences 
of individuals are stable.  Judgements about the economic value of various goods and 
services were proposed to be determined by subjective tastes which result in stable 
individual preferences that can be measured via market data (Veisten, 2007).  Simple 
decision-making assumptions such as rationality being defined as complete, reflective, 
transitive and continuous preferences became the behavioural axioms of the neoclassical 
paradigm.  Neoclassical economists still rely upon these axioms despite the emergence 
of a large body of literature from the field of the psychology of decision-making that 
suggests people rarely make decisions that are consistent with neoclassical behavioural 
assumptions (e.g. Dawes, 1979; Fischhoff, 1991; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gregory, 
Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1993; Janis & Mann, 1977; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, Slovic 
& Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Payne, 
Bettman & Johnson, 1992; Simon, 1986; Slovic, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
Neoclassical economists usually ignore empirical evidence that questions their basic 
behavioural assumptions because they do not define the concept of value as being a 
cognitive state as proposed by psychologists, but rather propose that they are addressing 
issues of value at the level of aggregated individual preferences revealed in the market 
rather than at the level of the individual (see Friedman, 1953).   
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in the 1960s and 1970s the general public became 
aware of an array of environmental problems (e.g. Carson, 1965; Ehrlich, 1968; 
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Meadows et al., 1972).  This new awareness has been proposed to have resulted in a 
new perspective of the nature-human relationship.  Proops (1989) notes that the 1960s 
and 1970s witnessed the development of a philosophy where the natural world was 
construed as being the creator and the self-sustainer, as was exemplified by the Gaia 
hypothesis (Lovelock, 1979) and the New Environmental Paradigm (Dunlap & Van 
Liere, 1978).  During the post-war period a small group of prominent economists began 
to conceptualise the relationship between different human economies as being 
embedded in the environment (Røpke, 2004).  Major contributions by Georgescu-
Roegen (1971, 1975), Herman Daly (1968) and Ken Boulding (1966) were inspired in 
particular by the laws of thermodynamics.  These authors described the human economy 
in terms of matter and energy being exchanged with the larger system of the earth 
(Røpke, 2005).  Production and exchange in economic systems was conceptualised as 
being part of a larger biospheric system of interdependent material, energy and 
information exchanges (Christensen, 1989).   
 
2.3.2 The Environmental & Resource Economics programme:  The application of 
neo-classical assumptions to define environmental value  
Economists applying neoclassical assumptions in the 1950s regarded the 
environment as being a source of valuable human consumption materials that required 
specialised management and conservation (e.g. Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1952).  As more 
environmental issues were publicly identified, an increasing number of neoclassical 
researchers became interested in environmental topics.  In the 1960s and 1970s the field 
of E&RE in the USA emerged as a distinct sub-discipline of neoclassical economics.  
The founding environmental & resource economists expressed concern about public 
good environmental problems such as pollution and the limits to the long-term 
availability of oil and coal energy resources (e.g. Ayres & Kneese, 1969; Bohm & 
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Kneese, 1971; Dasgupta & Heal, 1979).  The field of E&RE was officially 
institutionalised in 1974 with the establishment of the Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management (JEEM), while the Association of Environmental and 
Resource Economists (AERE) was inaugurated in 1979 (Røpke, 2004).   
During the 1970s and 1980s the field of E&RE became heavily reliant on the 
neoclassical welfare economic framework, while the perspectives related to biophysical 
limits received ―a humble position in relations to mainstream environmental 
economics‖ (Røpke, 2004, p. 302).  Spash (1999) suggests that the primary goal of the 
E&RE programme became applying Cost-Benefit-Analysis (CBA) procedures in order 
to offer policy relevant recommendations on how to efficiently distribute environmental 
benefits and costs (e.g. optimal pollution control).  Spash and Ryan (2010) argue that 
the reliance of the E&RE programme on CBA resulted in the field of inquiry becoming 
at a theoretical level nothing more than an extension of mainstream thought without 
having any impact on mainstream neoclassical thinking.   
The approach of the E&RE community is in essence an attempt to reduce all 
recognised instrumental value into a monetary estimate.   The E&RE framework 
suggests that a proposed environmental change is only of meaningful value when the 
result of the environmental change is the maintenance or enhancement of human quality 
of life.  A core assumption of the E&RE programme is that instrumental value flowing 
from the consequences of an outcome is good, while instrumental non-value is bad 
(Spash, 2000b; Spash & Simpson, 1993).  Controversially, the E&RE community has 
expanded the neoclassical definition of instrumental value from simply referring to ―use 
values‖ as revealed through market prices to also referring to a number of ―non-use 
values‖.  Non-use values include willingness to pay for possible future use of an 
environmental resource (option value), willingness to pay to protect environmental 
resources for future generations (bequest value) and willingness to pay for the continued 
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presence of an attribute regardless of any intended use (existence value) (Brennan, 
1992; Norton, 1987; Portney, 1994).  The majority, although not all environmental & 
resource economists, accept the economic analysis of non-use values (e.g. Diamond & 
Hausman, 1994; McFadden & Leonard, 1993).   
Members of the E&RE community are sometimes employed to assess the 
environmental value of traditionally non-market environmental goods.  The E&RE 
approach to assessing climate change policy is to calculate the instrumental value 
relating to the creation of future harm due to current day pollution.  If a CBA 
framework concludes that the present benefits of polluting outweigh the future costs of 
polluting, then the policy analysis will support of the polluting option (Spash, 2002a).  
Therefore, under an extension of the neoclassical approach, instrumental harm and good 
become tradeable items in a market economy.  By assuming that it is possible to put a 
price on present/future harm and present/future good, the E&RE community is able to 
propose that it is possible to put a price on traditional non-market goods such as carbon 
emissions (e.g. Jensen, 2000; Shiell, 2003) and water (e.g. Dinar & Letey, 1991; Weber, 
2001).  
A major strength of the E&RE programme is being able to provide estimations 
of environmental value in a monetary format that is compatible with policy frameworks.  
The monetary valuations provided by the E&RE community can be interpreted by the 
policy community as being a financial estimate of welfare impacts and can be used to 
support investment or tax policies that require an estimation of the social costs of 
environmental degradation (Getzner et al., 2005).  Policymakers who have access to 
monetary estimates of environmental value for competing policy options are usually 
able to politically defend their decisions by claiming the supported option is the ―most 
cost-effective‖.  A major problem, however, is that while neoclassical economists have 
traditionally assessed instrumental cost and benefits in terms of market values many 
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environmental consequences cannot be measured adequately by market data.  The 
E&RE community have therefore developed a range of methodologies that are 
specifically designed to calculate a monetary valuation of an environmental change in 
the absence of market data.  These non-market methodologies include travel cost, 
hedonic pricing, production function analysis and survey methodologies such as the 
Contingent Valuation Method and choice modelling (Hanley & Spash, 1993; Spash, 
2008a, 2008b).   
When environmental & resource economists cannot access revealed preference 
data, they often administer a technique known as the Contingent Valuation Method 
(CVM), which was developed according to neoclassical demand theory (Veisten, 2007).  
The CVM is a controversial hypothetical market approach for placing a monetary value 
on an actual or proposed environmental change.  Many economists believe that a well 
designed and properly administered CVM survey will result in a reliable and unbiased 
estimation of the ‗true‘ monetary valuation of an environmental proposal (e.g. Arrow et 
al., 1993; Bateman et al., 2002; Mitchell & Carson, 1989; Smith, 1994).  The traditional 
economic contention is that, under the right conditions, if you ask a member of the 
public ―What is the maximum you would be willing to pay for environmental 
improvement X?‖, CVM participants will readily provide a personal monetary valuation 
of the proposal that can be taken as representing the welfare they would gain.  The 
mainstream CVM approach assumes that people are not only capable of comparing the 
utility of the status quo with the utility of a proposed change, but are also able to 
estimate how much money they would be willing to spend in order to purchase the 
benefits that they, or their household, would derive from such a proposal.  The greater 
the perceived net benefit of the proposal, the more respondents should be prepared to 
pay.  Thus, a positive willingness to pay (WTP) bid is taken to represent the exchange 
of money for positive welfare benefits.  The resulting stated preference results are 
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commonly interpreted as representing the mean value of the proposed environmental 
change and then aggregated across the relevant populations and discounted for time 
(Spash, 2008a). 
CVM has become one of the most widely applied CBA tools for the E&RE 
community (Getzner et al., 2005; Spash, 2008a, 2008b) due to being simple, widely 
applicable and able to simultaneously assess values outside the economist‘s grasp such 
as option value, existence value and bequest value.  Spash (2008b) notes that a major 
success for the E&RE community has been the acceptance of CVM by government 
agencies and the defence of CVM by courts.  A particularly critical development was 
the legal examination of CVM after the Exxon Valdez tanker oil spill in Alaska which 
ultimately resulted in a new set of procedural guidelines being endorsed by a Noble 
prize winner (see Arrow et al., 1993).  After the Exxon Valdez court case, CVM moved 
from being an obscure experimental technique to a high profile legally endorsed policy 
tool (Spash, 2008a).  
 
2.3.3 Ecological economics: Criticisms of the CVM and the advocacy of value 
pluralism  
While Georgescu-Roegen, Daly and Boulding proposed biophysical theories in 
the 1960s that suggested we live in a world where there are limited resources, Røpke 
(2004) notes that it took a ―long gestation period from the beginning of the 1970s to the 
end of the 1980s‖ (p.295) before these biophysical economic concepts were understood 
by a body of economists who eventually were to refer to themselves as ecological 
economists.  EE was formally institutionalised with the establishment of the 
International Society of Ecological Economics (ISEE) in 1988, with the first conference 
being in 1990 and the first issues of the journal Ecological Economics being published 
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in 1989 (Røpke, 2004, 2005).  EE has been proposed to be a field that seeks out 
economic concepts that describe how the human economy operates within the limits of 
the earth (Faber, 2008).  Ecological economists typically attempt to describe the 
environment-economy relationship with analogies such as laws of thermodynamics, 
ecological resilience, limited substitutability of goods and non-linear equilibrium (e.g. 
Brand, 2009; Costanza, 1991; Costanza, Cumberland, Daly, Goodland & Norgaard, 
1997; Daly & Townsend, 1993; Wam, 2010).  
For some economists a major impetus for joining the ISEE was not just the 
biophysical conceptualisation of economics, but also personal rejection of the 
neoclassical methodology and ideology that underpin the E&RE research paradigm 
(Spash & Ryan, 2010; Spash & Ryan, Under Review).  Spash (1999) notes that many of 
the early ecological economists proposed that the neoclassical framework is too 
restrictive on ethical and social dimensions.  For example, a major criticism of the 
neoclassical framework is that market-based assumptions legitimise policies that ―are 
seriously detrimental to the poor and destroy ecosystems and life conditions for other 
species to serve the short-term interests of the richest fifth of the world‘s population‖ 
(Røpke, 2005, p. 281).  Söderbaum (1999), for instance, suggests that neoclassical 
theory legitimises specific values, thinking patterns and behaviour of some business 
leaders and politicians, while not legitimising the values of groups or individuals with a 
non-business sustainability perspective.   
Whereas neoclassical economists are generally not self-reflective about their 
underpinning assumption (e.g. the stability of preferences), ecological economists (e.g. 
O'Neill, 1992; Spash, 2000a) have argued that the neoclassical approach is based on a 
utilitarian ethical framework that is no more inherently right that other possible ethical 
frameworks.  Ecological economists have attempted to address the imbalances created 
by the neoclassical welfare perspective by exploring ethical issues such as 
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intergenerational and intragenerational fairness.  Other ethical issues include examining 
controversies that arise when placing a value on the loss of human life, the distress of 
human migration or the intrinsic rights of non-human entities (Vatn & Bromley, 1994).  
Spash (1995) argues that social and ethical concerns have directed the field of EE 
toward the political economy domain. 
Etzioni (1988) suggests that while an economic approach to the environment 
should acknowledge that there is a strong ego in each healthy individual, this is not 
sufficient reason to denigrate or exclude the social and ethical aspect of human 
behaviour.  When environmental value is being simultaneously considered from an 
individual, social and ethical perspective, some ecological economists (e.g. O'Neill, 
1993; Spash, 1993a, 2000c) argue that it can be possible for competing environmental 
values to be non-tradeable or to be incommensurable.  Therefore, ecological economists 
have described the environment as being a site of conflict between competing values 
and interests and different groups and communities that represent them (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz, 1990, 1991; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998).  Ecological economists have advanced 
the concept of value pluralism to recognise that the business of living decently involves 
many kinds of principles and various sorts of responsibility (Brennan, 1992).   
Ecological economists advocating value pluralism have gravitated towards 
advancing the concept of intrinsic ethics.  The concept of intrinsic environmental value 
holds that the environment has a value in its own right or for its own sake (Norton, 
1987).  While neoclassical economists may be open to including non-use instrumental 
values such as option, bequest and existence values in their conceptual framework, these 
indirect use values should not be confused with the intrinsic value literature (Spash, 
2002a).  A major advantage of a value pluralism approach is that individuals holding 
non-utilitarian based belief systems can be included in the environmental value 
framework rather than being reinterpreted according to neoclassical assumptions or 
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excluded from the survey results communicated to a policy community who are 
interested only in ―rational‖ trade-offs (Spash, 1997).  
Ecological economists advocating value pluralism reject the neoclassical notion 
that all things are commensurable.  As the economic interpretation of CVM is reliant on 
the assumption of commensurability, proponents of value pluralism have been very 
critical of this methodology as measuring too narrow a definition of environmental 
value (e.g Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991; Norgaard, 1989; Sagoff, 1998; Söderbaum, 1999; 
Spash, 1997; Vatn, 2004).  Ecological economists attack the neoclassical CBA approach 
of CVM for assuming value commensurability, denying the existence of inalienable 
rights, privileging consumer sovereignty, and contributing to distributional inequity 
(Gowdy, 2007; Söderbaum, 2000, 2007; Spash, 2008a, 2008b; Spash & Vatn, 2006; 
Vatn & Bromley, 1994).  A major concern with the CVM approach is that this 
methodology can be used by business-orientated stakeholder groups to control the 
process of environmental policy (Spash, 2008c).  Ecological economists who reject the 
application of CVM on philosophical grounds lack incentives to explore the meaning of 
a survey instrument that offers, what they believe to be, a morally deficient means of 
valuing the environment.   
Spash et al (2005) point out that philosophical concerns about attaching 
monetary values to all dimensions of socio-economic and biophysical systems have led 
to calls for alternative valuation methodologies.  An alternative methodological 
approach to account for multiple and incommensurable values associated with 
environmental issues is ―pluralism-as-a-methodology‖.  Examples of pluralism-as-a-
methodology approaches are Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) based upon weak 
comparability (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998) and Deliberative Monetary Valuation 
(DMV) (Spash, 2007a, 2008c).  DMV is administered in a political science setting 
where a group formally deliberates issues arising from a proposed environmental 
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change, while MCA methodologies are also most commonly administered in a group 
discussion design.  MCA and DMC methodologies both allow for the possibility of 
incommensurability, which is defined as the absence of a common unit of measurement 
(e.g. money) across pluralistic values.  While incommensurability entails the rejection 
of money reductionism, it does not mean that different values cannot be compared 
without recourse to a single type of value.  Both DMV and MCA designs often 
administer surveys, where participants are able to discuss or rate different, and possibly 
incommensurable, elements of a proposed environmental change.   
Spash (2000a) suggests that a deeper exploration of CVM responses may 
provide even further justification for the value pluralism approach.  Vatn (2004) 
identified two main positions taken by economists regarding CVM, in which the first 
camp regard anomalies as measurement bias to be removed while the second camp 
dismiss the whole valuation exercise based upon philosophical principles.  Vatn 
comments that ―my position is that one should take inconsistencies [of CVM] seriously 
and ask what they mean for economic theory‖ (p.1).  Spash (2000a) argues that while 
the E&RE community assert value monism, the underlying message coming from their 
CVM approach seems to be value pluralism.  He suggests that economists should not 
treat CVM biases with guidelines (as is done by Arrow et al., 1993; Fischhoff, Welch & 
Frederick, 1999; Mitchell & Carson, 1989; Payne, Bettman & Schkade, 1999), but nor 
should they ignore or dismiss responses to CVM.   Rather, economists should invest 
serious research energy into developing a better understanding of the meaning of CVM 
responses from the participant‘s perspective.  There is empirical evidence that some 
CVM participants respond to WTP questions with non-compensatory motives (e.g. 
Lockwood, 1998; Spash, 1998; Spash, 2000b), which supports the value pluralism 
hypothesis.  There is also growing evidence that there are pluralistic motives for 
offering a zero CVM bid and for refusing to answer a WTP question (e.g. 
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Dziegielewska & Mendelsohn, 2007; Jorgensen & Syme, 2000; Jorgensen, Syme & 
Nancarrow, 2006; Jorgensen, Wilson & Heberlein, 2001; Meyerhoff & Liebe, 2006).  
Spash (2008c) suggests that the field of psychology offers great potential for providing 
insights into how to develop a better understanding of pluralistic environmental values 
and the meaning of CVM responses.  
It is proposed that the E&RE community are more supportive of the CVM 
approach than the EE community.  A research goal of thesis is to empirically examine 
this generalisation.  It is important to note that the field of ecological economics has 
been described as having a weak identity (Faber, 2008; Røpke, 2005) and any pretence 
of a consensus on action or direction by ecological economists may be highly 
misleading (Spash & Ryan, 2010; Spash & Ryan, Under Review).  Ecological 
economics is a field that welcomes heterodox economists, neoclassical economists and 
non-economists (Söderbaum, 1999).  The complex interactions of ecologists, 
economists, political scientists, engineers, conservation biologists and others, seem 
likely to produce an array of positions.  Since the mid-1990s the field of ecological 
economics has attracted the interests of neoclassical minded researchers.  Røpke (2005) 
points out that neoclassical economists published in the journal Ecological Economics 
and they also attend EE conferences.  The CVM approach has also been defended on 
pragmatic grounds by prominent ecological economists (Costanza, d'Arge et al., 1997; 
Patterson, 1998; Pearce, 1998). Therefore, it is not clear whether the field of EE is 
generally sceptical of CVM or whether just a few prominent researchers are sceptical.  
It will be the role of Chapter 7 to empirically examine this question.   
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2.4 Comparison of the conservation psychology, the 
environmental & resource economics and the ecological 
economics conceptualisation of environmental value 
Table 2.1 summarises differences in the fields of conservation psychology, 
E&RE and EE across several dimensions.  These social science sub-disciplines were 
developed because of different historical circumstances that occurred in specific time 
periods.   While all three disciplines examine the concept of environmental value, they 
do so with different guiding principles, a different level of analysis, with different 
conceptualisations of the meaning of environmental value and with different policy 
objectives. What these three disciplines do have in common, however, is that they make 
use of survey methodologies to measure their theoretical definitions of environmental 
value.   
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Table 2.1: Comparison of the conservation psychology programme, the E&RE 
programme and the EE programme 
 Conservation 
Psychology 
Environmental & 
Resource Economics 
Ecological Economics 
The original 
impetus for the 
development of the 
research 
programme 
 
Environmental 
psychologists conducting 
field research became 
interested in examining 
public perceptions of 
emerging sustainability 
issues 
 
Applying the assumptions 
of neoclassical economics 
to emerging  environmental 
resource allocation 
problems 
Mixture of 
(i) Dissatisfaction with 
neoclassical paradigm 
(ii) The biophysical 
economics theories  
(iii) Interactions with 
ecologists 
Guiding Principle Environmental 
sustainability and 
environmentalism 
 
Efficient use of 
environmental resources  
Biophysical (e.g. Laws of 
Thermodynamics), social 
justice,  value pluralism (e.g. 
co-existence of instrumental 
and intrinsic value) 
 
Level of analysis  Individual perceptions Aggregation of individuals Concern with multiple levels 
(ethics, individual, society, 
biosphere, ecology, etc) 
 
Conceptualisation 
of environmental 
value 
 
Conservation 
psychologists related 
environmental value to 
the cognitions, emotions 
or behaviour of 
individuals 
Environmental value is 
proposed to be the monetary 
sum of all instrumental 
costs and benefits 
including: use value, option 
value, existence values and 
bequest value 
Ecological economists 
acknowledge the concepts of 
instrumental value and 
intrinsic value 
 
Some ecological economists 
argue that environmental 
values are commensurable, 
while others argue that it is 
not possible to reduce 
environmental value to a 
common unit such as money  
 
 
Policy objective 
related to 
environmental 
value 
To influence behaviour 
change, marketing and 
education strategies 
related to sustainability  
 
To provide monetary 
estimates of environmental 
value to the policy 
community that can be 
included in a CBA 
framework that can advise 
how environmental cost and 
benefits can be efficiently 
distributed  
1. To promoting the 
existence of pluralistic 
ethical frameworks to 
other stakeholders and 
policymakers 
2. To include a mixture of 
individual, social and 
biospheric values in 
policy  frameworks  
 
 
Prominence of  
survey 
methodologies to 
measure 
environmental 
value  
 
Close-ended surveys 
administered to 
individuals are the most 
popular methodology 
used to measure 
perceptions of 
environmental value 
 
Conservation 
psychologists will also 
measure environmental 
value via open-ended and 
semi-structured 
interviews or by 
measuring actual 
behaviour  
Environmental & resource 
economists prefer to 
measure all costs and 
benefits with market data.  
For many environmental 
change proposals there is no 
market data so a widely 
used methodology is the 
survey based CVM 
 
When there is no market 
data other options are travel 
cost, hedonistic pricing and 
production function analysis   
Some ecological economists 
reject CVM as a methodology 
based on philosophical 
grounds, but will accept 
pluralism as methodology 
surveys data 
 
Some ecological economics 
accept CVM designs 
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A researcher‘s worldview assumptions and ideologies heavily influence how 
he/she defines environmental value and interprets environmental value survey 
responses.  The thesis is based on the premise that in order to learn more about how 
people value the environment, researchers should empirically examine the descriptive 
validity of their interpretation of environmental value.  Examining the validity of an 
interpretation of survey data, however, is a challenging exercise.  It is proposed that 
when a conservation psychologist or an economist empirically examines the validity of 
environmental value survey data he/she should not only have a strong understanding of 
the assumptions that motivated the original design of the environmental value survey 
instrument, but also an awareness of other possible interpretations of the survey 
instrument.  The process of validating the scale responses should include a stage where 
the researcher actively considers the possibility of improving the interpretation of the 
survey responses by modifying the original theory or replacing the original 
interpretation with an alternative interpretation that can better account for the survey 
response patterns.  It is proposed that an exploration of the descriptive validity of 
environmental value scale responses should involve the following steps: 
(i) Understanding of the broad range of validity threats inherent to all general 
public surveys  
(ii) Understanding of the person-environment assumptions that motivated the 
initial design of the environmental value survey 
(iii) Understanding of how particular person-environment assumptions can limit 
incentives for researchers to exploring alternative interpretations  
(iv) An awareness of possible alternative interpretations of the environmental 
value survey 
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(v) A methodological design that is able to compare the validity of alternative 
interpretations of the environmental value survey    
The current thesis aims to demonstrate that the conservation psychology 
community, E&RE community and the EE community rarely follow these basic 
principles after survey data is collected.   
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Section 2 
Barriers to Assessing the Descriptive Validity of a 
Survey Interpretation 
  
69 
 
Chapter 3 
Barriers to assessing the validity of environmental 
value surveys administered to the general public  
3.1 Introduction 
Researchers looking for empirical evidence to justify their interpretation of 
survey responses face multiple challenges.  Assessing validity is an inherently 
subjective enterprise.  A researcher must make a judgement as to what theoretical 
interpretations to examine and against what empirical criteria.  Furthermore, surveys 
administered outside a controlled experimental setting can at best only claim to possess 
quasi-validity or something approximating validity.  Survey responses collected with 
quasi-experimental designs are likely to be contaminated with numerous confounding 
variables.  In many circumstances researchers analysing quasi-experimental survey data 
will not be able to gather sufficient empirical evidence to be able to make an informed 
judgement about the validity of a particular interpretation.  When researchers administer 
quasi-experimental designs do not seriously consider alternative interpretations of 
survey response motives they become highly vulnerable to the confirmation bias. 
 
3.2  Social processes and subjective factors that influence 
validity assessments of environmental value surveys 
3.2.1 The subjective nature of validity  
Psychometric validity refers to the degree that evidence supports the theoretical 
interpretation of test scores (American Psychological Association, 1999).  Assessing the 
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validity of an interpretation of a survey instrument involves comparing ideas, theories, 
hunches and hypotheses with survey response patterns.  There are various types of 
validity criteria that can be used to assess whether a particular interpretation of an 
environmental value survey is defensible, for example content validity, convergent 
validity, discriminate validity, criterion validity and nomological validity.  The act of 
assessing any of these forms of validity involves an ―empirical evaluation‖ (Cronbach, 
1988), where researchers draw upon actual evidence to examine their ―subjective‖ 
interpretations.   
Content validity (also referred to as face validity) is clearly a subjective claim, 
demonstrated when the survey refers exclusively and exhaustively to the definition of 
environmental value the researcher intended to measure.  When assessing criterion 
validity the relationship between survey responses and other hypothesised measures of 
environmental value is examined.  An assessment of convergent validity and 
discriminate validity requires a personal judgement as to whether the survey and other 
measures are (or are not) expected to be measuring the same environmental value 
construct.  Cronbach and Meehl (1955) highlight the subjective nature of nomological 
validity assessments, noting that the researcher must define a number constructs, outline 
how the constructs are related to each other and then propose a measurement strategy 
for each construct.  When several forms of construct validity evidence are 
simultaneously assessed, the overall conclusion as to whether the survey is or is not an 
appropriate measure of a definition of environmental value depends upon subjective 
assumptions made by the researcher as to how to weigh up the overall body of validity 
evidence (Messick, 1995).  Various threats to assessing construct validity will be 
explored in greater depth in Section 3.3.1. 
Disputes over the meaning of environmental value survey responses sometimes 
arise when different research groups hold conflicting assumptions about the theoretical 
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definition of environmental value.  If two researchers propose different explanations as 
to the meaning of environmental value, then they will seek out different evidence to 
vindicate their interpretation of the scale, which in turn makes it possible that each 
researcher will be satisfied with seemingly incompatible interpretations of a survey 
design.  For example, environmental & resource economists examine the validity of the 
neoclassical interpretation of CVM by looking for evidence that people are providing an 
economic valuation (e.g. assess income effect or hypothetical bias), while Kahneman 
and colleagues (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1993; Kahneman, Ritov & 
Schkade, 1999) assess the validity of their contribution model interpretation of CVM by 
examining correlations between attitudes scales and Willingness To Pay (WTP) bids.  
Polarised conclusions about the meaning of CVM are especially likely if both economic 
and contributory motives influence CVM responses, but by and large researchers are 
only willing to empirically examine the validity of one of these interpretations.  The 
neoclassical interpretation and the contribution model interpretation of CVM will be 
explored in greater depth in Chapters 8-10.                
 
3.2.2 Competing worldviews and declarations of irrelevance 
Smithson (1989) notes that all people, including scientists, make decisions 
regarding the aspects of a problem they deem to be relevant and the aspects deemed 
irrelevant.  Smithson defines irrelevance as an active strategy to suppress or control 
ignorance by reducing the amount of information to be considered.  While the act of 
declaring information as being irrelevant may at first glance seem irrational, regarding 
only some knowledge as worthy of interest can help decision-makers avoid paralysis 
when uncertainty or complexity cannot be reduced (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  
Although the act of deeming information irrelevant is a commonly applied tactic by 
research communities and lay people, Smithson (1989) points out that the concept of 
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irrelevance is a poorly understood form of ignorance.  There are, nevertheless, a range 
of political, cultural and sectoral perspectives actively attempting to promote the 
relevance of particular definitions of environmental value while downplaying the 
importance of other competing definitions.  Stern et al. (1993) note that:  
―Environmental politics has long frustrated participants on all sides.  
Environmental movement activists accuse corporations and government 
agencies of trading irreplaceable values for short-term selfish gains, and 
corporations and government officials accuse environmentalists of irrational 
desires for a risk-free life.  The participants seem to be talking past each 
other.  And the conflicts do not recede in the face of increasing knowledge 
about the effects of different policy choice on the environment or on other 
things that people value.  Part of the problem is that the political actors 
represent competing interests‖ (p.322-3).   
 
It is possible that some theories of environmental value may represent a valid 
description of the perspectives of some societal groups, while at the same time being 
completely insensitive to the motives of other societal groups (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 
1991, 1994a).  An interpretation of an environmental value survey that is only able to 
validly measure the environmental values of some key stakeholders is likely to be 
discriminatory (Jorgensen & Syme, 2000; Spash, 2008b).  Ignoring the response 
motives of key stakeholders is especially problematic when the interpretation of 
environmental value is designed to suit the definition of the stakeholders (e.g. 
government, private company) funding the survey.  Under such circumstances 
policymakers who claim they are employing social scientists to offer an ―objective‖ 
assessment of environmental value may be actually employing social scientists to 
promote the interests of already powerful stakeholders (Fischhoff, 1991; Söderbaum, 
1999).  
If some respondents feel that an environmental value survey does not respect 
their moral boundaries, they may respond to an environmental value survey with a 
taboo reaction.  Smithson (1989) refers to taboo as being socially enforced irrelevance.  
Drawing upon the work of Douglas (1966), Smithson suggests that the concept of taboo 
  
73 
 
holds interest for any researcher who is interested in exploring cultural responses to 
uncertainty.  Taboo refers to matters which people strongly encouraged others not to 
know or even inquire about.  People will attempt to punish those who break what they 
consider to be sanctioned taboo rules and an angry response is likely even when the 
prospect of the taboo being broken is only hypothetically discussed (Lichtenstein, 
Gregory & Irwin, 2007; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green & Lerner, 2003).  Fiske and 
Tetlock (1997) refers to taboo trade-offs as the refusal to undertake a mental transaction 
or social transactions that violates deeply held values or norms.   
While both conservation psychology surveys and economic surveys that seek to 
value the environment often ask for participants to offer a trade-off response, response 
formats to environmental value surveys from either discipline rarely allow for taboo 
responses to be formally acknowledged.  Informal evidence of a taboo response may be 
inappropriate comments, a refusal to answer the question or a scolding of the survey 
results in a public forum.  In the context of CVM, empirical studies have found that 
some participants refused to offer a monetary bid because of procedural justice concerns 
(Jorgensen, Syme, Bishop & Nancarrow, 1999; Jorgensen et al., 2006; Jorgensen et al., 
2001).  For example, survey participants whose ethical stance holds that the 
environment has an intrinsic right to exist have also been found to be likely to reject 
participating in CVM surveys that describe the environment as being an economic 
commodity (Spash, 2000c, 2002b; Spash & Hanley, 1995).  Respondents who are 
strongly sceptical about climate change science may be equally likely to reject 
participating in or may express anger towards surveys that refer to the need for policy to 
address ―human induced‖ climate change (Hulme, 2009).  Researchers are usually 
inclined to declare taboo reactions as being irrational, rather than seeking to explain the 
taboo response as being an understandable human response.  In most circumstances, 
taboo reactions to CVM that do not fit with the response format of the survey 
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instrument are usually excluded from the data analysis before any assessment of the 
validity of the survey instrument is made (Spash, 2008b).  
 
3.3    Quasi-experimental survey designs and validity threats 
Environmental value surveys administered in artificial laboratory settings are 
likely to be deemed as providing less policy relevant results than environmental surveys 
administered to a representative sample in more naturalistic settings.  When a survey is 
administered in a field setting, the study becomes quasi-experimental as the researcher 
has reduced control over the allocation of treatments or other factors that are being 
studied (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Robson, 1993).  Campbell and Stanley (1966) and 
Cook and Campbell (1979) have listed a number of validity threats that plague quasi-
experimental designs.  Cook and Campbell describe (i) threats to construct validity, (ii) 
threats to internal validity, (iii) threats to external validity and (iv) threats to statistical 
conclusion validity.  For Cook and Campbell the motivation behind their list of ―threats 
to validity‖ was to outline the barriers face when attempting to find scientific evidence 
for causal relationships from quasi-experimental designs.  The threats outlined by Cook 
and Campbell are of particular relevance to economists and psychologists who 
administered survey designs to the general public outside the control of the laboratory.  
Limitations imposed by a quasi-experimental design can result in researchers, despite 
their best efforts, not having adequate information to make an informed conclusion 
about the validity of their particular interpretation of survey response motives.     
 
3.3.1  Threats to construct validity  
Construct validity is defined as the degree to which inferences can legitimately 
be made from the operationalised measures in a study to the theoretical constructs on 
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which those operationalisations were based (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Cook & 
Campbell, 1979).  A researcher can be said to be assessing construct validity when 
he/she is examining whether a survey is actually measuring the theoretically proposed 
definition of environmental value.  In subsequent chapters the thesis will present three 
empirical studies (chapter 6, 9 and 10) that examine the construct validity of commonly 
administered psychological and economic survey measures designed to measure 
environmental value.  Table 3.1 lists and defines some construct validity threats which 
are proposed to be highly pertinent for publically administered surveys designed to 
measure environmental values.     
 
Table 3.1: Examples of construct validity threats 
Construct Validity 
Threat 
Explanation 
Mono-method bias 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation apprehension 
 
 
 
Researcher expectancies* 
 
 
 
Refers to dependent variable, which when 
operationalised in a single place at a single time with 
only one measure cannot adequately measure the 
construct  
 
Refers to participants being anxious about being 
examined, which in turn influences their performance 
(e.g. desirability effect) 
 
Refers to the data in an experiment being susceptible to 
bias in the direction of the experimenter‘s expectations 
(i.e. researcher hints at conservation being desirable 
when recruiting participants for a sustainability study).   
 
* ―Researcher expectancies‖ was labelled ―experimenter expectancies‖ by Cook and 
Campbell (1979).  This term was relabelled because many conservation psychologists 
would describe themselves as being researchers rather than experimenters.  
 
 Once a researcher has put forward a theoretical definition of environmental 
value, the next step is to devise an appropriate methodology to measure the defined 
construct.  It is not uncommon for researchers to struggle to develop survey-based 
metrics designed to measure a theoretical construct (Miles, 2001).  Cook and 
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Campbell‘s (1979) mono-method bias is a construct validity threat which surfaces when 
a particular operationalisation measures a theoretically outlined variable too narrowly.  
For example, there is ample evidence that there is no particular CVM design that 
satisfactorily measures the neoclassical definition of environmental value.  Applying 
different survey CVM designs (e.g. WTP, WTA, choice experiment, dichotomous 
choice) often results in significantly different monetary estimates, with several studies 
having found significant differences in response to WTP and WTA designs (Knetsch, 
1995; Knetsch & Sinden, 1984; Loomis, Peterson, Champ, Brown & Lucero, 1998; 
Thayer, 1981).  An approach employed by neoclassical economists to reduce the mono-
method bias is to triangulate the results of several methodologies that measure a 
monetary estimation of environmental value (e.g. hedonistic pricing, contingent 
valuation, market information).  The choice of methodologies to triangulate, however, is 
likely to influence the proposed monetary value of an environmental value.    
 If environmental values are measured solely with a closed-ended survey, the 
measurement will be limited by factors such as the response scale (e.g. psychology 
Likert scale or monetary scale) and the wording of the environmental value question.  It 
is unlikely that a set of psychometric statements or a brief description of an 
environmental change by a CVM design will satisfactorily capture the breadth and 
depth of environmental value issues under consideration.  Conservation psychologists 
attempt to increase the reliability of survey measures by administering multi-item 
scales.  Practical constraints of community surveying, however, can limit the length of 
questionnaire designs.  Economists attempt to capture the complexity of environmental 
value by providing participants with adequate information about the proposed 
environmental change.  When survey volunteers are recruited from the general 
population common strategy is to ensure that the questionnaire is not too lengthy or 
mentally taxing.  Although many environmental researchers would prefer to measure 
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environmental value by administering a lengthy survey that covers a wide range of 
value concepts, practicalities often result in a limited survey design.  The constraints of 
applied research ensure that many practically minded researchers will be inclined to 
administer relatively brief survey designs that only allow for a partial or narrow 
operationalisation of a proposed environmental value definition.   
Cook and Campbell (1979) described evaluation apprehension and experimenter 
expectancies as two examples of social construct validity threats.  Evaluation 
apprehension refers to participants being anxious about how their responses to the 
survey will be construed.  Many people are motivated to present a socially acceptable 
persona when filling out a survey (Krosnick, 1999).  A well-known phenomenon in 
survey research is an over-reporting of admirable attitudes and behaviours and an 
underreporting of those that are not socially respected.  Surveys that describe 
environmental problems in terms of the need for urgent conservation action may be 
biasing participants to respond in a way that inadvertently supports a researcher‘s pro-
conservation beliefs.  A number of conservation psychology studies (Lam & Cheng, 
2002; Milfont, 2009; Nancarrow, Smith & Syme, 1996-97) have found evidence of 
social desirability in responses to environmental surveys.     
 
3.3.2  Threats to internal validity  
Internal validity refers to whether a researcher can go beyond just saying there is 
a relationship between two variables, and actually put forward evidence that the 
relationship is causal (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979).  Both 
economists and psychologists propose a causal relationship between environmental 
value and other variables.  For example, neoclassical economists hypothesise that there 
is a causal relationship between WTP and demographics.  Conservation psychologists 
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regularly argue that there is a relationship between perceptions of environmental value 
and the performance of sustainability behaviour.  Threats to internal validity are 
especially damaging for environmental studies aiming to produce evidence of levers of 
control that could be used to strategically manipulate environmental value or 
behavioural incentives.  Table 2.2 lists and defines some of Cook and Campbell‘s 
internal validity threats that commonly plague applied research designs that administer 
survey methodologies with the goal of finding evidence of a causal relationship between 
environmental value and other conceptual framework variables.     
 
Table 3.2:  Examples of threats to internal validity 
Internal Validity 
Threat 
Explanation 
 
Maturation 
 
 
 
History 
 
 
Attrition 
 
Ambiguity about the 
direction of causal 
inference 
  
 
Processes within respondents that change as a function of 
the passage of time during the data collection period (e.g. 
fatigue, events between pre-test and post-test) 
 
Influence of specific events occurring contemporaneously 
with the treatment (e.g. introduction of water restrictions) 
 
Loss of participants during a study 
 
This is a salient threat in simple correlational designs, but 
not in experiments where the temporal ordering of 
independent and dependent variables is clear 
 
 
Environmental valuation surveys administered over extended periods of time 
face threats to internal validity, such as maturation, history threats and attrition.  An 
extended period of time can refer to the time taken to administer the data from the 
participant‘s perspective (e.g. surveys can be lengthy or can be part of a longitudinal 
design) or the time taken to collect the total data set, given that data collection can take 
weeks.  The more information included within a survey and the longer the participants 
are expected to be involved in the survey, the greater the likelihood that maturation 
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threats will decrease the internal validity of the study.  For example, conservation 
psychology survey participants may become fatigued or may learn non-experimental 
information between the administration of the pre-test and post-test.  A CVM study that 
offers a lengthy description of an environmental change may fatigue participants.  A 
Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) study or a Deliberative Monetary Valuation (DMV) 
study can take hours or days, although these studies are designed on the premise of 
social learning that proposes participants will become more mature and informed by the 
end of the data collection process.    
History threats to internal validity refer to the occurrence of specific and 
influential events that occur contemporaneously with the treatment.  For example, the 
introduction of new water restrictions midway through the data collection of an 
economic or psychological study examining water conservation would comprise 
internal validity.  Over the last decade many events may have profoundly influenced the 
way people construe conservation issues.  It is possible that Al Gore‘s documentary ―An 
Inconvenient Truth” in 2006, the rejection by the Australian Senate of the Emissions 
Trading Scheme in 2009, the stalemate at the Copenhagen Head of State Climate 
Conference in 2009 or the 2011 flooding of Queensland and Victoria have significantly 
modified Australian public perceptions of climate change.  Longitudinal designs can 
investigate the influence of possible history effects. 
The internal validity of longitudinal designs, however, can be reduced by 
participant attrition.  Attrition refers to questionable internal validity because of 
participants dropping out during a study.  For example a study by Moore, Murphy and 
Watson (1994) originally administered a survey measuring attitudes and perceptions of 
water conservation where 1800 participants responded.  Three years later they 
administered the survey again and only 476 participants from the original survey 
responded.    Attrition of this kind can be particularly damaging to internal validity if 
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participants who drop out differ from those who continue for the second stage of the 
survey.  When spurious relationships due to maturation, history and attrition cannot be 
ruled out, rival hypotheses to the original causal hypothesis emerge. 
A major threat to internal validity occurs when there is ambiguity about the 
direction of causal inference.  A major aim of the conservation psychology research 
programme, and the domain of neoclassical economics, involves finding evidence of 
relevant cause and effects relationships that can be used as policy levers of control.  
Researchers can use an experimental approach or an observational approach to examine 
a proposed cause and effect relationship.  The experimental approach typically 
randomly assigns participants into groups and provides a different manipulation for 
each group.  The manipulation is defined as being the independent variable and is 
proposed to exert an influence on the dependent variable.  The majority of 
environmental research, however, is conducted with an observational research design, 
where randomisation and temporal manipulation are lacking.  There are numerous 
examples of conservation psychology studies administering proposed dependent 
variables and proposed independent variables in the same survey (e.g. Ajzen et al., 
2000; Eiser, Spears & Webley, 1988; Poortinga, Steg & Vlek, 2002; 2009; Stern et al., 
1999; Van Der Pligt, 1985).  It is also common practice for CVM designs to 
simultaneously administer all the conceptual framework variables in a single survey 
instrument.  When a survey design collects all the study variables at the same time, 
which is the independent variable and which is the dependent variable is a matter of 
logic rather than temporal manipulation.  Even when an observational study claims that 
an independent variable is naturally occurring (e.g. demographics such as gender and 
income), without temporal ordering this can only be a theoretical, not an empirical, 
claim.  
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3.3.3  Threats to external validity 
External validity refers to whether the inferences of a study can be generalised 
across setting, person and time (Cook and Campbell, 1979).  In order for sustainability 
research to be policy relevant, it is important to be able make generalisations.  Any 
workable conservation psychology or economic conceptual framework can only 
explicitly describe a fraction of what influences responses to environmental value 
surveys. When an applied study is concerned about whether there is a relationship 
between a measure of environmental value and other variables proposed in a conceptual 
framework, the possibility of confounding variables is extremely high when a quasi-
experimental design is administered.  Some confounding influences that are unique to 
the particular survey design may have far-reaching impacts on the observed data 
patterns and thus reduce the generalisability of the study.   
Campbell and Stanley (1966) describe the occurrence of an interaction between 
selection and treatment as an external validity threat.  An interaction between selection 
and treatment refers to scenarios where the respondents who participate in a study differ 
substantially from those who refuse to participate or are not invited to participate.  For 
example, if a study finds it easier to recruit environmentally concerned participants who 
are interested in sustainability topics, the responses patterns to environmental scale are 
unlikely to be representative of the perceptions of non-respondents.  Likewise, the 
results of studies that are administered only to university students (e.g. Burgina, 
Williamson & Maheshwaria, 2010; Collins & Chambers, 2005) may not be 
generalisable to the community at large.  Several studies by Spash concluded that 
people who refuse to participate in CVM have a different environmental ethic to those 
who complete the survey (Spash, 2000c, 2002b; Spash & Hanley, 1995).  When an 
interaction between selection and treatment is identified, researchers should demonstrate 
caution when making generalisations.   
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 Another example of an external validity threat mentioned by Cook and Campbell 
involves an interaction between setting and treatment.  The responses to a survey 
obtained in one administration setting may be different to responses to a survey in 
another setting.  For example, it is possible that there will be significant differences 
between responses to environmental value scales that are administered over the internet 
(e.g. Dunlap, 2008; Ryan et al., 2009) and responses to environmental value scale that is 
administered via the traditional pen and paper approach (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1993; 
Snelgar, 2006; Stern et al., 1993).  Economists have also found that different CVM 
settings can result in different WTP estimates.  For example difference in CVM 
responses have been found for interview and group based designs (Macmillan, Phillips, 
Hanley & Alvarez-Farizo, 2002).  Ecological economist who administer DMV and 
MCA are well aware that different group settings (e.g. different facilitator role) will 
result in different discussions of value and ultimately different environmental values 
(see Jorgensen, 2009; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Munda, 2004; Spash, 2007a; Spash, 
2008c). 
 
3.3.4  Threats to statistical conclusion validity 
Statistical conclusion validity refers to whether appropriate statistics are used to 
assess co-variation between theoretical variable (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  The various 
threats to statistical conclusion validity include: low statistical power, violated statistical 
test assumptions, fishing and the error rate problem, the reliability of treatment 
implementation, random irrelevancies in the experimental setting, random heterogeneity 
of respondents, and the reliability of the measures.  While all of the listed statistical 
conclusion validity threats are relevant, the threat posed by poor reliability and internal 
consistency will be discussed in the upcoming chapters examining the psychological 
interpretation of conservation psychology trait-based scales.  As will be discussed in 
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Chapter 5, it is not uncommon for conservation psychology studies to report 
environmental scales that demonstrate poor internal consistency as measured by 
Cronbach‘s α or an dimensionality analysis pattern that is inconsistent with the 
theoretical interpretation (Dunlap et al., 2000; Hansla et al., 2008; Joireman et al., 2001; 
Snelgar, 2006; Spash, 2006; Stern, Dietz & Guagnano, 1995a; Stern et al., 1993; Stern 
et al., 1995b).     
 
3.4    The confirmation bias 
The confirmation bias refers to an information processing strategy wherein one 
selectively gathers, or gives undue weight to evidence that supports one‘s position while 
neglecting to gather, or discounting evidence, that would tell against it (Nickerson, 
1998; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).  Smithson (2000) warns that researchers need to 
be wary of the confirmation bias because it can entrap nearly everyone regardless of 
their ideology orientation or research motivations.  In particular, the confirmation bias 
can lead to evidence of statistical validity threats being ignored (e.g. not reporting key 
statistics such as Cronbach‘s α) or downplayed (e.g. not discussing implications of the 
statistical results that challenge the researcher‘s hypothesis).   
Researchers will be especially vulnerable to the confirmation bias when there is 
ambiguity in the subject matter and ambiguity in the empirical results, as such scenarios 
provide researchers with a greater opportunity to highlight supportive evidence and to 
turn a blind eye to disconfirming evidence (Nickerson, 1998; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 
1972).  The previous section discussed how validity threats inherent to many quasi-
experimental designs result in researchers not having access to adequate information 
that allows them to make an informed conclusion regarding the validity of a particular 
survey interpretation.  Chapter 2 highlighted the ambiguity of the environmental value 
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concept, noting different definitions offered by conservation psychologists, 
environmental & resource economists and ecological economists.  Several decision-
making psychologists have studied what they call ‗ambiguity aversion‘ (Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1985; Ellsberg, 1961), which is a tendency for people to prefer precise 
information over imprecise information, even when imprecision is more realistic. 
Researchers who experience ambiguity aversion may prefer to focus primarily on 
gathering confirming evidence for their interpretation of environmental value rather 
than outlining the uncertainties associated with their preferred interpretation.    
Environmental value is also proposed to be an ambiguous concept for the 
general public.  The concept of ―the environment‖ is effectively an umbrella for 
numerous concepts including, for instance, a species habitat, the natural world, a 
particular physical surrounding, human culture and contextual influences that impact 
upon the human condition (Vatn, 2004).  The concept of ―value‖ may, likewise, refer to 
relative worth, monetary price, general importance or absolute importance.  Significant 
differences therefore exist between how different research communities and the general 
public define environmental value.  Mebratu (1998) points out that researchers and 
policymakers have a tendency to apply an institutional interpretation to terms such as 
environmental value, while many non-technical people demonstrate an alternative 
understanding.  Reser and Bentrupperbäumer (2005) have discerned a growing 
awareness and concern that language being used in the environmental arena is suffering 
from increasing strain and slippage due to definitional ambiguities resulting in a range 
of barriers to effective communication.  They note that terms such as ―nature and 
natural‖, ―culture and cultural‖, ―value and values‖, ―sustainability and biodiversity‖ 
also have elusive meanings.   
When an environmental value survey is administered to the general public, a 
major research goal is to offer an interpretation of the survey responses that reflect the 
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participant‘s actual response motives.  It is proposed that other research goals may take 
precedent over this quest for an accurate survey interpretation.  Researchers with 
different environmental value worldview assumptions regularly compete for funding 
and prestige over how to define environmental value and when competing against other 
researchers there can be a number of benefits of employing the confirmation bias.  
Presenting research conclusions with an ―air‖ of certainty by attending only to 
confirming information undoubtedly helps researchers win jobs and grants.   The 
presentation of research conclusions in a format that suggests certainty is also often 
encouraged by the policy community who seek out straightforward evidence compatible 
with their policy frameworks (Hammond et al., 1995; Schwarz et al., 2002).  A major 
source of motivation for attending to evidence that confirms the policymakers preferred 
interpretation of an environmental survey is an awareness that the policy community 
may refuse to make use of information that is not consistent with their framework 
(Fischhoff, 1990). 
Contradictory evidence can result in an uncomfortable state of mind called 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).  Contradictory evidence suggests that the 
interpretation of the environmental value survey needs to be improved and modified, 
thereby invalidating previous research endeavours.  Mounting contradictory evidence 
about a particular interpretation of an environmental value survey may eventually lead 
to stress within a psychological or economic community whose research agenda is 
based upon a particular definition of environmental value (Popper, 1968).  Challenging 
a widely accepted interpretation of an environmental value survey with empirical 
evidence may result in a researcher being ostracised by their own research community, 
as their new interpretation may invalidate previous findings of numerous respected 
colleagues.  For example, environmental & resource economists who challenge the 
economic interpretation of CVM may be deemed a heretics by their own research 
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community who draw heavily upon CVM methodologies.  Arguably, many 
environmental researchers who administered environmental value surveys may have 
active incentives to fall victim to the confirmation bias. 
 
3.5    Conclusions and Implications as a Prelude to Section 3 
As previously noted, although both conservation psychologists and economists 
have different conceptual frameworks for environmental value, both professions often 
use survey methodologies to measure community environmental values. Section 3 will 
explore the approaches used by psychologists to measure environmental value with 
survey designs, while Section 4 will explore the CVM survey approach employed by 
economists.  Sections 3 and 4 will both review literature and summarise empirical 
evidence suggesting that psychologists and economists focus on evidence confirming 
their interpretation of the environmental value survey, while discounting evidence that 
disconfirms their interpretation.  The thesis will argue that vulnerability to the 
confirmation bias can be minimised by empirically examining two theoretical 
interpretations of the survey results simultaneously.  Such an approach can provide 
evidence: (i) of the superiority of one of the interpretations, (ii) that both interpretations 
partially explain the data or (ii) that two interpretations explain the survey response 
motives of different stakeholder groups. 
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Section 3 
A Critique of the Psychological Approach to 
Measuring Environmental Value with Survey 
Designs 
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Chapter 4 
Psychological worldviews employed to conceptualise 
environmental value 
4.1 Introduction  
An overall description of the field of conservation psychology was provided in 
Section 1.  The current chapter will provide a more in-depth analysis of conservation 
psychologists‘ conceptualisation of how people cognitively/emotionally value the 
environment.  A meta-theoretic framework of conservation psychology worldviews will 
be presented that was originally outlined by Altman and Rogoff (1987).  They proposed 
that there are four fundamentally different types of worldviews that environmental 
psychologists draw upon to conceptualise the person-environment interaction.  It is 
proposed that Altman and Rogoff‘s meta-theoretic framework can also be used to 
explore assumptions made by conservation psychologists about how people 
cognitively/emotionally value the environment.   
 
4.2  Meta-theories and psychological research worldviews  
Psychologists develop meta-theories to make sense of debates that cannot be 
resolved without an umbrella perspective of the contrasting research principles.  Meta-
theoretic frameworks enable researchers to examine the assumptions of more than one 
worldview or philosophical orientation and can often shed light on the basic drivers of 
theoretical conflicts within a field of inquiry.  By probing levels of theoretical 
―disunity‖, meta-theoretical frameworks can offer a more holistic description of 
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conceptual disagreements occurring within a research programme.  For example, 
Allport (1937) distinguished between the nomothetic framework and the idiographic 
framework to describe a conflict that had developed between psychologists whose 
primary research goal was to identify general psychological laws (the nomothetic 
approach) from psychologists who were interested in conducting in-depth investigations 
of individual participants (the idiographic approach).   
Meta-theories can also describe new or emerging theories.  For example, 
Tetlock‘s (2002) social functionalist framework for judgement and choice compares the 
assumption of the commonly employed utilitarian framework with several non-
utilitarian frameworks (e.g. political, theological and legalistic decision making 
frameworks).  Alexander, Ryan and Measham (Under Review) have applied Tetlock‘s 
framework to make sense of contrasting general public opinions about the threat of sea 
level rise.  Before reviewing the environment-person meta-theoretic framework by 
Altman and Rogoff (1987), a meta-theory called implicit theory (Dweck, 1986, 1999; 
Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995) will be briefly explored because some of the concepts 
proposed by implicit theory can be directly related to Altman and Rogoff‘s 
environment-person worldview framework.  
Implicit theory compares the assumption that human attributes are stable or fixed 
with the hypothesis that human attributes are malleable (Dweck, 1986, 1999; Heslin, 
Latham & VandeWalle, 2005).  Implicit theory was originally proposed to account for 
the ―implicit‖ attributions made by lay people assessing the attributes of others (Chiu, 
Hong & Dweck, 1997).  Implicit theory has since been employed to describe 
assumptions made by psychologists attempting to describe human functioning.  Entity 
theories are defined as being based upon the premise that psychological attributes are a 
fixed or stable ―entity‖.  For example, entity theorists describe perceptions of 
environmental value in terms of being a stable psychological disposition that influences 
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behaviour across time and situation.  Incremental theorists, on the other hand, hold that 
perceptions of environmental value are a malleable psychological attribute.  An 
incremental theorist would posit that environmental values are modified as context 
influences change.  While entity theorists are likely to infer that stable environmental 
value trait can be used to predict future and new situations, incremental theorists are 
more likely to look for mediators or situational variables when examining the 
malleability of environmental value perceptions (Chiu et al., 1997).  Dweck, Chiu and 
Hong (1995) point out that neither entity nor incremental research frameworks are 
necessarily ―correct‖ although they do provide alternative ways of constructing reality.       
 
4.3  A meta-theory of environment-person research 
worldviews  
In 1987 Altman and Rogoff argued that ―because environmental psychology is 
emerging as a fully-fledged discipline but has not yet fully explored its implicit and 
explicit philosophical underpinnings, it is crucial to engage in self-reflection and 
introspection regarding its basic values‖ (p.7).  In order to facilitate the process of self-
examination, Altman and Rogoff described four discrete research worldviews that they 
propose environmental psychologists are able to draw upon to conceptualise the person-
environment relationship.  Altman and Rogoff called their four worldviews (1) the trait 
worldview; (2) the interactional worldview; (3) the organismic worldview and (4) the 
transactional worldview.   
Altman and Rogoff stress that none of their proposed research worldviews are 
intrinsically better than any other, but simply represent different assumptions pertaining 
to the person-environment relationship.  Each worldview is proposed to have unique 
value in different circumstances.  As the field of environmental psychology investigates 
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complex, dynamic and political topics, it is of great benefit for researchers to have more 
than one conceptual lens to call upon.  At the same time, Altman and Rogoff propose 
that within the environmental psychology domain one of the worldviews is basically 
redundant (the trait-based worldview), while another represents the mainstream 
framework (the interactional worldview).  The other two frameworks (the organismic 
and transactional worldviews), despite their potential, are proposed to be under-utilised 
because they offer much greater empirical challenges to operationalising variables than 
the interactional framework. 
Altman and Rogoff (1987) worldview theory draws heavily upon the meta-
theoretical philosophical approaches outlined by Dewey and Bentley (1949) and Pepper 
(1942, 1967), while Altman and Rogoff also conceptually associating their meta-
theoretic approach with Aristotle‘s theory of causation.  The framework of both Dewey 
and Bentley, and Pepper, has also been the building block for other social science meta-
theories (e.g. Overton, 1984; Weems, 1999).  Altman and Rogoff‘s meta-theoretic 
framework has been widely applied by environmental psychologists interested in 
introducing new researchers to the domain of environmental psychology (e.g. Stokols, 
1995).  As Altman and Rogoff‘s framework was specifically designed to describe 
different environmental psychology worldviews, it is proposed that it can also be 
employed to describe the way in which the conservation psychology programme defines 
environmental value.  Several conservation psychologists who are active proponents of 
qualitative research (Altman, 1987; Bishop, 2007; Lawrence & Low, 1990; Werner et 
al., 2002) have already promoted their qualitative research goals by referring to Altman 
and Rogoff‘s transactional worldview.   
A version of Altman and Rogoff‘s (1987) meta-theoretical worldview scheme 
will be described in order to examine in greater depth conservation psychology theories 
of environmental value.  While Altman and Rogoff‘s framework was not designed to 
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specifically explain the different ways in which psychologists can conceptualise 
environmental value, it is argued that a modified version of this framework can offer 
valuable insights into how basic assumptions made by conservation psychologists can 
influence the interpretation of environmental value survey scales.   
 
4.3.1  Trait-based worldview 
Altman and Rogoff (1987) draw a parallel between the trait-based worldview 
and Aristotle‘s concept of material causation as both concepts argue that a stable latent 
variable is the primary driver behind an outcome, event or perception.  Altman and 
Rogoff describe the unit of analysis for their trait-based framework as being the 
individual actor.  Trait constructs are defined as being fixed or highly stable properties 
of individuals unless the researcher is interested in examining the individual over an 
extended period of time (e.g. developmental psychologists may assess how a trait 
changes over years or decades).  The trait-based framework is therefore an entity theory 
that construes perceptions of environmental value as being a stable construct.  The trait-
based perspective, however, downplays or ignores the influence of temporary context 
on environmental value perceptions.   
Historically trait-based assumptions have been drawn upon by theorists who 
research domains where psychological surveys or questionnaires are administered.  
Over 100 years ago Francis Galton defined intelligence as being a stable trait, while 
Mischel and colleagues (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Shoda, Mischel & Wright, 1993) 
point out that research into personality has traditionally relied heavily upon a trait-based 
worldview to explain individual differences.  Attitudinal research also has a history of 
interpreting attitude scales as being a measure of stable attitudinal constructs (Allport, 
1935; DeFleur & Westie, 1963).  Altman and Rogoff (1987) argue that trait worldviews 
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have minimal relevance for the environmental psychology programme given that 
environmental psychologists are interested in emphasising the relevance of 
environments, contexts and settings rather than focusing on stable individual properties.   
While the trait-based framework may not be relevant for environmental 
psychologists investigating the human response to built environments, the trait-based 
worldview has become a highly influential perspective for conservation psychologists 
who are interested in examining the concept of environmental value.  A number of 
conservation psychologists have become deeply interested in the possibility that stable 
environmental value traits influence other environmental perceptions and sustainability 
behaviour.  For example, Dunlap et al. (2000) note that many researchers have 
interpreted the widely administered New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale as being 
a measure of a stable environmental worldview, which taps into ―primitive beliefs about 
the nature of the earth and humanity‘s relationship with it‖ (p.427).  Stable ―value 
orientations‖ have been hypothesised to act as ―organising‖ principles that ―direct 
individuals‘ attention to certain possible outcomes of actions under consideration‖ and 
that ―simplify that person‘s choice processes‖ (Dietz & Stern, 1995, p. 269).  Other 
trait-based environmental constructs that have been recently put forward by 
conservation psychologists include the traits related to: Connectedness to Nature 
(Mayer & Frantz, 2004),  Ecocentric and Anthopocentric Environmental Attitudes 
(Thompson & Barton, 1994)  and Environmental Concern (Schultz, 2001; Schultz, 
Shriver, Tabanico & Khazian, 2004; Weigel & Weigel, 1978).  Chapter 5 will provide a 
detailed examination of the validity of psychometric scales designed to measure these 
trait-based constructs. 
Trait-based worldview assumptions underlie various sustainability policy 
recommendations.  For example, it is trait-based assumptions that justify environmental 
conservation marketing techniques such as market segmentation and product 
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positioning (Bixler, 2003).  A major aim of sustainability marketers is to design 
advertisement strategies compatible with the stable interests and dispositions of people 
with specific environmental values (Myers, 1996).  The field of social marketing began 
examining the concept of stable environmental values decades before the emergence of 
the conservation psychology programme by outlining ways to profile the socially 
responsible consumer (e.g. Antil, 1984; Kinnear, 1974; Webster Jr, 1975).   
Trait-based assumptions have also been used to argue for a sustained pro-
environmental curriculum in primary and secondary schools, where the goal is to 
encourage the development of stable environmental perception in a young and 
impressionable generation.  For example, although Mayer and Frantz (2004) suggest 
that long-term exposure to modern Western culture undermines our sense of belonging 
and connectedness with nature, they also propose that long-term exposure to an 
outdoors environment helps people develop a stronger sense of connectedness to nature.  
If traits can be developed over the long-term, then it should be possible to formulate 
educational programs that draw upon social learning and direct experience to develop 
stable pro-sustainability environmental values (Baron & Byrne, 1984).  Both Dunlap et 
al. (2000) and Stern et al. (1993) suggest that a greater contemporary awareness of 
environmental problems has already resulted in an increased level of pro-environmental 
traits within modern societies.   
 
4.3.2  Interactional worldview 
Altman and Rogoff (1987) associate the interactional worldview with Aristotle‘s 
concept of efficient cause, as both notions assume that an antecedent variable 
systematically ―causes‖ a change in a consequent variable.  This association, however, 
is not a strict rule, as Altman and Rogoff mention that the interactional approach is also 
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able to account for reciprocal relationships.  Altman and Rogoff define the unit of 
analysis for the interactional framework as being ―psychological qualities of personal 
and social or physical environment treated as separate underlying entities with 
interaction between the parts‖ (p.12).  In other words it is the interactions between 
separate parts that are assumed to combine to make up the holistic unit of analysis.  The 
interactional framework epitomises the traditional ‗normal‘ scientific mind-set, which 
construes phenomena as being interrelated, regular, and reducible into simple 
empirically verifiable laws (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990).  Goals of interactional research 
include (i) outlining and empirically verifying laws of relations between parts of the 
system, (ii) understanding the interaction system by prediction and control, and (iii) 
gathering additive information about relations between elements in a systematic, 
objective and parametric fashion.   
Philosophically the interactional worldview construes humans as being 
inherently at rest, with activity or behaviour being a response to some extraneous 
stimulation (Weems, 1999).  The interactional framework is therefore an incremental 
theory with dependent variables being assumed to be malleable based upon the 
interactions with independent variables.  The interactional framework is typically used 
by conservation psychologists to explore the two broad themes outlined by Saunders 
(2003):  (i) The way in which people cognitively and emotionally relate to the natural 
world, (ii) the drivers of environmentally-friendly behaviour.  The interactional 
framework conceptualisation of environmental value in the first of the themes is 
proposed by Saunders to be a dependent variable that changes incrementally with 
independent contextual variables.  Numerous conservation psychology studies have 
used interactional frameworks to investigate how context effects influence responses to 
psychometric scales designed to measure perceptions of environmental value (e.g. 
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Brown, Peterson, Brodersen, Ford & Bell, 2005; Castro, Garrido, Reis & Menezes, 
2009; Hartig & Staats, 2006; Hatfield & Soames, 2001).  
Psychologists also utilise interactional behavioural models to describe the 
drivers of environmentally friendly behaviour.  Behavioural models are designed to 
explain the drivers of conservation behaviour and to offer suggestions about how 
behaviour can be modified.  Several behavioural models have been proposed by 
conservation psychologists, in which trait-based independent variables are proposed to 
ultimately influence behaviour (e.g. Grob, 1995; Homburg & Stolberg, 2006; Ohtomo 
& Hirose, 2007).  The most prominent conservation psychology interactional 
framework that includes trait-based variables is the Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) model 
(Stern, 2000b; Stern et al., 1999).  The VBN model proposes that there are three 
logically distinct value orientations relevant to sustainability behaviours.  These value 
orientations are proposed to pertain to (i) self interest, (ii) altruism towards other 
humans, and (iii) altruism towards other species and the biosphere.  In the VBN model, 
value orientations are the first variable in a chain of other psychological variables (e.g. 
beliefs and norms) that are proposed to ultimately influence sustainability behaviour.  A 
diagrammatic depiction of the VBN model is presented in Figure 4.1.  Various 
interactions between variables in the VBN are proposed to ultimately explain 
environmental behaviour. 
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Figure 4.1: The VBN model (from Stern, 2000b) 
 
The VBN model has major policy implications.  It implies, for example, that 
neoclassical economic and legal policies focusing solely upon individual incentives for 
performing sustainability behaviour may appeal only to people with a strong egoistic 
value orientation (Stern et al., 1993).   Traditional policy instruments such as restrictive 
laws, fines, rebates, subsidies, tax breaks and market incentives are designed to appeal 
specifically to the self-seeking individual motives.  The VBN model proposes an 
argument consistent with the claims of some ecological economists (e.g Funtowicz & 
Ravetz, 1991; Norgaard, 1989; Sagoff, 1998; Söderbaum, 1999; Spash, 1997; Vatn, 
2004) that people are not homogenous in their environmental value outlook and can be 
motivated by social and biospheric motives.   
A corollary of the VBN is that traditional policy instruments may not appeal to 
individuals who have weak egoistic value orientations but rather strong 
altruistic/biospheric value orientations.  An individual who has strong biospheric or 
altruistic motives would be expected to perform sustainability behaviours because of the 
perceived benefits to society or to nature itself.  It is possible a heavy reliance on 
traditional economic policy instrument may ―crowd out‖ (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Frey & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) or reduce the incentives of people with strong non-egoistic value 
orientations.  In particular policy that encourages conservation by highlighting egoistic 
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benefits (e.g. carbon trading schemes) may discourage individuals with high altruistic or 
biospheric value orientations from performing sustainability behaviours that are 
institutionally framed in terms of egoistic incentives.  Individuals with strong altruistic 
and/or biospheric value orientations, however, may respond positively to non-egoistic 
policies that foster community participation/identity or enhance the perceived dignity of 
natural environments. 
 
4.3.3  The Organismic worldview 
Altman and Rogoff (1987) associate their organismic worldview with the 
Aristotelian concept of final cause, as both frameworks are assumed to emphasise the 
role of predetermined directions, goals, and end states toward which phenomena 
gravitate.  Altman and Rogoff propose that an organismic worldview perspective 
regards psychology as being ―the study of dynamic and holistic psychological systems 
in which person and environmental components exhibit complex, reciprocal 
relationships and influences‖ (p.19).  Like the interactional worldview, the organismic 
worldview is based upon a system approach, although a defining and distinguishing 
feature of organismic frameworks is that the system is driven by a higher-order purpose.  
The driving higher-order purpose ensures that cognitions and behaviour are not 
regarded as just independently operating variables as is the case in the interactional 
approach.  Instead they are assumed to be the teleological building blocks for the 
higher-order goals of a person, with both behaviour and cognitions proposed to be 
functional expressions that support the higher-order cause.   
Altman and Rogoff (1987) define the unit of analysis for the organismic 
approach to be ―holistic entities composed of separate person and environmental 
components, elements or parts whose relations and interactions yield quantities of the 
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whole that are more than the sum of the parts‖ (p.13).  As all of the variables are 
working towards a higher purpose, Altman and Rogoff use the cliché ―the whole being 
greater than the sum of the parts‖ to describe the underlying philosophy of the 
organismic framework.  Examples of the organismic worldview provided by Altman 
and Rogoff (1987) include Heider‘s (1958) social-psychological balance theory, 
Bandura‘s (1977, 1978) model of reciprocal determinism and certain aspects of Piaget‘s 
(1952) theory of development.  In the environmental psychology domain, Altman and 
Rogoff (1987) note several systems theory studies that have been applied to physical 
settings (e.g. Moos & Lemke, 1984) and models of crowding (e.g. Sundstrom, 1978).  
In the ecological domain they only mention a transportation study by Stokols and 
Novaco (1981) where travel stressors (i.e. congestion, distance, travel time) are related 
to cognitions, physiological arousal and behavioural functioning in what they regard to 
be a holistic systems theory that has multiple-directional causal connections and a 
feedback loop.   
The current thesis proposes a modification to Altman and Rogoff‘s (1997) 
organismic approach for the specific purpose of examining the validity of 
environmental value scales.  This modification involves redefining the unit of analysis 
to be group membership, where group membership is assumed to be defined by a 
common goal or guiding philosophy.  Different groups of people can vary in terms of 
how well their belief systems are organised into coherent frameworks (Bechtel, 
Verdugo & Pinheiro, 1999; Gooch, 1995).  Goal orientated group membership is a level 
of analysis that is of particular relevance to sustainability policy as perceptions of 
environmental value can be influenced by politics or ethics, especially when a policy is 
being heatedly debated by competing interest groups.  It is proposed that political 
debates are fuelled by fundamentally different higher order goals (e.g. the goal of 
development or environmental protection), with philosophically opposed interest groups 
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(e.g. business lobby organisations and green groups) battling over how environmental 
policy should be defined.   
The modified version of the organismic approach proposes that respondents 
driven by a common purpose are likely to respond to environmental scales with similar 
motives, while survey response motives of competing interest groups may be 
fundamentally different.  This version of the organismic approach assumes that the 
responses of each higher-order group can only be interpreted in the context of the 
ideology of that group and it is not appropriate to use a single interpretation to describe 
the response motives of heterogeneous stakeholders.  When there are several different 
goal orientated groups competing with one another over how a conservation issue 
should be defined, a single framework of environmental value may even be 
discriminatory (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; Spash, 2008b).   
Organismic frameworks have been drawn upon by conservation psychologists to 
conceptually differentiate between groups with intrinsic and extrinsic higher-order 
sustainability goals (Seligman, 1989; Stokols, 1990).  The organismic framework is also 
compatible with ecological economics frameworks that propose that people can assess 
environmental value with different ethical frameworks, such as a utilitarian framework 
or a deontological framework (e.g. O'Neill, 1992; Spash, 2000a).  Chapter 10 will 
examine how an organismic framework can be used by economics to examine the value 
pluralism hypothesis that people can respond to CVM surveys with fundamentally 
different response motives. 
 
4.4.4  Transactional approach 
The final framework described by Altman and Rogoff (1987) is the transactional 
worldview which is associated with the Aristotelean concept of formal cause, as both 
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approaches focus on the pattern, shape or organization of a phenomenon in a given set 
of circumstances.  The transactional framework examines patterns and/or configurations 
of phenomena in a given context without having to draw upon universal explanatory 
principles, higher-order principles or an underlying essence.  The transactional approach 
argues that there is inseparability in the contextual, temporal, physical and 
psychological factors related to an environmental issue.  Altman and Rogoff suggest 
that, unlike the trait-based approach, the transactional approach does not emphasise 
universal principles as governing cognitions and behaviour, nor does it allow for the 
teleological principle of the organismic approach.   
Altman and Rogoff (1987) suggest that rather than conceptualising independent 
components as combining additively to make up a whole, as is done in the interactional 
approach, the transactional approach defines aspects of phenomena in terms of their 
mutual functioning.  The root metaphor of the transactional approach is described as 
being an historical event, which is intrinsically embedded in its surrounding context and 
which unfolds in time. The transactional worldview is therefore focused on learning 
more about a confluence of inseparable factors that are dependent on one another and 
which are the basis for meaningful conclusions.   
The transactional approach, which cannot be described as being an entity or 
incremental theory, operates at a descriptively deep level.  Altman and Rogoff (1987) 
note that transactional approaches, given their holistic emphasis, are prone to be 
portrayed as relying solely on ―descriptive‖ methods, naturalistic observations and other 
non-experimental procedures.  Unlike the other three environment-person worldviews 
that assume that phenomena can be studied by objective and detached observers, 
transactional approaches assume that phenomena are partly defined by the qualities of 
the observer which thereby make the observer part of the event being examined.  
Qualitative interviewing methods are well suited to probing meaning, and an analysis of 
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the verbal transcript can also relate actions to context in an inseparable way (Werner et 
al., 2002).  Pluralism-as-a-methodology environmental valuation methods such as 
Multi-Criteria Analysis based upon weak comparability (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998) 
and Deliberative Monetary Valuation (Spash, 2007a, 2008c) are also consistent with the 
transactional worldview approach.   
Altman and Rogoff (1987) note that while many psychologists advocate the 
benefits of using a transactional framework, this worldview is generally applied to make 
sense of a theoretical question rather than empirical data.  A review of the history of the 
Journal of Environmental Psychology reveals that only a handful of studies (e.g. 
Werner, 2003; Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2005) could be classified as being based 
upon a transactional framework.  Transactional research construes the rigid 
standardisation of measures across settings as being inappropriate, as the transactional 
worldview suggests that closed-ended methodologies cannot satisfactorily describe the 
social, physical and temporal qualities of particular settings.  As the transactional 
frameworks are not based on predefined theoretical constructs this approach will rarely, 
if ever, be employed to interpret quantitative responses to closed-ended environmental 
scales.    
 
4.4  Summary of Altman and Rogoff’s worldviews 
Table 4.1 summarises Altman and Rogoff‘s (1987) four worldviews.  The 
summary of the organismic worldview is based on the proposed revision that focus 
upon higher-goal orientated groups rather than describing the broader organismic 
worldview originally proposed by Altman and Rogoff.  Table 4.1 differentiates the 
worldviews according to Aristotelian concept, unit of analysis and the basic 
interpretation of environmental value.  The different worldviews also put forward 
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different assumptions about environmental value.  The next two chapters will explore 
conservation psychology trait-based assumptions of environmental value in more depth.  
It is the contention of the thesis that the assumption of stability proposed by the trait-
based worldview can act as a barrier preventing researchers from being open to 
alternative explanations of psychometric scale responses. Chapter 5 will put forward 
evidence that the validity of the mainstream interpretation of five prominent trait-based 
scales designed to measure environmental value is questionable, and that the validity of 
these scales may be improved by examining competing interpretations.  Chapter 6 will 
then examine the descriptive validity of the widely administered and policy relevant 
Awareness of Consequence scale (Stern et al., 1993).   
 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of the modified version of Altman and Rogoff‘s (1987) worldviews    
 Research Worldview 
 Trait Interactional Organismic Transactional 
Aristotelian 
Concept 
 
Material 
causation 
Efficient causation Final 
causation 
Formal causation 
Unit of analysis 
 
The individual 
actor 
The interaction 
between 
psychological, social 
and contextual 
variables 
 
Goal/Ethic 
orientated 
groups 
The historical 
event 
Basic 
Interpretation 
of 
Environmental 
Value 
 
A latent stable 
trait construct  
As a dependent 
variable 
The result of an 
interaction between 
psychological, social 
and contextual 
variables 
 
As an independent 
variable 
A causal influence 
on sustainability 
behaviour 
 
Environmental 
value depends 
upon the 
stable higher-
order goals of 
a group  
Environmental 
value is 
influenced by rich 
contextual factors 
and unfolds over 
time 
 
 
 
 
  
  
104 
 
Chapter 5 
Prominent Trait-Based Environmental Value Scales with 
Debated Interpretations 
5.1 Introduction  
If people possess traits that influence perceptions of environmental value then it 
should be possible to develop survey methodologies that can accurately measure stable 
differences in how individuals cognitively and/or emotionally value the environment.  
This chapter will critique prominent environmental value scales that have been 
developed according to trait-based assumption.  While two of these environmental value 
scales are now redundant, competing interpretations exist for five scales that are widely 
administered by current day researchers.  For each of these five prominent 
environmental value scales, statistical evidence has been reported that casts doubt upon 
the validity of the mainstream interpretation.  Only a small number of the conservation 
psychologists who administer these prominent environmental value scales, however, 
have been willing to consider alternative theoretical interpretations.  This chapter holds 
that when conservation psychologists administer environmental value scales based upon 
the premise that stable environmental value traits exist within people, unless they are 
open to examining alternative psychometric interpretations, they are highly susceptible 
to the confirmation bias. 
 
  
105 
 
5.2 Examining the validity of “off the shelf” trait-based 
environmental value scales  
A large number of conservation psychology publications analyse original 
environmental value scales that have been unsystematically developed (Hawcroft & 
Milfont, 2010; Heberlein, 1981).  Dunlap and Jones (2002) estimate that at least several 
hundred survey measures of environmental attitudes were developed between the 1960s 
and 2000.  The caveats of developing new environmental value survey items have 
opened up opportunities for members of the conservation psychology community to 
develop psychometric instruments that can be used as ―off the shelf‖ surveys.  ―Off the 
shelf‖ surveys are most likely to be designed to according to trait-based assumptions, 
especially if there is an expectation that the ―off the shelf‖ survey will be administered 
under a wide range of conditions.  A major benefit of trait-based assumptions for ―off 
the shelf‖ survey instruments is that researchers can draw upon a stable interpretation of 
the environmental value survey response across diverse administration settings.  Once a 
trait-based environmental scale has been empirically developed and the psychometric 
properties of the scale have been found to support a particular theoretical definition of 
environmental value, other researchers can administer the environmental value scale 
with a greater sense of confidence.  
Conservation psychologists who are interested in developing ―off the shelf‖ 
trait-based scales assume that it is possible for a set of statements to evoke a particular 
trait-based response in people.  As the concept of environmental value is ambiguous, 
however, it can be difficult for researchers to identify a set of statements that clearly 
induce a trait-based reaction that is consistent with the researcher‘s theoretical 
assumptions.  It is well known that the wording and framing of items influences how 
people interpret the meaning of questionnaire statements (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 
Wang, Simons & Bredart, 2001).  Linguistic and cognitive scientists (Croft & Cruse, 
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2004; Lakoff, 1987; Pinker, 1998, 2007) have noted that some variations of a statement 
or sentence will result in a listener or reader extracting precisely the same meaning, 
while others, with seemingly subtle sentence variations, can result in the recipient 
forming radically different interpretations.  Similarly, item sequence, the response scale 
and the overall questionnaire format can influence responses (Schwarz, 1999, 2007a, 
2007b; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Schwarz & Strack, 1991).  There is, therefore, always 
the possibility that survey participants will interpret environmental value statements in a 
way that is inconsistent with the researcher‘s interpretation.   
There are different ways in which conservation psychologists can appraise the 
validity of a particular environmental value scale interpretation.  The simplest validity 
appraisal approach involves a content validity assessment where the match between the 
content of the scale items and the theoretical interpretation is examined.  Conservation 
psychologists designing environmental scale often rely heavily upon criterion validity 
assessments, with the scale being concluded to possess criterion validity if evidence of 
high correlations with other theoretically aligned environmental value scales is found, 
or the scale is found to be able to differentiate between environmentalist and non-
environmentalist populations (e.g. Arcury & Christianson, 1990; Arcury, Johnson & 
Scollay, 1986; Dunlap et al., 2000; Edgell & Nowell, 1989; Maloney & Ward, 1973; 
Schultz, 2000, 2001; Thompson & Barton, 1994).   
Trait-based environmental value scales promoted as being validated ―off the 
shelf‖ instruments should also be able to demonstrate a match between a theoretically 
proposed factor structure and actual response patterns.  Conservation psychologists are 
able to employ statistical techniques such as Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to 
examine the match between theoretical dimensionality and the dimensionality of actual 
responses.   EFA and PCA can also be used to look for new or unexpected response 
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patterns.  Care must be demonstrated, however, when interpreting EFA or PCA results 
because several decisions (e.g. whether to rotate factor loadings, choice of rotation 
procedure) can profoundly influence the results (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum & 
Strahan, 1999).  CFA are able to examine the match between the proposed theoretical 
factor structure and the actual response patterns by examining goodness of fit statistics.  
CFA also allow for the goodness of fit statistics of different factor structure 
interpretations to be empirically compared.  Conservation psychologists should question 
the validity of environmental value scale interpretations that propose a factor structure 
that is inconsistent with EFA or CFA results. 
The following section will review the match between mainstream interpretations 
of prominent trait-based environmental value scales and the results of EFA, PCA and 
CFA reported in the empirical literature.  It will be argued that for the five prominent 
environmental value scales, the empirical literature has reported dimensionality 
statistics that challenge the mainstream interpretation.  Nevertheless Kuhn (1962) points 
out that many researchers are often satisfied with simply applying the mainstream 
interpretation as prescribed by their dominant scientific paradigm.   Researchers who 
draw heavily upon a dominant paradigm to interpret environmental value scales may be 
highly susceptible to ignoring evidence that questions their mainstream interpretation, 
and may also be closed to the possibility of a more appropriate survey interpretation.   
 
5.3 Prominent trait-based environmental value scales 
Table 5.1 list eight scales that have been widely administered as ―off the shelf‖ 
measures of environmental value.  For each of these scales, Table 5.1 presents the 
number of Google Scholar citations for the articles that first published the scales.  The 
large number of citations listed for each article highlights that each of these 
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environmental value scales has been very influential.  Three of the scales (Ecology 
scale, EC-1 scale and original NEP) were widely administered up until the end of the 
20
th
 century, but have been rarely administered in the new millennium.  Five of the 
scales (revised-NEP, AC scale, Ecocentric/Anthropocentric Attitudes scales, EC-2 scale 
and CN scale) are currently being widely administered.  In the next section, the 
mainstream interpretation of each of the modern day environmental value scales will 
undergo a literature review that examines the results of dimensionality analyses reported 
in empirical studies.   
 
Table 5.1: Number of Google Scholar citations for eight prominent trait-based 
environmental value scales 
Environmental Value Scale Number of 
Citations* 
Ecology Scale (Maloney & Ward, 1973) 
 
323 
Environmental Concern (EC-1) scale (Weigel & Weigel, 
1978) 
 
208 
Original New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale (Dunlap 
& Van Liere, 1978) 
 
 
452 
Revised New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale 
(Dunlap, et al., 2000) 
 
 
786 
Awareness of Consequence (AC) scale (Stern, et al., 1993) 
 
569 
 
Ecocentric and Anthropocentric Attitudes scales (Thompson 
& Barton, 1994) 
 
257 
Environmental Concern (EC-2) scale (Schultz, 2000) 
 
166 
 
Connectedness to Nature (CN) scale (Mayer & Frantz, 
2004) 
 
116 
 
* Based upon Google Scholar citations on 1/4/11 
 
5.3.1  Influential but redundant trait-based environmental value scales   
 The Ecology scale developed by Maloney and Ward (1973) was the first widely 
recognised psychometric instrument developed to specifically measure perceptions of 
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environmental value.  In the early 1970s the policy and scientific communities were 
promoting technology as being the key to solving environmental pollution issues.  
Maloney and Ward, referring to the limits to growth forecasts of the Club of Rome 
(Meadows et al., 1972), concluded that technological solutions will not avoid long-term 
pollution damage.  Maloney and Ward argued that it is unwise for the policy community 
to ignore behavioural solutions.  The primary motivation for designing the Ecology 
scale was to develop an instrument capable of measuring community views regarding 
environmental pollution issues.  The original Ecology scale consisted of 130 items 
designed to measure four factors: (i) verbal commitment to pro-environmental 
behaviour, (ii) actual commitment to pro-environmental behaviour, (iii) affect or 
emotional attachment to ecological issues and (iv) ecological knowledge.  A follow up 
study (Maloney, Ward & Braucht, 1975) shortened the ecology scale to 40 items.  
While the shortened ecology scale reported high reliability coefficients (Affect subscale 
Cronbach‘s α = .85-.90; Verbal commitment subscale Cronbach‘s α = .81-.89; Actual 
commitment subscale Cronbach‘s α = .89-92), no dimensionality analysis has been 
conducted on the Ecology scale items.  Consequently, there is no empirical evidence to 
support the claim that the ecology scale measures the four factors put forward by 
Maloney and Ward. 
 Weigel and Weigel (1978) constructed the Environmental Concern (EC-1) scale 
items with the goal of developing a one factor ―attitude measure capable of assessing an 
individual‘s relatively enduring beliefs and feelings about ecology such that 
predispositions to engage in pro- or anti-environmental actions could be anticipated‖ 
(p.4).  The EC-1 scale, like the Ecology scale (Maloney & Ward, 1973; Maloney et al., 
1975), focused primarily on pollution issues.  Weigel and Weigel reported strong 
reliability coefficients (Cronbach‘s α = .80-.88) and a high test-retest correlation (.83) 
  
110 
 
for the EC-1 scale.  Once again, no dimensionality analysis was reported for the EC-1 
scale, although the high Cronbach‘s α is suggestive of a one-factor solution. 
 While the publication of the ecology scale (Maloney & Ward, 1973; Maloney et 
al., 1975) and the EC-1 scale (Weigel & Weigel, 1978) was a groundbreaking 
development for the conservation psychology programme, in recent times these scales 
have fallen out of favour.  Dunlap and Jones (2002) argues that both these scales 
became outdated as new sustainability issues emerged (e.g. greenhouse gas-induced 
climate change, ozone concerns, water shortages, recycling).  Dunlap et al. (2000) also 
propose that the ecology scale and the EC-1 scale are rarely administered in recent years 
because these scales are not interpreted with a highly developed theory of environment 
perceptions.  In the 1970s conservation psychologists were only just beginning to 
develop theories of environmental value and the goal of constructing the ecology scale 
and EC-1 scale was to develop a survey instrument that could predict environmental 
behaviour.  The impetus for designing these scales was not to measure a sophisticated 
definition of environmental value, but to assess general environmental perceptions.  
Furthermore, these scales were designed over 30 years ago when it was less common 
for dimensionality analyses, such as EFA or CFA, to be reported in applied psychology 
journals.  As the ecology scale and the EC-1 scale are no longer widely administered, 
the validity of the interpretation of these scales is no longer a policy relevant question 
and will therefore not be examined further.   
 
5.3.2  Environmental value scales that are currently widely administered   
NEP scale 
 The original NEP scale (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978) is a third influential 
environmental value scale that was developed in the 1970s.  What differentiates the 
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NEP scale from the ecology scale and the EC-1 scale, however, is that a revised version 
of the NEP (Dunlap et al., 2000) is still being widely administered.  Dunlap et al. (2000) 
described the NEP scale as measuring stable trait perceptions, positing that ―the NEP 
items primarily tap primitive beliefs about the nature of the earth and humanity‘s 
relationship with it‖ (p.427).  Dunlap et al., however, do not clarify the type of 
psychological trait that the NEP is measuring, preferring to simply note that ―the NEP 
scale is treated as a measure of endorsement of a fundamental paradigm or worldview, 
as well as of environmental attitudes, beliefs, and even values‖ (p.427).  Dunlap et al. 
mention that social psychologists typically interpret the NEP to be a measure of 
attitudes, while political scientists usually interpret the NEP as a measure of an 
individual‘s comprehensive environmental belief system. 
 The ambiguity of the interpretation of the NEP scale is not just confined to the 
issues of whether the scale measures attitudes, beliefs, values or worldviews.  The 
interpretation of an environmental value scale as widely administered as the NEP 
should be based upon a theoretically meaningful factor structure that is supported by 
empirical evidence.  In 1978 Dunlap and Van Liere suggested that the original NEP was 
designed to measure a three factor solution, as they posited the NEP to measure (i) 
humanity‘s ability to upset the balance of nature, (ii) existence of limits to growth, (iii) 
humanities right to rule over nature.  Empirical examination of the dimensionality of the 
original NEP has not supported this three factor solution.  For example, studies that 
have factor analysed the original NEP have concluded that there is one (e.g. Edgell & 
Nowell, 1989), two (e.g. Scott & Willits, 1994), three (e.g. Shetzer, Stackman & Moore, 
1991) or four factors (Furman, 1998).  It is common practice for researchers who 
administer the original NEP to add up all the items into a single scale, which implies a 
one factor solution.  The NEP literature referred to above, however, does not provide 
strong support for a one factor solution. 
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 In order to improve and modernise the original NEP, Dunlap et al. (2000) 
developed a revised version of the NEP that they propose to be less sexist and to be 
more aligned with modern environmental issues.  Dunlap et al. propose that the revised 
NEP is made up of five factors, namely: (i) the reality of limits to growth, (ii) anti-
anthropocentrism, (iii) fragility of nature‘s balance, (iv) rejection of exemptionalism and 
(v) the possibility of an ecocrisis.  The results of a PCA reported by Dunlap et al., 
however, do not support this hypothesised five factor structure.  Dunlap et al. once 
again recommend that the NEP should be treated as a one factor scale.  An inspection of 
the PCA reported by Dunlap et al., however, reveals that 6 out of the 15 items reported 
loadings less than .3 on the first PCA component.  It is evident that the statistical 
analysis conducted by Dunlap et al. simply does not support their one factor model.  
Indeed, Dunlap and colleagues continue to simultaneously discuss the five facets that 
make up the revised NEP scale, while advising that in practice the NEP should be 
interpreted based upon a one factor model (e.g. Dunlap, 2008; Dunlap & Jones, 2002), 
even though very little empirical evidence exists to support either of these factor 
structure interpretations. 
The interpretation of the NEP scale is further confused by Dunlap et al. (2000) 
suggesting that ―the decision to break the NEP items into two or more dimensions 
should depend upon the results of the individual study.  If two or more distinct 
dimensions that have face validity emerge and are not highly correlated with one 
another, then it is sensible to employ them as separate variables‖ (p.431).  Such a 
recommendation appears to counter the claim by Dunlap et al. that the NEP items 
constitute a ―fundamental component of people‘s belief system‖ (p.428).  Dunlap et al. 
attempt to reconcile this uncomfortable and contradictory situation by arguing that ―it is 
not unreasonable to expect that discernible dimensions will emerge in some samples, as 
populations vary in terms of how well their belief systems are organized into coherent 
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frameworks‖ (p. 431).  If the factor structure for the NEP is expected to be different 
across samples, then the NEP is not a very good ―off the shelf‖ survey measure of trait-
based environmental values.  It is also disconcerting that few studies that administer the 
NEP are willing to assess the factor structure for their particular sample.  Hawcroft and 
Milfont (2010) reviewed 139 empirical studies that administered the NEP and found 
that only 78 studies even reported a reliability coefficient such as a Cronbach‘s α.  In 
practice, most researchers simply accept, at face value, that the NEP represents a one-
factor measure of environmental value. 
 
The Ecocentric and Anthropocentric scales 
 An organismic theory rather than a trait-based theory motivated Thompson and 
Barton (1994) to develop the ecocentric scale and the anthropocentric scale.  Thompson 
and Barton propose that the different higher-order goals of ecocentric individuals and 
anthropocentric individuals result in fundamentally different environmental values.  
Thompson and Barton comment that ―ecocentrics will probably agree with 
anthropocentrics that ecological issues should be addressed so that health and quality of 
life can be preserved – the difference is that ecocentrics feel that even if these were not 
issues, nature is worth preserving because of the transcendental dimensions‖ (p.150).  
Ecocentric individuals are defined as valuing nature for its own sake and intrinsic value 
is proposed to be the motivation underlying judgements that nature deserves protection.  
Anthropocentric individuals are defined as being willing to support environment policy 
when the policy will result in the quality of human life being maintained or enhanced.   
 While Thompson and Barton (1994) theorise about ecocentric and 
anthropocentric perceptions with an organismic framework, they operationalise these 
constructs with a trait-based framework.  Rather than developing a survey instrument 
that differentiates between ecocentric individuals and anthropocentric individuals, 
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Thompson and Barton developed a multi-item scale that is designed to measure the 
degree of ecocentrism and anthropocentrism for each individual.  The original study by 
Thompson and Barton assessed two small samples (115 participants in sample 1 and 71 
participants in sample 2) and reported poor to average reliability coefficients for the 
ecocentric scale (Cronbach‘s α = .63-.78), and poor reliability coefficients for the 
anthropocentric scale (Cronbach‘s α = .58-.67).  Other empirical studies have 
administered the scales to larger samples and have also reported poor to average 
reliability coefficients.  For example, Bjerke and Kaltenborn  (1999) administered 1783 
participants (ecocentric Cronbach‘s α = .65; anthropocentric scale Cronbach‘s α =.73), 
while Nordlund and Garvill (2002) administered the scales to 1400 participants 
(ecocentric Cronbach‘s α = .65; anthropocentric scale Cronbach‘s α =.52).   
 A dimensionality analysis should be able to differentiate the ecocentric scale 
items from the anthropocentric scale items.  Despite concluding that they had developed 
a valid measure of ecocentrism and anthropocentrism, Thompson and Barton (1994) 
choose not to report any dimensionality analysis such as an EFA, a PCA or a CFA.  A 
EFA conducted by Spash (1998) failed to find the two factor interpretation proposed by 
Thompson and Barton, or any meaningful alternative explanation.  Cuervo-Arango et al. 
(2007) put forward a hypothesis that a three factor solution provides a more accurate 
description of response patterns to the ecocentric scale and anthropocentric scale items 
than the mainstream two factor solution.  Cuervo-Arango et al. propose that Thompson 
and Barton‘s items can be differentiated according to whether they refer to egoistic, 
altruistic and biospheric statements.  A CFA conducted by Cuervo-Arango et al. was 
more supportive of the alternative three factor solution than the mainstream two factor 
solution. 
Milfont and Duckitt (2004) undertook an exploratory study that aimed to 
improve the conceptualisation of the environmental concern construct.  This study 
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conducted an EFA on a large set of items that included NEP scale items (Dunlap et al., 
2000) and ecocentric/anthropocentric scale items (Thompson & Barton, 1994), as well 
as items from two lesser profile scales: The Ecological World View scale (Blaikie, 
1992) and the ENV scale (Bogner & Wiseman, 1999).  The EFA found a ten factor 
solution, with five of the factors being made up of a mixture of items from the various 
scales.  The results of the EFA raised the possibility that the ―mixed factors‖ may be a 
superior measure of environmental perceptions than the original scales from which they 
were derived.  Milfont and Duckitt (2004) then proposed that these ten factors can be 
grouped into two higher order-dimensions: Preservation or Utilisation.  The higher-
order preservation/utilisation interpretation of the four scales was supported by the 
results of a follow up study that conducted a CFA (see Milfont & Duckitt, 2010).  In 
both studies conducted by Milfont and Duckitt, some of the NEP scale items were found 
to group into the preservation higher-order factor, while other NEP items were grouped 
into the utilisation higher-order factor.  This suggests that the NEP scale is made up of 
items that measure two different aspects of environmental value.  It also offers further 
evidence that the mainstream approach of combining all the NEP items into a single 
scale is not appropriate.  While the anthropocentric items were found to have high 
loadings in the utilisation higher-order factor, some ecocentric items loaded onto the 
utilisation higher-order factor while other ecocentric items loaded onto the preservation 
higher-order factor. 
 
Awareness of Consequence (AC) scale 
 The AC scale (Stern et al., 1993) will be empirically examined in depth in 
Chapter 6.  Hence only a brief empirical critique of the AC scale will be presented here.  
The AC scale is made up of a set of items that refer to adverse consequences.  It was 
originally proposed by Stern et al. that egoistic, altruistic and biospheric value 
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orientations causally influence how participants respond to the AC scale items.  As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, this three factor solution has reported poor to average 
reliability coefficients and has not been supported by empirically reported EFA or PCA 
results.  Stern and colleagues (e.g. Stern et al., 1995a; Stern et al., 1995b) then raise the 
possibility of the scale measuring a one factor solution, which they label the General 
Awareness of Consequences (GAC) interpretation.  An unrotated EFA conducted by 
Stern et al (1995a) was found to support the GAC interpretation.  Other dimensionality 
analyses, however, have not supported the GAC or value orientation interpretations 
(Snelgar, 2006; Spash, 2006) 
 The next chapter will discuss in greater detail the psychometric issues related to 
the three factor value orientation interpretation of the AC scale and the one factor GAC 
interpretation.  EFA and CFA will be used to assess the response patterns of two AC 
scales samples.  Chapter 6 will examine the valuation orientation interpretation and the 
GAC interpretation of the AC scale, while also being open to the possibility of another 
interpretation explaining AC scale response patterns.   
 
Environmental Concern (EC-2) scale (Schultz, 2000) 
 Schultz (2000, 2001) propose that the type of concerns that a person develops 
about environmental issues is related to the extent to which the individual believes they 
are part of nature.  Egoistic, altruistic and biospheric value orientations are proposed to 
influence what people become concerned about when faced with problematic 
environmental consequences.  The EC-2 scale employs the statement: I am concerned 
about environmental problems because of consequences for ‘______’.  Respondents are 
then asked to rate nouns such as: me, my health, people in the community, future 
generations, plants, trees, whales.  Schultz (2000) proposes that the EC-2 scale 
measures a three factor solution based upon value orientation interpretation.  Out of all 
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the mainstream interpretations of environmental concern scales discussed in this 
chapter, the EC-2 scale is the psychometrically best performing environmental value 
scale.  Studies that have administered the EC-2 scale have reported EFA and CFA 
solutions and reliability coefficients that provide reasonable support for the proposed 
three factor solution (Hansla et al., 2008; Milfont, Duckitt & Cameron, 2006; Schultz, 
2000, 2001; Schultz et al., 2004; Snelgar, 2006).  The results of an EFA and a CFA 
conducted by Snelgar (2006), however,  found that a four factor model may offer a 
superior interpretation to the three factor model.  This four factor model divides the 
biospheric scale into a biospheric-animals scale and a biospheric-plant scale. 
 
Connectedness to Nature (CN) scale 
 Mayer and Frantz (2004) put forward a trait-based hypothesis that individuals 
with a strong connection to nature are more likely to perform sustainable behaviours.  
They refer to the connectedness to nature construct which they theoretically associated 
with the biophilia hypothesis (Kellert & Wilson, 1995).  The biophilia hypothesis 
argues that humans over the course of evolution have developed a biological trait to 
affiliate with and feel connected to the broader natural world, although modern society 
lifestyles can mitigate the influence of this trait.  Mayer and Frantz suggest that the trait 
of connectedness to nature emerged during a time when 350,000 generations of humans 
lived close to the land as hunter-gatherers.  Mayer and Frantz designed the CN scale 
with the goal of measuring affective or emotional experience of nature and they contrast 
their CN scale to the NEP scale (Dunlap et al., 2000) that is described as being a 
cognitive measure of environmental value.  A one factor solution and acceptable 
reliability coefficients (Cronbach‘s α between .79-.84) was reported in all five of the 
empirical studies reported by Mayer and Frantz.  Mayer and Frantz claim that these 
results support their ―affective‖ interpretation of the scale. 
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 A study by Perrin and Benassi (2009) puts forward the argument that the CN 
scale is a cognitive measure rather than an affective measure.  Perrin and Benassi argue 
that some of the CN scale items clearly measure cognitions, not emotions (e.g. ―I think 
of the natural world as a community to which I belong‖; ―My personal welfare is 
independent of the welfare of the natural world‖).  They note that eight out of the 
fourteen CN items include the word ―feel‖, which possibly could evoke an emotional 
response.  They propose that if some of the CN scale items measure emotions, a two 
factor solutions should be found that differentiates between the items containing the 
word ―feel‖ and the other items that they claim to be clearly cognitive measures.  A 
CFA conducted by Perrin and Benassi supported the one factor model.  Perrin and 
Benassi (2009) conclude that the CN scale is a cognitive measure and comment that ―if 
the CN scale is not a valid measure of emotional connection, future research utilising 
the CN scale may lead to erroneous conclusions and suggest unwarranted implications‖ 
(p.435).  The debate about the interpretation of the CN scale highlights the subjective 
nature of validity assessment, with Mayer and Frantz (2004) claiming that a one factor 
solution supports their emotive interpretation, and Perrin and Benassi (2009) claiming 
that a one factor solution supports their cognitive interpretation. 
 
5.4 Ambiguous interpretations of trait-based environmental 
value scales 
Researchers who believe that a trait actually exists and has inductive potential 
may find it difficult to be open to the possibility that items making reference to trait-
based content do not evoke the theoretically proposed trait-based response.  A review of 
the results of dimensionality statistics reported in the literature, however, reveals that 
there are competing interpretations of the NEP scale, the ecocentric/anthropocentric 
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scales, the AC scale, the EC-2 scale and the CN scale.  These five scales are arguably 
the most widely administered ―off the shelf‖ trait-based environmental value scales used 
by current day researchers.  Many social scientists who only discuss the mainstream 
interpretation of these scales may not be aware of, or may simply choose not to 
acknowledge, that empirical evidence exists that supports an alternative interpretation.   
Table 5.2 provides a summary of whether dimensionality statistical evidence 
supported the mainstream of each of the five widely administered environmental value 
scales, while also presenting alternative interpretations that have been put forward.  The 
conservation psychology programme should make it a high priority to empirically 
compare the validity of the different interpretations for each of these ―off the shelf‖ 
environmental value scales.  It is proposed that if the conservation psychology 
community are willing to examine the different interpretations and promote the 
interpretation that is backed by the strongest empirical evidence, this may lead to more 
valid ―off the shelf‖ survey instruments.  Furthermore, an empirical examination of the 
different interpretations may have the benefit of providing valuable insights about the 
nature of stable environmental value perceptions.   
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Table 5.2:  Different interpretations of the five environmental value scales 
Scale Interpretations Degree of Evidence 
Revised NEP 
scale (Dunlap, 
et al., 2000) 
 
1. NEP scale is a measure of the following five 
distinct subscales: (i) limits to growth, (ii) anti-
anthropocentrism, (iii) fragility of nature, (iv) 
rejection of exemptionalism and (v) possibility 
of an ecocrisis 
2. NEP scale measures a one factor solution 
 
3. NEP measures a two factor solution.  Some 
NEP items assess preservation of nature, while 
other NEP items assess utilisation of nature  
 
 
 
 Not supported by 
dimensionality analysis 
 
 
 
 Not supported by 
dimensionality analysis  
 Supported by an 
exploratory 
dimensionality analysis 
by Milfont and Duckitt 
(2004) 
 
AC scale 
(Stern, et al., 
1993) 
 
1. AC scale measures a three factor solution: 
measures egoistic, altruistic and biospheric 
value orientations 
2. AC scale measures a one factor solution called 
the General Awareness of Consequences   
 
 Not supported by 
dimensionality analysis 
 
 Some supported by 
unrotated dimensionality 
analysis (Stern, et al., 
1995a; Stern, et al., 
1995b)  
 
 
Ecocentric and 
Anthropocentr
ic Attitudes 
scales 
(Thompson & 
Barton, 1994) 
 
1. Two factor interpretation:  Scales measure 
ecocentrism and anthropocentrism 
2. Three factor interpretation:  Scales measure of 
egoistic, altruistic and biospheric perceptions 
 
3. Three factor interpretation:  All the 
Anthropocentric items assess utilisation  
Some ecocentric items assess utilisation, while 
some ecocentric items assess preservation 
 
  Not supported by 
dimensionality analysis 
 Supported by a CFA 
conducted by Cuervo-
Arango (2007) 
 Supported by a 
dimensionality analysis 
conducted by Milfont 
and Duckitt (2004) 
 
 
 
Environmental 
Concern (EC-
2) scale 
(Schultz, 
2000) 
 
1. EC-2 scale measures a three factor solution: 
measures egoistic, altruistic and biospheric 
value orientations 
 
 
2. EC-2 scale measures a four factor solution: 
measures egoistic, altruistic, biospheric-
animals and biospheric-plants value 
orientation 
 
 Supported by 
dimensionality analysis 
(e.g. Schultz, 2000, 
2001; Schultz, et al., 
2004)  
 Superior dimensionality 
analysis to three factor 
solution reported by 
Snelgar (2006) 
 
 
Connectedness 
to Nature scale 
(Mayer & 
Frantz, 2004) 
 
1. One factor solution suggests CN scale is a 
measure of emotive connection to nature 
 
2. One factor solution suggests  CN scale is a 
cognitive measure   
 
 One factor solution 
supported (Mayer & 
Frantz, 2004) 
 One factor solution 
supported  (Perrin & 
Benassi, 2009)  
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5.5 Prelude to empirical chapter 
Chapter 6 will examine two different samples of responses to the Awareness of 
Consequences (AC) scale.   This chapter will begin by recapping previous examinations 
of the AC scale.  An EFA will then be employed on one of the samples in order to 
assess whether another interpretation provides a more valid account of the AC scale 
response patterns.  The conclusions of the EFA will then be further examined by a CFA.  
There are three reasons why it is important to analyse the properties of the AC scale.  
Firstly a number of highly cited studies have already used the AC scale, so if the 
interpretation of the scale is in error, then the conclusions of studies that have used the 
AC scale are also questionable.  Secondly the awareness of consequence construct is a 
significant concept in the field of conservation psychology, as it is a key variable in the 
Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) model (Stern et al., 1999), which is perhaps the most 
popular and prominent of the environmental behaviour models (De Groot & Steg, 2007, 
2008; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003; Oreg & Katz-Gerro, 2006; Steg & De Groot, 2008; 
Steg, Dreijerink & Abrahamse, 2005).  If beliefs about awareness of consequences are 
not organised according to valuation orientations then the VBN should be questioned or 
modified.  The third reason for analysing the AC scale is that the scale items reflect 
everyday statements about the environment that may be expressed on TV, in the 
newspaper or at home, for example ―We don‘t need to worry much about the 
environment because future generations will be better able to deal with these problems 
than we are‖ and ―The effects of pollution on public health are worse than we realise‖.  
It is important to understand how people cognitively organise their everyday beliefs 
about the environment. 
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Chapter 6  
An Examination of the Validity of the Trait-Based 
Awareness of Consequence Scale 
6.1  The development of the Awareness of Consequence scale 
Stern et al. (1993) integrated the assumptions made by several other 
psychological theories into a behavioural framework of environmental intentions, which 
has since developed into the Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) model (Stern, 2000b; Stern et 
al., 1999).  Although the VBN is an interactional framework, it has incorporated Stern 
et al.‘s trait-based social psychological theory, which was in turn based on the 
interactional assumptions outlined by Schwartz‘s (1977) Norm Activation Model 
(NAM).  The NAM posits that altruistic behaviour is the result of an individual being 
explicitly aware of the consequences (AC) in terms of social harm of not performing a 
behaviour and that they accept responsibility (AR) for the performance of that 
behaviour.  The NAM also proposes that AC combined with AR increases the 
probability that a person will feel morally obliged to act.   
Stern et al.‘s (1993) value orientation theory aims to extend Schwartz‘s model in 
two ways.  Firstly, the ―awareness of harmful consequences‖ construct, which originally 
described an explicit awareness of consequences, now includes beliefs about potential 
future world states.  For example, an individual may believe that ―thousands of species 
will die within the next decade‖, which may or may not happen.  Secondly, an 
individual‘s awareness of adverse consequences is assumed to be organised around 
value orientation pertaining to (i) oneself, (ii) other humans and (iii) non-humans.  
These three value orientations are interpreted according to a VBN model and are 
hypothesised to directly influence how people structure their environmental beliefs 
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(Stern, 2000b).  A diagrammatic depiction of the VBN model was previously presented 
in Figure 4.1.   
An individual‘s value orientation is proposed to causally influence beliefs relating to 
adverse consequences, because factual information congruent with an individual‘s value 
orientation is given more weight than value-incongruent information (Stern, 2000b; 
Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern et al., 1999).  The value orientations traits are therefore 
proposed to be the filter for the environmental topics than an individual deems to be 
relevant.  It is proposed that:   
―A strong value orientation may lead someone to seek information selectively 
or to attend selectively to information about the consequences of an 
environmental condition for particular valued objects, and therefore to 
develop beliefs about those consequences that will guide action‖ (Stern & 
Dietz, 1994, p. 68). 
 
By making an individual more receptive to certain desirable information, value 
orientations are proposed to causally influence an individual‘s beliefs.  Although Stern 
et al. (1995a) note that beliefs can be judged according to criteria of truthfulness, 
because ―beliefs… are in principle vulnerable to empirical challenge‖ (pp.727-728), this 
second possibility has not been formally included in Stern et al.‘s (1993) trait-based 
framework or the VBN model. 
The Environmental Concern construct can be distinguished from beliefs about 
adverse environmental consequences.  Environmental concern has been defined as 
being rooted in a person‘s affect, with feelings of interconnectedness and empathy being 
an especially important driver of concern regarding others or the natural environment 
(Schultz, 2000, 2001).  It is possible that value orientations may influence what people 
are concerned about rather than what they believe in.  Under such circumstances, the 
Environmental Concern construct would be expected to have a closer relationship with 
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egoistic, altruistic and biospheric orientations than factually based environmental 
beliefs. 
Whether people cognitively differentiate their environmental concerns and beliefs 
based on Stern‘s proposed value orientations is a hypothesis open to empirical 
investigation.  Social psychologists have independently administered both the 
Environmental Concern (EC-2) scale and the AC scales under the assumption that the 
scale items should be organised according to value orientations.  The EC-2 scale 
constructed by Schultz (2000) has produced the most supportive results.  EC-2 studies 
have been concluded to report exploratory and confirmatory analyses that provide 
reasonable support for Stern‘s hypothesised factor structure, as well as strong subscale 
reliabilities and reasonably interpretable correlations between subscales (Hansla et al., 
2008; Milfont et al., 2006; Schultz, 2000, 2001; Schultz et al., 2004; Snelgar, 2006).  
Such results are compatible with a hypothesis that people differentiate adverse 
environmental concerns according to the trait-based value orientation structure proposed 
by Stern and colleagues, although as discussed in Chapter 5, Snelgar (2006) noted that it 
may be possible to further refine the value orientation interpretation.   
Stern et al. (1993), and subsequent authors who have added items to the AC scale 
(Guagnano, Dietz & Stern, 1994; Stern et al., 1995a; Stern et al., 1995b) have designed 
the AC scale items based on a factual cause and consequence formula.  A set of items 
on a Likert scale is designed to measure awareness of consequences relating to each of 
the egoistic (ACego), social (ACsoc), and biospheric (ACbio) value orientations.  Each 
item is a statement proposing that a cause (e.g., pollution, environmental protection) 
will affect a target (i.e. either oneself, others or the biosphere).  For example, a 
biospheric item might be related to the problem of tropical deforestation, with the 
consequences being for the Earth as a whole, producing an item statement: ―Tropical 
rain forests are essential to maintaining a healthy planet Earth‖.  The wording of items 
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is generally kept simple, while also including both positively and negatively phrased 
items for each AC value orientation subscale. 
The original AC scale study conducted by Stern et al. (1993) proposed a three factor 
structure based on the value orientations.  This interpretation of the AC scale, however, 
has not been deeply examined with factor analysis (FA) or principal component analysis 
(PCA) procedures.  Snelgar (2006) notes the initial AC studies (Stern et al., 1993; Stern 
et al., 1995b) employed a theta scaling procedure.  Stern et al. (1995a) then reported an 
unrotated EFA that yielded a one factor solution and raised the possibility that the AC 
scale may be uni-dimensional, measuring only a single General Awareness of 
Consequences (GAC) construct.  
Rather than treating the GAC factor structure and the value orientation factor 
structure as being competing hypotheses, Stern and colleagues attempt to reconcile the 
two possibilities by suggesting that the AC scale measures both interpretations.  This 
attempt to reconcile two contradictory hypotheses suggests Stern and colleagues have 
fallen prey to the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).   
Other studies have reported dimensionality that is not consistent with the value 
orientations or GAC interpretation.  Spash (2006) found a three factor solution with the 
first loading based mostly on egoistic and social items, the second on social and 
biospheric, and the third combining all three value orientations.  Snelgar (2006) found 
that two to five factors could be extracted using principal axis factoring both with 
varimax and direct oblimin rotations, and also PCA.  She concluded that ―no clear 
structure was obtained with any of these analyses.  Thus it is not appropriate to attempt 
to label any of the factors/components‖ (p.91). 
Table 6.1 displays subscale reliability coefficients reported by a variety of published 
studies (Gärling et al., 2003; Hansla et al., 2008; Joireman et al., 2001; Snelgar, 2006; 
Stern et al., 1993; Stern et al., 1995b).  AC studies have reported weak to moderate 
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reliability coefficient results, which Stern and colleagues declare to be a sign of 
―measurement error‖.  Initially Stern et al. (1993) reasoned that moderate reliabilities 
might be due to too few items being administered.  However, both Gärling et al. (2003) 
and Hansla et al. (2008) had to remove an item from each scale in order to improve the 
reliability coefficient.  Most AC studies conclude that a better set of items would 
improve reliability coefficients, and this quest is undoubtedly in turn responsible for the 
variety found in published versions of the scale. 
 
Table 6.1:  Published reliability statistics for the AC subscales 
 Awareness of Consequences Scales 
 ACego  ACsoc  ACbio 
Cronbach‘s Alpha 
     
Hansla et al. (2008) .64 
(2 items) 
 
.56 
(2 items) 
 
.56 
(3 items) 
Snelgar (2006) .30 
(4 items) 
 
.56 
(5 items) 
 
.46 
(4 items) 
Gärling et al. (2003) .45 
(2 items) 
 
.42 
(2 items) 
 
.54 
(2 items) 
Joireman et al. (2001) .67 
(4 items) 
 
.76 
(5 items) 
 
.65 
(4 items) 
Theta Reliability 
     
Stern et al. (1993) .66 
(3 items) 
 
.62 
(3 items) 
 
.56 
(3 items) 
Stern et al. (1995b) .77 
(2 items) 
 
.71 
(2 items) 
 
.73 
(4 items) 
Note: .90 = very good reliability; .80 = good-moderate reliability; .70 = low reliability; 
.60 or less = poor reliability  
 
Empirical studies have also reported correlations between the AC value 
orientation sub-scales that are counter to theoretical expectations, thus providing 
evidence that the value orientation interpretation has poor criterion validity.  While the 
egoistic subscale is expected to be negatively correlated with the social and biospheric 
subscales, studies have regularly reported positive correlations between all AC 
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subscales (Joireman et al., 2001; Snelgar, 2006; Stern et al., 1993).  The exception is 
Hansla et al. (2008), who found that administering a questionnaire including only 
negatively framed AC items produced a pattern consistent with the ACego scale being 
negatively correlated with the other two subscales.  Another major problem has been the 
high correlation between subscales.  Subscales are reported to share the same variance 
as follows: 18.50% – 36.00% for Stern et al. (1993), 29.16% – 38.44% for Joireman et 
al. (2001) and 8.24% – 14.98% for Snelgar (2006).  Such correlations are more 
consistent with the uni-dimensional GAC interpretation than the value orientation 
interpretation.   
Further evidence of distortion of the value orientation interpretation of the AC 
scale is provided by additional criterion validity assessments.  Schwartz‘s (1992) self-
enhancement scale has been proposed as a measure of egoistic value orientation, while 
the self-transcendence scale has been proposed as a measure of social-altruistic and 
biospheric value orientations combined as one factor.  As theoretically expected, 
Schwartz‘s self-transcendence and self-enhancement scales have been found to correlate 
negatively. It has been reported however that the ACego scale fails to correlate 
positively with Schwartz‘s self enhancement scale (Stern et al., 1995b).  Furthermore 
the ACego scale has not been found to significantly correlate with the EC-2 egoistic 
scale (Snelgar, 2006).  
Empirical examination of the AC scale castes doubts as to whether the scale 
satisfactorily measures three distinctive value orientation elements has led to calls for 
improvement by varying the number of items (Stern et al., 1993) or administering 
negative items only (Hansla et al., 2008).  However, Snelgar (2006), who presents a 
thorough investigation of the measurement properties of the AC questionnaire, provides 
the most pessimistic prognosis in concluding that the EC-2 scale is a better instrument 
and should be used in preference to the AC scale.  There is, however, another possible 
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interpretation of the scale that merits consideration, namely that the AC items may be 
cognitively categorised using a criteria fundamentally different to the value orientation 
interpretation hypothesised by the VBN authors.  The upcoming analysis will raise the 
possibility of an alternative interpretation of the AC that is not related to the GAC or the 
value orientation interpretation.   
 
6.2   Have previous AC interpretations suffered from 
confusion? 
Constructing an instrument that can successfully differentiate between value 
orientations requires more than simply designing a set of items that refer to 
consequences affecting egoistic, social or biospheric targets.  This is particularly so 
when the value orientations are associated with statements about very general and 
complex environmental topics.  In particular, an individual may fail to cognitively 
construct an interpretation based on his/her value orientations if confronted by items 
appearing to be factual statements.  It is possible that responses to AC statements such 
as ―Pollution generated here harms people all over the earth‖, ―Laws to protect the 
environment limit my choice and personal freedoms‖ or ―Over the next several decades, 
thousands of species will become extinct‖ could be influenced by general knowledge, 
personal experience or some other influence such as a recently viewed TV show rather 
than by one‘s underlying value orientation disposition.  If evidence is produced that the 
AC scale elicits a consistent response pattern that is not compatible with the 
theoretically proposed value orientations, this may prove to be a valuable insight into 
how people cognitively organise environmental beliefs.   
Previous studies provide some clues for alternative cognitive processes that 
could account for AC scale responses.  Spash (2006) reported a factor combining equal 
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loadings across all three value orientations.  This was interpreted as ―an anti-
environmental sentiment or lack of worry over possible environmental problems and a 
concern about the potential negative personal consequences of environmental 
protection‖ (Spash, 2006, p. 611).  Spash also noted that the negative egoistic items 
were separated from the positive egoistic items.  Hansla et al. (2008) found that AC 
subscale correlations demonstrated the theoretically expected negative relationship 
between the ego sub-scale and the other two subscales only when the items were 
phrased in terms of negative outcomes.  In addition, Snelgar (2006, p. 88) has 
commented that: 
―As Stern et al. framed the value–belief–norm theory, beliefs that the 
consequences are adverse will result in action.  The beliefs part of the theory 
can also be considered in terms of perceived costs and benefits for valued 
objects.  Behavioural intention will be influenced by the perceived costs and 
benefits of a particular environmental action for each set of valued objects, 
weighted according to the individual‘s relative value orientations.‖ 
 
The comments made by these researchers raise the possibility that respondents 
are sorting bad environmental consequences into a distinctive perceptual category and 
good consequences into a separate category.  It is also possible that these authors have 
identified an artefact of questionnaire designs rather than a positive/negative construct.  
Researchers who administer psychometric scales regularly report that positively worded 
items are more strongly correlated with each other than with negatively-worded items, 
and vice-versa (Schwarz, 2007b; Schwarz & Strack, 1991). 
Another possible criterion that respondents might employ to categorise AC 
questionnaire items is whether the items mention environmental protection and 
therefore refer to positive action.  Some AC items imply environmental action (e.g., 
―Environmental protection is beneficial to my health‖), while others do not (e.g., ―The 
effects of pollution on public health are worse than we realise‖; ―Claims that we are 
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changing the climate are exaggerated‖).  Anderson (2003) argues that the psychological 
literature has often ignored fundamental differences between action and inaction, and 
that - other things being equal - people generally prefer no change.  He refers to the 
principle of ―conservation of energy‖ as an explanation.  For example, the option of 
environmental action may involve inconvenience and monetary losses that are less 
salient under inaction.  A range of psychological literature has concluded that people 
prefer to do nothing as opposed to performing an action e.g., status quo bias (Samuelson 
& Zeckhauser, 1988), omission bias (Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1992), inaction inertia 
(Tykocinski, Pittman & Tuttle, 1995) and choice deferral (Dhar, 1996). 
In summary, no one has yet provided good evidence that the AC scale is a 
measure of Stern‘s hypothesised structure.  The AC scale, however, may still be able to 
provide some insights into how people construct their environmental beliefs.  The 
current chapter thus focuses on whether there is only enough evidence to conclude that 
the AC scale is suffering from distortion by degree or whether there is adequate 
evidence to suggest that the value orientation interpretation of the AC scale suffers from 
distortion in kind.  In order to explore whether the AC scale is a measure of an 
alternative cognitive process, the research reported next compares two AC samples 
collected in the context of willingness-to-pay surveys, while also reprinting the results 
of an AC Principal Component Analysis (PCA) reported by Snelgar (2006).  These 
samples vary according to the context in which the AC scale was administered, as well 
as in sample size, population characteristics, item presentation order and response scale 
(see Table 6.3).  The following analyses will employ an Exploratory Factor Analysis 
(EFA) on one of the samples, which will be compared to a PCA conducted on the AC 
scale that was reported by Snelgar (2006). A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) will 
be conducted on the second sample.  If a response pattern emerges from the EFA which 
is then supported by a CFA conducted on an AC datasets collected under a different set 
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of conditions, then this would indicate the new interpretation has a high level of external 
validity.     
 
6.3   Data and method    
In order to analyse the psychometric properties of the AC scale, two datasets 
will be analysed that were collected as part of Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) 
research examining environmental proposals.   These datasets are part of a sub-set of 
data made available by Clive Spash.  One dataset was collected from a survey design 
that assigned participants into one of two conditions, with one condition presenting the 
AC items sequentially while the other condition mixed the AC items with other 
questions.  The other dataset is from a survey design that administered to all participants 
the AC items mixed in with other survey questions.  In both CVM datasets the 
respondents were (i) members of the general public in the UK approached at home by 
an independent market research company; (ii) recruited via a stratified random sampling 
procedure; and (iii) verbally administered the AC questions in a face-to-face interview.  
These surveys were funded as part of European Community projects (see 
acknowledgments).   
The CVM surveys included 13 AC items designed by Stern and colleagues taken 
from the following studies, namely Stern et al. (1993), Guagnano, Dietz and Stern 
(1994), Stern et al. (1995a) and Stern et al. (1995b).  In reviewing the literature the 
number of distinct biospheric items was found to be limited to just three and therefore 
an extra item was designed and added for the contingent valuation studies (See the 
ACbio4 item from Table 6.2).  Snelgar administered the version of the AC scale 
reported by Joireman et al. (2001) who also decided to design an additional biospheric 
item (see ACbio5 item from Table 6.2).  While the number of items employed seems 
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small for measuring a multi-attribute scale, the work on AC scales reported in Table 6.1 
has often used even fewer items than the datasets that will be examined in the upcoming 
analysis.   
 
Table 6.2: AC scale items in recent studies 
 Administered 
 
Study 
1 
Study 
2 
Snelgar 
(2006) 
ACego1: Environmental protection will provide a better 
world for me and my children 
  × 
ACego2:  Environmental protection is beneficial to my health    
ACego3:  Protecting the environment will threaten jobs for 
people like me 
   
ACego4:  Laws to protect the environment limit my choice 
and personal freedoms 
   
ACego5:  A clean environment provides me with better 
opportunities for recreation 
   
ACsoc1:  Environmental protection benefits everyone    
ACsoc2:  Environmental protection will help people have a 
better quality of life 
   
ACsoc3:  We don‘t need to worry much about the 
environment because future generations will be 
better able to deal with these problems than we are 
   
ACsoc4:  The effects of pollution on public health are worse 
than we realise 
   
ACsoc5:  Pollution generated here harms people all over the 
earth 
   
ACbio1:  While some local plants and animals may have been 
harmed by environmental degradation, over the 
whole earth there has been little effect  
×   
ACbio2:  Over the next several decades, thousands of species 
will become extinct 
   
ACbio3:  Claims that current levels of pollution are changing 
earth‘s climate are exaggerated 
   
ACbio4:  Tropical rain forests are essential to maintaining a 
healthy planet earth 
  × 
ACbio5:  Modern development threatens wildlife × ×  
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6.3.1 Study 1 (random sample and non-random sample) 
Study 1 was administered to 1069 participants across Scotland.  A market 
research company was sub-contracted to collect data over a five month timeframe.  A 
questionnaire was verbally administered by a market research company representative, 
who recruited participants by door-knocking randomly stratified destinations.  The 
market research company did not report information on response rates or refusal rates.  
The survey was conducted to assess the maximum amount that people would personally 
be willing to pay each quarter on their electricity bill over the next year to restore 
biodiversity from 14% to 70% in the river Tummel and its surrounding area.  
Participants were verbally administered a questionnaire that contained the 13 AC items 
displayed in Table 6.2.  The survey also included questions referring to ethical beliefs, 
general attitudes, normative attitudes, control beliefs and socioeconomic status.  
Participants answered the AC questions using a 7 point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree). 
Participants were randomly administered into one of two conditions in Study 1.  
One group of participants were administered the AC items in sequential order, while the 
other group of participants were administered the AC items mixed in with other survey 
questions.  These two samples were analysed separately because altering the order of 
questionnaire items can influence responses (Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz, Strack & Mai, 
1991).  For the non-random condition the AC items were administered in a sequential 
order to 528 participants and 511 participants answered all the AC items.  For the 
random condition, 541 participants were administered the AC items randomly mixed 
with other survey items, of which 531 participants answered all of the AC items. 
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6.3.2 Study 2 
A survey was designed to assess the maximum willingness to pay of individuals 
for a proposal to convert a small area of Cambridgeshire farmland into a wetland 
ecosystem.  The participants were 713 members of the public recruited from across the 
UK, with a national and regional sample split (51 % national, 49% local).  A market 
research company was once again employed to collect the data, this time over a three 
month period.  A questionnaire was verbally administered by a market research 
company representative, who recruited participants by door-knocking randomly 
stratified destinations.  The market research company did not report information on 
response rates or refusal rates.  The survey included questions regarding WTP, ethics 
and political action.  Socio-economic data was also collected.  In total, 572 participants 
completed all of the 14 AC items shown in Table 6.2.  Participants responded on a 4-
point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree).  A 4-point response scale is not 
preferable and the decision to administer this 4-point scale was not made by the author 
of the current thesis.   
 
6.3.3 Summary of studies 
Table 6.3 summarises the design of the three CVM study conditions that will be 
analysed alongside the design reported by Snelgar (2006).  Although the Snelgar sample 
is small and therefore had poor statistical power, it was still concluded to be worthwhile 
comparing the PCA results of this study with the EFA results that will be reported from 
the CVM samples.  Table 6.3 highlights the differences in (i) how the scale was 
administered to participants, (ii) the study context, (iii) sample size, (iv) response scale, 
and (v) whether the items were presented sequentially or mixed with non-AC 
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questionnaire items.  Table 6.3 also presents demographics (i.e., age, gender and 
education) for the four datasets that will be analysed.   
 
Table 6.3:  Summary of the design and demographics of the four samples examining the 
interpretation of the AC scale 
 Study 1 Random Study 1 Non-
Random 
Study 2 Snelgar 
Study 
 
Test type  
 
 
 
Verbally 
administered 
 
Verbally 
administered 
 
Verbally 
administered 
 
Pen & paper 
questionnaire 
Sample 
 
 
 
N=531, Scotland N=511, Scotland N=572, UK 
national 
N=101, 
University of 
Westminster 
Context of 
administering 
AC scale 
 
 
WTP survey for 
restoring 
biodiversity  
WTP survey for 
restoring 
biodiversity 
WTP survey for 
converting 
farmland to 
wetland 
Undergraduate 
course activity 
AC items 
sequential or 
randomised 
 
Randomly mixed 
with other survey 
items 
Sequentially 
administered 
Randomly 
mixed with 
political action 
scale 
Sequentially 
administered  
 
Response 
Scale  
 
 
7-point scale 
 
7-point scale 
 
4-point scale* 
 
7-point scale 
Age 
 
19% Under 25 
20% 25-34 
21% 35-44 
19% 45-54 
21% 55 or more 
 
18% Under 25 
20% 25-34 
21% 35-44 
22% 45-54 
19% 55 or more 
 
13% Under 25 
24% 25-34 
20% 35-44 
21% 45-54 
22% 55 or more 
Not reported 
Gender 
 
53.1% females 48.5% females 59.1% females Not reported 
Education 
 
 
 
53.3% left school 
at age 16 
51.5% left school 
at age 16 
52.0% left 
school at age 16 
100% 
undergraduate 
students 
* The author of this thesis was not involved in the decision to administer a 4-point scale.   
 
6.4  Results 
The following criteria will be used to assess whether the AC scale demonstrates 
the pattern proposed by Stern and colleagues: (i) bivariate correlations between 
subscales, (ii) internal consistency, (iii) dimensionality, and (iv) consistency across 
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datasets.  Any emergent pattern is assessed based on (i) interpretability, (ii) correlations 
between new factors and (iii) internal consistency.   
 
6.4.1 Exploratory analysis 
Table 6.4 displays Cronbach‘s α for the value orientation subscales for each of 
the three samples.  The social subscale reported a moderate reliability coefficient.  The 
egoistic and biospheric subscales, however, both reported a poor reliability coefficient. 
 
Table 6.4:  Study 1 and 2 Cronbach‘s α for AC subscales 
 Egoistic Scale  Social Scale  Biospheric Scale 
Study 1: Random .60  .70  .44 
Study 1: Non-random .60  .72  .52 
Study 2 .56  .69  .53 
 
Correlations between the subscales proposed by Stern et al. (1993) are shown in 
Table 6.5.  It should be pointed out that the correlations between (i) egoistic and social 
subscales, and (ii) egoistic and biospheric subscales are positive rather than negative as 
is predicted by the valuation orientation theory.  Indeed, all of the correlations are large 
and positive.  The subscales share between 21% and 45% of the same variance, which 
supports the GAC interpretation that the constructs are partially measuring the same 
construct. 
 
Table 6.5:  Study 1 and 2 Pearson bivariate correlations between AC subscales 
 
Egoistic 
& 
Social 
 Egoistic 
& 
Biospheric 
 Social 
& 
Biospheric 
Study 1: Random  0.66**  0.46**  0.63** 
Study 1: Non-random  0.67**  0.57**  0.64** 
Study 2 0.67**  0.57**  0.60** 
** p < 0.001 
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A decision was made to conduct an exploratory analysis on the datasets 
collected in the random and non-random conditions administered in Study 1, and then to 
investigate any emergent patterns on the data collected from Study 2 with a CFA.  The 
exploratory analysis employed a principal axis Factor Analysis (FA).  As Stern and 
colleagues (Stern et al., 1995a; Stern et al., 1995b) proposed a single factor GAC 
solution, which is supported by the correlations in Table 6.4, a direct oblimin rotation 
was employed because this rotation favours a one factor solution.  Two principal axis 
factor analyses with direct oblmin rotations conducted on the two Study 1 datasets were 
compared with the results of Snelgar‘s (2006) reported PCA with varimax rotation.  
Eigenvalue scores being greater than 1 was the criteria employed to select how many 
components to extract from the PCA.  An assessment of scree plots confirmed that this 
approach was suitable.  Table 6.6 presents the eigenvalues and percentage of variance 
explained for the Study 1 FA.  The non-random study reported a three component 
solution, while the random study was found to be best described by a two factor 
solution, although the percentage of variance explained in each study was low. 
 
 
Table 6.6: Eigenvalues and percentage of variance explained for AC scale factor 
analysis 
 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings (Unrotated) 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Study 1 Non-random        
Factor 1 5.14 39.57 39.57  4.70 36.18 36.18 
Factor 2 1.51 11.64 51.21  .83 6.40 42.57 
Factor 3 1.16 8.90 60.11  .65 5.00 47.57 
Study 1 Random        
Factor 1 4.89 37.62 37.62  4.37 33.60 33.60 
Factor 2 1.50 11.53 49.15  .78 5.98 39.58 
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The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is an index for 
comparing the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitude of 
partial correlation coefficients.  The results were 0.88 for the non-random condition and 
0.89 for the random condition.  These high KMO indexes provide evidence that the AC 
items can be grouped into a smaller set of underlying factors.   
In Table 6.7 the rotated component matrix from Snelgar‘s (2006) study and two 
rotated factor matrices from Study 1 are presented alongside each other.  The crucial 
issue here is that all three rotated matrices clearly fail to illustrate the theoretical 
structure proposed by VBN authors.  For example, in all samples, Factor 1 contains a 
mixture of egoistic, social and biospheric items.  Furthermore, none of the datasets in 
Table 6.7 presented a one factor solution that is suggested by the GAC interpretation.  
However, all three datasets do report consistencies in the loading patterns.   
 
Table 6.7:  Rotated component matrix for Study 2 and the Snelgar study 
 
Study 1 
FA with Quartimax rotation
 
 Snelgar 
PA with Varimax 
rotation
 
 Study 1  
Non-Random 
 Study 1 
Random 
 
Study 2006 
 1 2 3  1 2  1 2 3 
ACego1 .87   .78      
ACego2 .76   .67   .76   
ACego5 .71   .75   .33   
ACsoc1 .68   .70   .55  .38 
ACsoc2 .78   .77   .61 .41  
ACbio4 .75   .64      
ACego3  .52   .47    .74 
ACego4  .54   .57    .75 
ACsoc3  .46  -.36 .36   .74  
ACbio1         .72  
ACbio3  .35      .72  
ACsoc4 .49  .45 .55    .48  
ACsoc5 .59  .51 .63   .65   
ACbio2 .46  .45 .53   .59   
ACbio5       .48   
Factor loadings less than .30 are not reported 
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An inspection of Table 6.7 reveals two clusters of items that load on separate 
factors for three datasets.  In the non-random study and the Snelgar (2006) study there is 
also some evidence that these two factors can be further divided.  Table 6.7 reveals that 
the items ACego3, ACego4, ACsoc3, ACbio1 and ACbio3 consistently load on a 
different factor to the rest of the items.  These items are interpreted as representing 
―beliefs that are supportive of environmental inaction‖.  All the other items represent 
―beliefs that are supportive of environmental action‖.  Furthermore, the non-random 
condition reported a three factor solution, with some of the items referring to ―beliefs 
supportive of environmental action‖ appearing on Factor 3.  The factor loadings on 
Factor 3 of the non-random condition are only moderate in size, and these items were 
not separated from Factor 1 in the other datasets.   
As the goal of the analysis is to be open to the possibility of a new response 
structure for the AC scale, it is argued that the results of the non-random study provides 
grounds for examining whether the ―beliefs that are supportive of environmental 
inaction‖ factor can be further divided.  If further evidence can be found to be 
supportive of this claim, the divided factors would be interpreted as representing 
―beliefs that environmental protection has positive consequences‖ and ―beliefs that the 
environment is being seriously harmed‖.  In the Snelgar sample the ―beliefs that are 
supportive of environmental inaction‖ were separated into two components.  Although 
Snelgar‘s sample was very small and therefore has questionable statistical power, a 
decision was still made to explore the possibility of separate components, which would 
be interpreted as representing ―beliefs that environmental protection has negative 
consequences‖ and ―beliefs that the environment is not being seriously harmed‖.   
Consequently, although Table 6.7 shows only two factor and three factor 
solutions, it is argued that there is evidence that responses to the AC scale are 
influenced by whether a statement implies action or inaction.  There is also some 
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indication that items that focus on the consequences of environmental action can be 
differentiated from beliefs about whether or not the environment is being harmed, 
although much stronger additional evidence would be required to support this claim as it 
is also possible that the results in Table 6.7 are representative of an item valency artefact 
(Schwarz, 2007b; Schwarz & Strack, 1991). 
Table 6.8 presents the items for each of the four proposed clusters.  The ―beliefs 
that environmental protection has positive consequences‖ and the ―beliefs that the 
environment is being seriously harmed‖ can be combined into a ―beliefs supportive of 
environmental action‖ (BSEA) scale, while the ―beliefs that environmental protection 
has negative consequences‖ and ―beliefs that the environment is not being seriously 
harmed‖ can be combined into a ―beliefs supportive of environmental inaction‖ (BSEI) 
scale.  It is important to note here that four items failed to load strongly onto the newly 
proposed interpretation.  These are items ACbio3, ACsoc3, ACsoc4 and ACbio5, which 
have either low or inconsistent factor loadings.  They would be candidate items to be 
dropped from future work interested in developing a scales based on the newly 
proposed interpretation. 
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Table 6.8:  The items for the four reinterpreted AC scale clusters 
Grouping 1a – Beliefs that environmental protection has positive consequences 
ACego1:  Environmental protection will provide a better world for me and my 
children 
ACego2:  Environmental protection is beneficial to my health 
ACego5:  A clean environment provides me with better opportunities for recreation 
ACsoc1:   Environmental protection benefits everyone 
ACsoc2:   Environmental protection will help people have a better quality of life 
ACbio4:   Tropical rain forests are essential to maintain a healthy planet earth 
Grouping 1b – Beliefs that the environment is being seriously harmed 
*ACsoc4:  The effects of pollution on public health are worse than we realise. 
ACsoc5:    Pollution generated here harms people all over the earth 
ACbio2:    Over the next several decades, thousands of species will become extinct 
*ACbio5:  Modern development threatens wildlife 
Grouping 2a – Beliefs that environmental protection has negative consequences 
ACego3:   Protecting the environment will threaten jobs for people like me 
ACego4:   Laws to protect the environment limit my choice and personal freedoms 
ACsoc3*:  We don‘t need to worry much about the environment because future  
generations will be better able to deal with these problems than we are 
Grouping 2b – Beliefs that the environment is not being seriously harmed 
ACbio1:   While some local plants and animals may have been harmed by  
environmental degradation, over the whole earth there has been little effect 
*ACbio3: Claims that current levels of pollution are changing earth‘s climate are  
                 Exaggerated 
* Item that did not consistently load strongly onto factor 
 
Table 6.9 displays Cronbach‘s α for the newly proposed subscales.  The 
subscales were constructed by adding together items.  The BSEA scale, despite being a 
combination of egoistic, social and biospheric items, demonstrates an excellent 
reliability coefficient.  The BSEI items report poor reliabilities similar to the reliabilities 
for the egoistic and biospheric subscales (see Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.9:  Cronbach‘s α for newly proposed subscales 
 
  
Study 1: 
Non – Random 
 Study 1: 
Random 
BSEA scale   .88 
(9 items) 
 
.88 
(9 items) 
Environmental protection has 
positive consequences 
 .89 
(6 items) 
 
.87 
(6 items) 
The environment is being 
seriously harmed 
 .73 
(3 items) 
 
.68 
(3 items) 
BSEI scale   .56 
(4 items) 
 
.50 
(4 items) 
Environmental protection has 
negative consequences 
 .53 
(3 items) 
 
.50 
(3 items) 
The environment is not being 
seriously harmed scale 
 NA 
Only 1 item 
 
NA 
Only 1 items 
NA = not analysable 
 
 
Table 6.10 displays the bivariate correlations for the newly proposed subscales.  
In both samples the ―environmental protection has positive consequences‖ scale and the 
―environment is being seriously harmed‖ scale report moderate positive correlations, 
which is consistent with the argument that they form part of the higher order BSEA 
factor.  The ―environment is not being seriously harmed‖ scale and the ―environmental 
protection has negative consequences‖ scale also demonstrate a positive correlation, 
which is consistent with their combination into the higher order BSEI factor.  The 
―environmental protection has positive consequence‖ scale correlated negatively with 
both the ―environmental protection has negative consequences‖ scale and the 
―environment is not being seriously harmed‖ scale.  The ―environmental protection has 
negative consequences‖ scale is negatively correlated with the ―environmental 
protection has positive consequences‖ scale and the ―environment is being seriously 
harmed‖ scale.  All of these correlations are theoretically consistent.  Table 6.10 
displays mostly moderate correlations that represent a significant improvement over the 
  
143 
 
AC subscale correlations (between 0.67 and 0.46) as presented in Table 6.5.  The 
correlations between BSEA items and BSEI items are much smaller than the 
correlations between any of the AC subscales. 
 
Table 6.10:  Bivariate correlations for the newly proposed subscales 
 
  
Study 1: 
Non-
Random 
 Study 1: 
Random 
BSEA scale & BSEI scale  -.33**  -.30** 
Environmental protection has positive consequences & 
Environment is being seriously harmed 
.58**  .61** 
Environmental protection has positive consequences & 
Environmental protection has negative consequences 
-.26**  -.29** 
Environmental protection has positive consequences & 
Environment is not being seriously harmed 
-.26**  -.24** 
Environment is being seriously harmed & 
Environmental protection has negative consequences 
-.19**  -.10* 
Environment is being seriously harmed & Environment 
is not being seriously harmed 
-.19**  -.23** 
Environment is not being seriously harmed & 
Environmental protection has negative consequences 
.30**  .24** 
** p < .001  * p < .05 
 
6.4.2 Confirmatory analysis 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted on the Study 2 sample to 
compare the alternative interpretation presented in the exploratory analysis section with 
Stern and his colleagues‘ valuation orientation and GAC interpretations.  A major 
strength of a CFA analysis is that it is able to account for the possibility that two scales 
(e.g. ―environmental protection has positive consequences‖ and the ―environment is 
being harmed‖) can be combined at a higher level (e.g. BSEA scale). Such a 
hierarchical relationship may be able to explain a significantly higher proportion of the 
variance than the Principal Axis FA conducted on Sample 1 in Table 6.6.   
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A Structural Equation Model (SEM) CFA compares Stern‘s GAC interpretation 
(model 1), Stern‘s value orientation interpretation (model 2), the proposed two factor 
beliefs supportive of environmental action/inaction interpretation (model 3), outlined in 
the previous section, and the hierarchical interpretation outlined in Table 6.8.  The 
structural analysis was conducted in Amos 17.0 using the maximum likelihood method.  
Criteria usually thought to indicate an acceptable fit are: ≤ 3 for χ2/df, RMSEA ≤ .06 
and the other fit indices (NFI, TLI, GFI, AGFI) ≥ .95 (Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow & 
King, 2006).  The CFA conducted on the generally accepted EC-2 scales, however, 
have reported CFA results where χ2/df  ≤ 4 for, RMSEA ≤ .9 and the other fit indices 
(NFI, TLI, GFI, AGFI) ≥ .90 (see Milfont et al., 2006; Schultz, 2000, 2001; Snelgar, 
2006).  Nested models can also be compared with the χ2diff test.  Models which are not 
nested can be compared with the AIC and BIC statistics, where smaller AIC and BIC 
statistics represent a better model. 
When analysing the SEM for the hierarchical model proposed in Table 6.8, the 
2
nd
 order factor ―environment is not being seriously harmed‖ was found to report a 
variance greater than 1 and one of the items on this 2
nd
 order factor also reported a 
standardised coefficient greater than 1.  Both of these improper solutions are examples 
of Heywood cases.  One of the reasons why a SEM would report a Heywood case is that 
the model is structurally misspecified (Rindskope, 1984).  This suggests that the BSEI 
scale should not be further divided into 2
nd
 order-factors.  The hierarchal model (model 
4) is therefore presented as having 2
nd
 order factors for the BSEA scale, but not for 
BSEI scale. 
Table 6.11 displays the χ2 and fit indices outcomes for each model.  Figure 6.1 
illustrates the estimated standardised regression weights and the variance of each 
observed variable for model 1.  Figure 6.2 depicts model 2, with this model also 
displaying correlations between the egoistic, social and biospheric scales.  While model 
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2 was found to report a significantly better fit than model 1 [χ2diff (3) = 24.8, p < .001], 
Table 6.11 demonstrates that both models report similarly poor fit indices.  An 
additional issue with model 2 was that a Heywood case was reported, with the 
correlation between the egoistic scale and the social scale being greater than 1.  This 
Heywood case provides evidence against the value orientation model.   
 
Table 6.11:  CFA measures of fit for four proposed theoretical models 
 χ2 Df χ2/df RMSEA NFI TLI GFI AGFI AIC BIC 
Model 1 
One-factor GAC 481* 77 6.24 .10 .78 .78 .87 .83 537 658 
Model 2 
Stern three 
factors 456* 74 6.16 .10 .79 .78 .88 .83 518 653 
Model 3 
Revised two 
factor 287* 76 3.77 .07 .87 .88 .93 .90 345 471 
Model 4 
Revised 
hierarchical 202* 74 2.73 .06 .91 .93 .95 .93 264 399 
Notes:  RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; NFI = normed fit index; 
TLI = Tucker-Lewis coefficient; GFI = goodness of fit index; AGFI = adjusted 
goodness of fit index; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayes information 
criterion. 
p < .0001 
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General Awareness
of Consequences
.63ACego1
.37ACego2
.34ACego5
.30ACsoc1
.59ACsoc2
.28ACsoc5
.05ACego3
.03ACego4
.42ACbio4
.16ACbio2
.19ACsoc3
.55
.77
.53
-.44
.64
.58
-.18
.80
.13ACbio1
-.36
.09ACbio3
.40
-.30
-.22
.61
.35ACsoc4
.59
 
Figure 6.1: CFA results for Model 1: The General Awareness of Consequences one 
factor model (Standardised estimates) 
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Social
.62ACego1
.37ACego2
.33ACego5
.29ACsoc1
.58ACsoc2
.25ACsoc5
.04ACego3
.03ACego4
.51ACbio4
.19ACbio2
Biospheric
Egoistic
.20ACsoc3
.76
.79
.91
1.07
.17ACbio1
.11ACbio3
.32ACsoc4
.87
.54
-.21
-.18
.57
-.44
.57
.50
-.41
.44
.71
-.34
.61
 
 
Figure 6.2: CFA results for Model 2: The three factor Egoistic, Social and Biospheric 
model (Standardised estimates) 
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When compared to model 1, both model 3 [χ2diff (1) = 193.9, p < .001] and 
model 4 [χ2diff (3) = 278.4, p < .001] were found to report much better fits.  As model 2 
did not have a nested relationship with model 3 or model 4, the AIC and BIC statistic 
were used to compare these models.  Table 6.10 shows that model 3 (see Figure 6.3) 
and model 4 (see Figure 6.4) both reported a lower AIC and BIC statistic than model 2, 
thus indicating that these models provided a better fit.  Furthermore, model 4 was found 
to be a significant improvement over the two factored model 3 [χ2diff (2) = 84.5, p < 
.001].  In fact the fit indices for model 4 were found to be better than the fit indices 
reported in any of the studies that reported a CFA for the EC-2 scale  (Milfont et al., 
2006; Schultz, 2000, 2001; Snelgar, 2006). 
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.65ACego1
.38ACego2
.34ACego5
.31ACsoc1
.61ACsoc2
.28ACsoc5
.21ACego3
.23ACego4
.40ACbio4
.15ACbio2
.45ACsoc3
Beliefs Supportive of
Environmental Action
Beliefs Supportive of
Environmental Inaction
-.51
.36ACbio1
.16ACbio3
.35ACsoc4
.80
.62
.58
.56
.78
.59
.53
.39
.63
.46
.48
.67
.60
.40
 
 
Figure 6.3: CFA for Model 3: The revised two factor model (Standardised estimates) 
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Figure 6.4: CFA for Model 4: The revised two stage hierarchical model (Standardised 
estimates) 
.79 
Beliefs that environmental 
protection has positive 
consequences 
.68 ACego1 
.38 ACego2 
.34 ACego5 
.30 ACsoc1 
.64 ACsoc2 
.49 ACsoc5 
.21 ACego3 
.23 ACego4 
.39 ACbio4 
.29 ACbio2 
.66 
Beliefs that the environment 
is being seriously harmed 
.45 ACsoc3 
Beliefs Supportive of 
Environmental Action 
Beliefs supportive of 
Environmental Inaction 
.15 ACbio3 
.36 ACbio1 
.47 ACsoc4 
.81 
-.56 
.89 
.68 
.70 
.54 
.82 
.62 
.58 
.55 
.80 
.62 
.46 
.48 
.67 
.60 
.39 
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6.5  Discussion 
Stern et al. (1993) designed the AC scale to measure the trait-based assumption 
that people cognitively differentiate between egoistic, social and biospheric concerns 
when assessing adverse general environmental consequences.  The focus of previous 
AC scale assessments factors (e.g. Snelgar, 2006; Spash, 2006; Stern et al., 1995a; Stern 
et al., 1993; Stern et al., 1995b) has been on examining distortion in degree (e.g. 
analysing correlations patterns noting theoretical inconsistencies while still holding onto 
the value orientation propositions) and degree of random error (e.g. poor Cronbach‘s α).  
It is proposed that the mounting evidence that the AC scale is not a good measure of 
valuation orientations is justification for examining the scale with a distortion in kind 
perspective.  By conducting an EFA that is open to the possibility of finding an 
alternative interpretation that is not related to the value orientation or the GAC 
interpretation, the research conclusion are less likely to fall prey to the confirmation bias 
(Nickerson, 1998; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).   
Both an EFA and a CFA provide supportive evidence that people have a 
tendency to differentiate between action and inaction when examining general 
environmental consequences.  The results are less clear as to whether people 
differentiate between the positive and negative consequences of action/inaction.  There 
was stronger evidence that the positive and negative consequences of action are 
differentiated, although future research may conclude that this is an artefact of 
questionnaire designs.  Psychometric scales regularly report that positively worded 
items are more strongly correlated with each other than with negatively-worded items 
and vice-versa (Schwarz, 2007b; Schwarz & Strack, 1991).  It was possible to combine 
the positive and negative action items into the BSEA scale that reported a strong 
reliability coefficient, which supports the artefact interpretation.  The Snelgar (2006) 
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PCA, which had low statistical power, is the only study that provided evidence that 
people differentiate between the positive and negative inaction items.   
Previous studies have gathered evidence suggesting that value orientations 
influence how people cognitively organise their environmental concerns about specific 
objects (see Schultz, 2000, 2001).  AC items, which are representative of media 
statements and everyday comments, and therefore are of great interest, do not seem to 
be cognitively organised according to the trait-based value orientation assumptions.  
The evidence presented in Chapter 6 suggests the AC scale cannot be simply improved 
as a measure of value orientations by adding more items or designing ―better‖ items in 
the same mode.  A questionnaire design that encourages participants to assess their 
beliefs on emotive and subjective criteria, such as the EC-2 scale, would seem to be 
required in order to develop a scale that measures such constructs.  If this is so, a scale 
trying to measure VBN value orientations based on general statements of awareness of 
consequences could not be improved by simply adding more items or designing ‗better‘ 
items in the same mode.  A more emotive approach would be required to increase the 
salience of an individual‘s value orientation on the construction of the belief, such as 
asking participants to assess their concerns about valued objects.  In addition, value 
orientations may directly influence other emotional cognitions such as environmental 
norms and expectations. 
Trait-based environmental value constructs when placed into interactional 
behaviour models can feed into a policy process and influence regulatory design.  
Behavioural models are often general in nature and can be applied to a variety of topics 
such as political action, recycling and household water management.  The potential for 
direct policy relevance relates to correctly understanding the key motive and barriers to 
human action and for some behavioural models this requires outlining an empirically 
verifiable relationship between trait-based environmental values and other 
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environmental cognitions.  Stern et al. (1993) designed the AC scale in order to test the 
proposition that people cognitively differentiate between egoistic, social and biospheric 
concerns when assessing beliefs about adverse general environmental consequences and 
they included these value orientation constructs in the policy relevant VBN model.  The 
VBN model has made a significant contribution to the environmental attitude-behaviour 
literature.  AC items, however, which are representative of media statements and 
everyday comments, and therefore are of general public interest, do not seem to be 
cognitively organised according to the assumptions of the VBN model. 
A revised model is proposed in Figure 6.5, which is consistent with empirical 
findings for the current study and for the Snelgar study.  Based on the findings of both 
an EFA and a CFA, ―beliefs supportive of environmental action‖ appear to be 
influenced by egoistic, social or biospheric concerns about environmental problems.  
Furthermore they can be separated into ―beliefs about the environment being seriously 
harmed‖ and ―beliefs about environmental protection having positive consequences‖.  
While the current study, unlike Snelgar's, did not find that ―beliefs supportive of 
environmental inaction‖ can be similarly separated into two components, there remains 
room for this relationship to be further explored. 
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Figure 6.5: Revised Behavioural Model 
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A possible relationship is that biospheric concerns about environmental 
problems are negatively correlated with ―beliefs that the environment is not being 
seriously harmed‖ (or ―beliefs supportive of environmental inaction‖, if no second order 
factor is found).  Social and egoistic concerns about the costs of conservation should be 
positively correlated with ―beliefs that environmental action has negative 
consequences‖ (or ―beliefs supportive of environmental inaction‖, if no second order 
factor is found).  It is proposed that future research need to explore the relationship 
between environmental concern and environmental beliefs. 
Both an EFA and a CFA presented evidence that people have a tendency to 
differentiate between environmental action and inaction.  There is also some evidence 
that respondents differentiated between the environment being harmed and the benefits 
of environmental protection.  An improved BSEI scale should be developed.  The 
relative weakness of this scale is unsurprising given that it arises from items designed 
for a different purpose (i.e. to measure AC beliefs).  The BSEI scale could therefore be 
improved by dropping some items (e.g. ACbio3 and ACsoc4), adapting others, and 
adding new items.  This process would also benefit from working with a far greater 
number of items than has been typical in research on the AC scale.  The confirmatory 
analysis conducted on hierarchical model 4, which is made up of items which could be 
refined, reported fit indices on par, if not better, than the indices reported for the EC-2 
scale. 
These findings also shed light on some of the measurement anomalies in the AC 
scale literature.  Where subscale reliabilities have proven satisfactory this may be due to 
a high proportion of environmental action items.  Thus, the AC social subscale has four 
out of five of its items classified into the BSEA factor and was found to have higher 
reliabilities than the other subscales.  The fact that different concepts are being 
measured than those assumed by VBN theory also explains why the AC egoistic 
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subscale has previously been found to be  not significantly correlated with the EC 
egoistic subscale and Schwartz‘s self enhancement scale.  This also provides an 
alternative explanation to the one factor GAC interpretation for why previous studies 
have reported high correlations between the egoistic, social and biospheric AC 
subscales. 
The results presented here indicate that the scales being employed to measure 
egoistic, altruistic and biospheric value orientations actually relate to beliefs about 
whether environmental action or inaction is required.  ―Beliefs Supportive of 
environmental action‖ can be further classified into ―beliefs about environmental harm 
being serious‖ and ―beliefs that environmental action has positive consequences‖.  
Improving a reinterpreted scale as a measure of these concepts seems worthwhile.  
Future research should also be open to exploring the relationship between 
environmental concerns and beliefs.  A more sophisticated understanding of how value 
orientations influence other perceptions could aid environmental policy by supplying a 
new means of identifying motives and barriers to behavioural change. 
 
6.6  Overall conclusion of Section 3  
Section 3 argues that when conservation psychologists interpret environmental 
value scale responses according to a single definition of environmental value they are 
vulnerable to falling prey to the confirmation bias.  Chapter 4 outlined a framework 
originally proposed by Altman and Rogoff (1987) to describe different worldview 
assumptions that conservation psychologists draw upon to conceptualise how people 
perceive environmental value.  When conservation psychologists conceptualise 
environmental value with a particular worldview, this will naturally result in a limiting 
or narrowing of the researcher‘s perspective of environmental value.  Perspectives 
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regarding environmental value are especially likely to be limited when there is a 
requirement for the definition of environmental value to be compatible with the needs of 
the policy community.   
Conservation psychologists who administer surveys in order to provide a 
scientific measure of environmental value for the policy community are obliged to 
empirically assess whether their definition of environmental value satisfactorily 
accounts for the survey response patterns.  Chapter 5 offered evidence that mainstream 
interpretations of prominent trait-based environmental value scales poorly match the 
response patterns to the scales.  Based upon a literature review it was argued that 
conservation psychologists are generally reluctant to consider the possibility that an 
alternative interpretation could offer a superior description of the survey response 
patterns.  Chapter 5 proposed that conservation psychologists should re-examine several 
prominent trait-based scales while being open to alternative interpretations.  The current 
chapter examined the AC scale (Stern et al., 1993), which has been widely administered 
by the conservation psychology community.  Based on the results of an EFA and a 
CFA, it is concluded that a superior interpretation of the AC scale exists that had not 
been previously identified in the conservation psychology literature.   
Finally, Section 3 demonstrated that it is extremely challenging for conservation 
psychologists to develop psychometric scales that measure a theoretically proposed 
interpretation of environmental value.  As people can cognitively or emotively value the 
environment in different ways it is a difficult task to develop a survey instrument that 
encourages participants to perceive environmental value in a way which is consistent 
with the constraints of a particular theoretical interpretation.  Conservation 
psychologists have the opportunity to be open to the possibility that an unexpected 
interpretation offers a better account of environmental value survey response patterns.  
This thesis recommends that in instances where more than one interpretation is possible 
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they should empirically examine the competing interpretations.  If stable response 
patterns emerge that are outside the researcher‘s conceptual framework, then it may be 
possible to use these response patterns as the basis of a new understanding of how 
people cognitively and emotionally value the environment.   
While Section 3 examined obstacles facing conservation psychologist who 
measure environmental value with psychometric scales, Section 4 will examine the 
challenges facing economists who measure environmental value with survey 
methodologies.  It will be proposed that economists, like conservation psychologists, 
are also prone to interpreting environmental value survey responses based upon fixed 
worldview assumptions.  It will be argued that it is rare for economists to be open to the 
possibility of an unexpected or competing interpretation providing a superior account of 
environmental value survey response patterns.   
Chapter 7 will provide empirical evidence that the worldview assumptions of 
economist heavily influence validity assessments of environmental value surveys.  In 
order for economists to offer scientific conclusions about an environmental value survey 
the construct validity of the proposed interpretation of the survey should be examined.  
It will be proposed that economists seeking to challenge their current worldview 
assumptions, in order to learn more about how people economically value the 
environment, should empirically examine the validity of more than one interpretation of 
environmental value surveys.  To merely examine a single interpretation is to leave 
oneself susceptible to the confirmation bias.  Following on from Chapter 7, Chapters 8-
10 will demonstrate this claim by empirically examining different interpretations of 
CVM.   
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Chapter 7 
Empirical Examination of the Relationship between the 
Worldview Assumptions of Economists and Validity 
Assessments of Environmental Value Surveys 
7.1 Introduction  
While Section 3 examined the conservation psychology approach to 
conceptualising and measuring environmental value, Section 4 will explore the 
approach to defining and operationalising environmental value undertaken by two 
contrasting economic schools of thought.  The first step, which will be presented in this 
chapter, involves empirically identifying differences in how the Resource & 
Environmental Economics (E&RE) community and the Ecological Economics (EE) 
community (i) define environmental value and (ii) assess the validity of different 
environmental value surveys.  Chapter 8 will then outline opposing interpretations of 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) responses, which will be followed by an 
empirical examination of the validity of opposing interpretations of CVM in Chapters 9-
10.   
Chapter 2 put forward the argument that the EE programme and the E&RE 
programme are based upon different worldview assumptions and ideologies.  
Furthermore, Chapter 2 suggested that researchers from these two economic 
communities offer different conclusions about the validity of CVM and pluralism-as-a-
methodology survey options.  Prominent ecological economists (e.g. Norgaard, 1989; 
Røpke, 2004, 2005; Söderbaum, 1999; Spash, 1997) have suggested that the domain of 
EE can be differentiated from the domain of E&RE based upon the acceptance and 
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reliance of concepts such as Cost-Benefit-Analysis (CBA), value pluralism, pluralism-
as-a-methodology and biophysical limitations.  As there are a variety of perspectives 
within the EE community it is not clear whether these proposed ideological and 
methodological differences reflect the opinions of particular ecological economists 
putting forward a proposal for how the field of EE should define itself, or whether the 
proposed differences between the two economic schools of thought actually exist.  The 
current chapter will assess, based on the results of a survey administered at economic 
conferences, whether the E&RE community and the EE community actually draw upon 
different worldview assumptions and offer different validity assessments of the 
environmental value survey methodology options.  Details of the conference survey will 
follow shortly. 
From a policy perspective, it is easier to justify decisions to the general public 
that are founded upon measureable objectives performed by ―independent‖ economists.  
The policy community regularly employ economists to offer scientific assessments of 
environmental value in terms of monetary estimates.  If the acceptance of particular 
economic theoretical assumptions is a prerequisite for an economist to declare the 
results of an environmental value survey (e.g. CVM format or multi-criteria analysis 
format) to be valid, then it is clear that economists cannot legitimately claim that their 
surveys offer objective or value-free results.  Chapter 7 will empirically examine 
whether differences in the validity assessments of environmental value survey 
methodologies by the EE community and the E&RE community can be explained by 
these two economic communities relying upon a different set of economy-environment 
interface assumptions. 
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7.2 Questioning the neoclassical logical positivistic approach 
to environmental policy advice 
The early development of the neoclassical programme was associated with a 
logical positivistic perspective of science.  Logical positivism claims that a combination 
of unity of method and empirical evidence leads to knowledge that is objective and 
neutral with respect to the beliefs and values of people who desire and produce 
knowledge (Boldeman, 2007; Veisten, 2007).  The neoclassical economic programme 
proposes that the application of universal market laws (e.g. laws of supply and demand), 
basic assumptions about individual decision-making (e.g. stable preferences) and 
mathematical modelling can provide the policy community with a value-free and 
objective assessment of value.   
Norgaard (1989) suggests that neoclassical communities have historically 
assumed their approach is not value-based, but claim it is simply a fact that market 
approaches are the only ―right way‖ of pursuing economic questions.  Norgaard argues 
that positivistic beliefs of neoclassical economists are reinforced by a broader faith in 
modern societies that people have control over the environment and an objective 
monetary price for environmental changes actually exists.  Neoclassical economists and 
many members of the policy community draw upon logical positivistic assumptions and 
treat money as a neutral form of measurement by which all things can be made 
comparable and by which trade-offs are possible (Spash, 2008d).  Many modern day 
environmental government policies (e.g. putting a tax on carbon emissions or a carbon 
trading scheme) are based upon logical positivistic frameworks where monetary 
estimates provided by economists are promoted to the general public as being objective 
scientific measurements that are ideology free and representative of a real price.   
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The primary goal of the E&RE programme is to offer advice to the policy 
community about how valued environmental resources can be used efficiently for 
human purposes.  Environment & resource economists define environmental value as 
being the monetary sum of all instrumental costs and benefits, although as noted in 
Chapter 2 there is debate within the E&RE community as to whether instrumental value 
should refer only to demand value (e.g. Diamond & Hausman, 1994; McFadden & 
Leonard, 1993), or also to non-demand values such as option value, bequest value and 
existence value (e.g. Carson, Flores & Meade, 2001; Mitchell & Carson, 1989; Portney, 
1994).  Regardless of whether environmental & resource economists are interested in 
measuring only demand value or a combination of demand and non-demand value, the 
E&RE community measures environmental valuation in terms of monetary estimates 
obtained through market-based designs.   
When an actual market-based valuation for an environmental change is not 
available, environmental & resource economists who are willing to measure non-
demand values will often administer CVM surveys to obtain a monetary estimate of an 
environmental change.  Ever since CVM was legally ratified by the courts (e.g. the 
Exxon Valdez case in USA and the Kakadu National Park case in Australia), the policy 
community have been given a ―green light‖ to accept CVM monetary estimates at face 
value as an input into their decision-making frameworks.  It is currently common 
practice for neoclassical economists and the policy community to interpret monetary 
estimates obtained from CVM surveys at face value and to claim that they represent an 
unbiased, objective, scientific and ideological neutral monetary estimate of value 
(Spash, 2008a, 2008b).  
A number of high profile ecological economists criticise the positivist approach 
employed by the E&RE community by noting that all policy advice offered by 
economists is influenced by ideology and worldview assumptions (e.g. Funtowicz & 
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Ravetz, 1990; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Norgaard, 1989; O'Neill, 1992; Söderbaum, 
2000; Spash, 2000a).  These ecological economists propose that the preference for a 
particular economic framework is not exclusively a matter of truth, but depends upon 
the values and ideology of the researcher.  Far from being neutral, modern neoclassical 
consumer theory can be seen as being based on a utilitarian philosophy of preferences 
and a restricted, largely hedonistic model of psychological behaviour (Spash, 2000b).  
Value pluralists from the EE community argue that economists assessing environmental 
value are not inherently obliged to value a proposed environmental change with 
neoclassical or market-based assumptions and that there are many disadvantages to 
assessing environmental value with a neoclassical approach.  Notably, Holland (1997) 
argues that market-based approaches to value elicitation are incapable of recognising 
certain values (e.g. intrinsic values) and that they preclude the expression of non-
utilitarian valuations.  Spash (2008d) suggests that there is a stark disconnect between 
environmental values as constituted in mainstream economics and as recognised by 
wider society and other disciplines.   
There exists a number of alternative environmental value approaches designed to 
address the wider implications of environmental policy for society or for the biosphere. 
For example, citizen-based approaches argue that environmental value discourse should 
be at a political or societal level rather than an individual or market-based level 
(Common & Perrings, 1992; Sagoff, 1988, 1994, 1998), while biocentric theories of 
environmental value put forward by deep ecologists argue that non-human species also 
possess value in their own right (Devall & Sessions, 1985).  Another non-utilitarian 
ethical approach can be found in aesthetic theories that argue that there can be 
environmental value in non-life (Brennan, 1992).  It has also been proposed that 
environmental value can based upon nationalistic concerns about the exploitation of 
natural resources by central governments (Stern et al., 1993).  These non-positivistic 
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environmental value theories are very different from the complete, logically closed, 
mathematical objective function assumed in neoclassical analysis (Söderbaum, 1999).   
The debate between the neoclassical economists and value pluralists suggests that 
environmental value surveys, despite the claims of some economists and policymakers, 
do not provide objective or ideologically free monetary estimates of an environmental 
change.  The aim of this chapter is thus to empirically examine the following three 
questions:   
(i) Are there significant differences in the worldview assumptions of the E&RE 
community and the EE community? 
(ii) Are there significant differences in how the E&RE community and the EE 
community assess the validity of environmental value survey options? 
(iii) Can differences in the validity assessments of environmental value surveys 
by the EE community and E&RE community be explained by these two 
economic communities relying upon different environmental value 
assumptions? 
 
7.3 The worldview assumptions of environmental & resource 
economists and ecological economists 
The extent to which the field of EE is actually substantively different from the 
mainstream domain of E&RE remains unclear for many, especially for those outside the 
ecological economics movement (Spash & Ryan, 2010; Spash & Ryan, Under Review).  
The journal of Ecological Economics has published numerous orthodox articles.  Entire 
issues of Ecological Economics have appeared which fit comfortably within the 
orthodox frame (e.g. adopting mathematical models of optimising behaviour, assuming 
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micro-economic axioms, regarding humans as self-interested utility maximisers, pricing 
externalities and conducting trade-offs).  The journal of Ecological Economics has also 
published articles that have been uncritical in the use of CBA, along with benefit 
transfer and more simplistic calculations for claiming that a money value can be 
attached to ecosystem goods and services.  The journal of Ecological Economics has 
published a large number of articles where nature has been described as a capital that 
can be traded for other types of capital (e.g. Berry, 2002; Drechsler & Wätzold, 2009; 
Kuosmanen, Bijsterbosch & Dellink, 2009; Kuosmanen & Kortelainen, 2007; Stern, 
1997; Wen & Chen, 2008).  Spash and Ryan (2010) note that at a time when ecological 
economists can be found to be putting their names to pricing biodiversity, ecosystems 
and carbon, whether the field of EE has anything interesting to say outside the 
orthodoxy is unclear.   
A goal of this chapter is to examine responses to a survey that was administered 
at several EE conferences and at an E&RE conference.  The survey analysis will 
explore whether the EE community and the E&RE community have different ratings of 
importance for (i) the concept of CBA, (ii) value pluralism concepts, (iii) pluralism-as-
a-methodology concepts and (iv) the concept of biophysical limitations. 
 
7.3.1  Cost-Benefit-Analysis 
Neoclassical economic empirical frameworks rely heavily upon CBA 
methodologies, which are proposed to allow for the most ―rational‖, the ―best‖ or 
―optimal‖ decisions.  The CBA‘s employed by neoclassical economists typically assess 
various consequences according to a unifying utility principle, where a higher level of 
some resulting end state – monetary profit, pleasure, happiness or welfare – is deemed 
to be the decision maker‘s objective (Spash, 1993a).  The neoclassical CBA approach 
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implies value monism where all objects of utility have some common characteristic that 
allows them to be compared in terms of monetary units (Gowdy & Erickson, 2005).  
Under the mainstream economic approach, if a monetary benefit for a proposal cannot 
be identified, then the project will be deemed as having no positive value.  The E&RE 
community have anointed money as the universal utility metric, which means that there 
is a requirement for all relevant costs and benefits of a proposed environmental change 
to be assigned a monetary value based upon a market-orientated trade-off mechanism.   
Nearly all economists working in the environmental policy domain are acutely 
aware that summarising environmental value in terms of monetary estimates increases 
the likelihood that their research will be used by the environmental policy community 
(Getzner et al., 2005).  In many respects economists undertake CBA applications for 
practical purposes rather than for scientific exploration and the CBA approach has been 
heavily defended for being able to engage with the powers capable to make an impact in 
sustainability debates (Spash, 2009).  The E&RE community has forged close links with 
the policy community due to it being able to offer a range of methodologies (e.g. 
hedonistic pricing, production function analysis, travel cost and CVM) that are able to 
summarise environmental value in monetary terms and are compatible with policy CBA 
frameworks.   
A number of prominent ecological economists have also defended both CBA 
and CVM on pragmatic grounds, noting that these approaches can be used to convince 
the policy community of the need for environmental action (e.g. Costanza, d'Arge et al., 
1997; Pearce, 1998).  Patterson (1998) argues that without an approach that can reduce 
environmental value to a monetary price, valuation of ecosystems and economic 
resources cannot be rigorously defended to the policy community.  In contrast to the 
E&RE community, the ecological economists who defend CVM and CBA are likely to 
also argue that the discipline of EE should not rely solely upon CBA approaches.  For 
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example, Bob Costanza (1989), who is a supporter of CVM argues in the opening 
paragraph to the introduction of the first edition of the seminal Ecological Economics 
textbook that the field of EE will ―include neoclassical environmental economics and 
ecological impact studies as subsets, but will also encourage new ways of thinking 
about the linkages between ecological and economics systems‖ (p.1).  Howarth & Faber 
(2002) argue that although monetary valuations can be useful for providing insights into 
the tradeoffs between market activity and environmental quality that are implicit in the 
process of economic growth, the monetary valuation approach has limitations that 
should made explicit and be respected.  
While some ecological economists are comfortable with monetary-based CBA, 
the EE community also includes a number of researchers who are highly critical of 
environmental policy frameworks that simply compares instrumental costs and benefits.  
Members of the EE community attack the reliance on CBA by the environmental policy 
community by arguing that:  (i) CBA approaches hide the influence of ideology in 
policy decisions (e.g. Norgaard, 1989; Söderbaum, 1999), (ii) CBA approaches deny the 
existence of intrinsic rights (e.g. Attfield, 1998; Brennan, 1992), (iii) CBA frameworks 
defend consumer sovereignty even when the end result will be distributional inequity 
(e.g. Common & Perrings, 1992; Douai, 2009; Gowdy, 2007; Söderbaum, 2007; Spash, 
2008b), and (iv) CBA is unsuitable when environmental problems involve ethics and 
uncertainty (e.g. Munda, 1996; Spash, 2002a, 2007b).  The role of CBA has also been 
criticised by ecological economists for assuming value commensurability (e.g. Holland, 
1997; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Spash, 2007a), which is an issue that will be explored 
in the value pluralism section discussed next.   
 
  
169 
 
7.3.2  Value pluralism 
While neoclassical economists describe humans as being robot-like optimisers 
who instantly react to price signals, value pluralists note that humans are capable of 
judging complex issues from a variety of ethical perspectives (Söderbaum, 1999).  
Value pluralists suggest that the field of neoclassical economics is based upon a 
utilitarian ethic, which is a very specific philosophy of value rather than being a 
generally accepted meta-ethic which can be universally applied (Getzner et al., 2005).  
Deontological reasoning, where a person refuses to make a trade-off under any 
circumstance, is an example of an alternative approach based upon non-utilitarian 
ethical criteria.  Value pluralists point out that non-utilitarian ethical reasoning 
perspectives of environmental value are ignored by the mainstream neoclassical 
approach.  For example, Spash (1997) notes that individuals who hold a deontological 
rights-based belief system are often forced to adopt a utilitarian mindset when 
responding to CVM surveys.  Those who refuse to respond based upon utilitarian 
principles are usually excluded from the statistical analysis or their motives are 
reinterpreted by CVM practitioners as being based upon utilitarian logic. The 
neoclassical interpretation of CVM does not acknowledge the legitimacy of an 
individual refusing all money trade-offs nor does the neoclassical approach 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the argument that some aspects of the environment 
have an absolute right to be protected.  Martinez-Alier et al (1998) based upon a value 
pluralism philosophy, argue that economists should respect both utilitarian and non-
utilitarian reasoning.   
The philosophy of value pluralism does not seek to explore the concept of 
environmental value through a single worldview such as the neoclassical paradigm, but 
seeks to learn more about a plurality of legitimate perspectives.  Post-normal science 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990) is an example of a value pluralism framework developed 
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to help scientific decision-making address social issues that are both complex and 
contested.  The post-normal science framework suggests that there are central aspects 
of the social issues that tend to be neglected by traditional scientific approaches such 
as uncertainty, value loading, and the existence of a plurality of legitimate 
perspectives.  When environmental policy is being debated by stakeholders with 
different ideologies, the post-normal science approach suggests that the decision 
framework should seek to solve or manage the environmental problem at the level of 
principled advocacy rather than aiming to generate a solution primarily through 
scholarly contributions.  The post-normal science approach also points out that when a 
decision framework seeks a plurality of perspectives, this does not mean that the 
special competence of people with expertise should be denied nor does it mean that the 
opinions of token laypersons should be mindlessly included.  Rather, plurality of 
perspectives for a post-normal science perspective refers to a mixing and blending of 
skills, partly technical and partly personal, so that all those engaged on an issue can 
enrich the comprehension of the whole (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991).   
There are different value pluralism perspectives within the EE community.  
Söderbaum (2000) discusses the concept of value pluralism and concludes that 
ecological economics should exclude papers built on cost-benefit analysis and CVM, 
while there should be a greater focus on exploring ethic and ideology issues.  At the 
most general level, however, value pluralism does not necessarily deny that 
environmental value can be measured in monetary terms for some specific purposes.  
Rather, value pluralism acknowledges that there are perspectives or environmental 
values that cannot be simply described in terms of money.  For example, Funtowicz and 
Ravetz (1994b) note that trappers or pet lovers can through a market institution 
exchange money for a songbird, which in one respect reflects the monetary price of the 
songbird.  Such a monetary price, however, does not take into account the value of the 
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contribution of the songbird to the survival of its species, the relationship the songbird 
has with the ecosystem at large, or the value of the bird‘s beautiful music.  Therefore the 
price in the pet market for a songbird does not represent an absolute price for the 
songbird and it is possible to use an alternative ethical framework to conclude that the 
songbird cannot be simply valued in monetary terms.  A challenge for ecological 
economists who advocate value pluralism is to develop institutions and engagement 
processes that allow for different and incommensurable environmental value 
perspectives to be legitimised and explored.  Pluralism-as-a-methodology methods, 
which will be discussed next, have been developed to help economists deal with this 
formidable challenge.  
 
7.3.3  Pluralism-as-a-methodology 
A number of researchers have advocated environmental valuation methodologies 
that are procedurally fair and grounded in democratic decision-making (e.g. Sagoff, 
1998; Wilson & Howarth, 2002).  An alternative methodological approach to CVM that 
is based upon the philosophy of value pluralism and designed specifically to account for 
the possibility of multiple and incommensurable values is pluralism-as-a-methodology.  
Pluralism-as-a-methodology approaches allow for multiple dimensions to be chosen, 
evaluated and weighed (Gowdy & Erickson, 2005).  Pluralistic valuation can account 
for diverse criteria such as efficiency or equity, and this approach also allows for an 
explicit consideration of how ethics relates to monetary valuation.  Examples of 
pluralism-as-a-methodology approaches are Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) based upon 
weak comparability (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998) and Deliberative Monetary Valuation 
(DMV) (Spash, 2007a, 2008c).   
  
172 
 
Pluralism-as-a-methodology approaches do not attempt to measure stable 
environmental values and do not aim at being able to solve all environmental conflicts 
or at reaching a consensus between all stakeholders.  Rather the goal is social learning 
through understanding competing discourses (Jorgensen, 2009).  Approaches such as 
DMV and MCA acknowledge that perceptions of value are constantly changing and 
therefore assess ―what could be‖ rather than ―what is‖ (Proops, 1989).  A group-based 
pluralism-as-a-methodology approach is proposed to allow for a deeper insight into the 
nature of the conflicts and into future possibilities in order to arrive at political 
compromise in the case of divergent preferences, while also increasing the transparency 
of the process (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998).  Pluralism-as-a-methodology approaches 
are also designed to acknowledge power relations and hidden interests, social 
participation, and other ―soft‖ values.  Pluralism-as-a-methodology approaches are 
therefore compatible with Post-Normal Science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990, 1991), as 
Post-Normal Science recommends a shift away from an outcome focus and a move 
toward the assessment of the quality of the decision process and the power relations 
between stakeholders.   
There are a number of caveats of pluralism-as-a-methodology approaches, such 
as the potential for unsuccessful facilitation, no firm guidelines on how to select 
participants for small group deliberation forums and a lack of appreciation of social 
learning principles by the administrators of pluralism-as-a-methodology designs 
(Jorgensen, 2009; Spash, 2007a).  Both DMV and MCA methodological designs often 
administer environmental value surveys after a group deliberation forum.  The survey 
typically asks the focus group participants to weigh up a set of potentially 
incommensurable decision-criteria.  The aim of the survey is not to simply reduce the 
decision criteria into a single metric, but to allow for a survey summary that highlights 
any fundamental difference between the various stakeholder‘s environmental values 
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(e.g. utilitarian versus rights-based perspectives) or incommensurable environmental 
values that are inherent to the environmental issue (need for monetary valuation versus 
need for intergenerational equity).  Value pluralists argue that the policy community 
should be explicitly educated about the range of incommensurable environmental values 
elicited during pluralism-as-a-methodology forums, and that sustainability policy should 
be formulated in light of such awareness (Norgaard, 1989; Spash, 2007a).  
 
7.3.4  Biophysical limitations 
Neoclassical economists typically assume that there are no biophysical 
limitations to economic growth because it is possible to make substitutability-based 
trade-offs between exhaustible resources, renewable resources and reproducible 
resources (e.g. Solow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1979).  For example, aluminium can be used 
instead of copper in electric wires and biomasss can be used instead of oil to provide 
energy.  Advancing technology and the market system are proposed to prevent human 
societies from being exposed to long-term shortage of vital resources.  The field of EE, 
however, is founded upon biophysical theories that question the neoclassical assumption 
of substitutability (Røpke, 2004, 2005).  Ecological economists challenge the 
neoclassical assumption that human economies will not run out of resources, arguing 
that there are only a few kinds of resources that are capable of eventually yielding 
extractive products at constant or declining costs (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1990; Georgescu-
Roegen, 1975, 1993).   
Furthermore, ecological economists have for a number of decades argued that 
the intensive use of natural resources has put the earth‘s natural systems under a large 
degree of stress (Ehrlich, 1989).  Ecological economists use analogies such as entropy, 
critical points, phase transition and non-linear dynamics to argue that planet earth is 
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currently being irreversibly harmed by the waste products of human economic 
development. The biophysically orientated economists (e.g. Daly and Georgescu-
Roegen) propose that human societies should aim for achieving a ―steady-state 
economy‖ rather than ―sustainable growth‖ in order to work within the biophysical 
limitations of planet earth.  Daly (1990) argues that the term ―sustainable growth‖, when 
applied to the economy, is a bad oxymoron as when the economy grows it gets bigger 
and requires more resources.  In its physical dimensions Daly argues that the economy 
is an open subsystem of the earth‘s ecosystem, which is finite, non-growing, and 
materially closed.  As the economic subsystem grows it incorporates an ever greater 
proportion of the total ecosystem into itself and must reach a limit at 100%, if not 
before.  Therefore, it can be concluded that economic growth based primarily upon 
material and energy growth is not sustainable over the long-term.   
 
7.4 The link between economic worldview assumptions and 
validity assessments of environmental value surveys 
Assessing the validity of an environmental value survey is a subjective process.  
Different theoretical definitions of environmental value will result in economists 
seeking out different forms of evidence to assess the validity of an environmental value 
scale.  For example, CVM practitioners interpret survey responses based upon 
neoclassical assumptions positing that people are capable of using utilitarian decision-
making to summarise environmental value in terms of a monetary estimate.  When 
CVM practitioners attempt to empirically assess the construct validity of their monetary 
reductionism survey instrument they look for evidence such as a significant income 
effect (where higher income groups offer a higher WTP) or a low hypothetical bias 
(where hypothetical CVM bids are consistent with real monetary bids).  Value pluralists 
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who advocate pluralism-as-a-methodology approaches, on the other hand, look to 
validate their survey approaches by looking for evidence of incommensurable 
environmental values.  Value pluralists will seek out empirical evidence that some 
aspects of environmental value are incommensurable or that the environmental values 
of different stakeholders are incommensurable. For example, a social multi-criteria 
analysis survey may seek to demonstrate that pro-development groups assess a proposed 
environmental change in term of money, while environmental groups assess the 
environmental change in terms of heritage or intrinsic value. 
Vatn (2004) suggests that economists have a tendency to judge the 
environmental value survey data based upon worldview assumption rather than 
exploring survey data with an open mind.  For example, Vatn points out that economists 
either regard CVM as being a methodology that offers a legitimate economic valuation 
when administered under state of the art conditions or, economists dismiss the whole 
CVM valuation exercise.  Vatn argues that few economists are willing to use CVM data 
to learn more about how the general public actually economically values the 
environment.  When economists conclude that an environmental value survey is valid 
because it is consistent with their proposed theoretical framework, they are making a 
judgement about the surveys based primarily on content validity criteria and are highly 
vulnerable to the confirmation bias.  
An aim of the upcoming empirical analysis is to examine the degree to which 
economists assess the validity of an environmental value survey by judging whether the 
survey approach is consistent with their worldview assumptions.  It is proposed that the 
contrasting worldview assumptions of the EE community and the E&RE community 
will be able to explain differences in the validity assessments of different environmental 
value survey options.  In particular, the upcoming analysis will explore whether 
differences between the E&RE community and the EE community in the validity 
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assessments of monetary valuation methodologies and a social multi-criteria analysis 
methodology can be explained by divergent ratings of importance of the concepts of 
CBA, value pluralism, pluralism-as-a-methodology and biophysical limitations.  If the 
economists‘ worldview assumptions are found to heavily influence conclusions about 
the validity of survey designs then this would add weight to Vatn‘s (2004) claim that 
economists assess environmental surveys according to content validity rather than being 
open to learning more from the survey results about how the general public 
economically values a proposed environmental change.   
 
7.5 Study overview 
A survey that was administered to five conferences will be used to compare the 
approach of the E&RE community and the EE community.  While non-economists from 
these conferences also responded to the survey, the upcoming empirical analysis will 
only examine survey responses by conference delegates who identified themselves as 
being economists.  Delegates from the conferences were asked to assess the importance 
of key concepts for addressing environmental problems.  The key concepts referred to 
CBA, value pluralism, pluralism-as-a-methodology and biophysical limitations.  The 
first hypothesis proposes that the E&RE community and the EE community have 
different worldview assumptions.  This hypothesis can be further broken down into the 
following four sub-hypotheses that explore the importance ratings of specific economy-
environment interface concepts: 
Hypothesis 1.1:  As the E&RE community rely heavily on CBA assumptions, while 
some prominent members of the EE community are critical of the CBA approach, it is 
hypothesised that E&RE community will have higher ratings of importance for the 
concept of CBA than the EE community. 
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Hypothesis 1.2:  As value pluralism is a topic that has been developed in the EE 
literature rather than the E&RE literature, it is hypothesised that the EE community will 
have higher ratings for the concept of value pluralism than the E&RE community. 
Hypothesis 1.3:  As pluralism-as-a-methodology has been developed by the EE 
community and has been largely ignored by the E&RE community, it is hypothesised 
that the EE community will have higher importance ratings of the concept of pluralism-
as-a-methodology than the E&RE community. 
Hypothesis 1.4:  As the concept of biophysical limitations has been proposed to 
underpin the domain of EE, while the concept of substitutability has been proposed to 
underpin the domain of E&RE, it is hypothesised that the EE community will have 
higher importance ratings of the concept of a steady-state economy than the E&RE 
community. 
 
The conference survey also asked participants to assess the validity of three 
economic publications that discussed assessing environmental value with survey 
methodologies.  Two of these studies (Costanza, d'Arge et al., 1997; Hanley, Wright & 
Adamowicz, 1998) proposed that the environment should be valued in monetary terms, 
while the other publication (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998) advocates the pluralism-as-a-
methodology approach of multi-criteria analysis when there are aspects of 
environmental value that cannot be simply reduced to a dollar figure.  The following 
sub-hypotheses will therefore be assessed: 
Hypothesis 2.1:  As monetary valuation methodologies are more widely administered in 
the E&RE community than in the EE community it is hypothesised that the E&RE 
community assess methodologies designed to measure environmental change in 
monetary terms as being more valid than the EE community.   
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Hypothesis 2.2:  As pluralism-as-a-methodology is a methodological approach 
developed and advocated by the EE community it is hypothesised that social multi-
criteria designs will be assessed as being more valid by the EE community than by the 
E&RE community. 
 
Finally an argument put forward by this thesis is that economists assess the 
validity of environmental value surveys primarily according to the compatibility 
between the survey design and the researcher‘s ideology/worldview assumptions.  In 
other words, it is proposed that economists judge the validity of survey instruments 
largely according to face validity criteria.  The final hypothesis will examine the 
strength of the relationship between economists worldview assumptions and there 
validity assessment. 
Hypothesis 3:  It is hypothesised that differences between the E&RE community and the 
EE community in validity assessments of environmental survey methodologies can be 
explained by these two economic communities having different ratings of importance 
for the concepts of CBA, value pluralism, pluralism-as-a-methodology and biophysical 
limitations. 
 
7.6 Methodology 
7.6.1  Recruitment 
In 2009 a survey was administered by the author of this thesis during five 
conferences exploring issues related to the economy-environment interface.  These 
conferences were:   
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(i) The United States Society of Ecological Economics (USSEE) conference held in 
New York, United States (23
rd
 June to 26
th
 June 2009) 
(ii) The 17th Annual European Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economics (EAERE) conference held in Amsterdam (24
th
 June to 27
th
 June 2009) 
(iii) The European Society of Ecological Economics (ESEE) conference held in 
Ljubljana, Slovenia (29
th
 June to 2
nd
 July 2009) 
(iv) The Canadian Society of Ecological Economics (CANSEE) conference held in 
Vancouver, Canada (20
th
 October to 22
nd
 October 2009) 
(v) The Australia & New Zealand Ecological Economics Society (ANZEE) 
conference held in Darwin, Australia (27
th
 October to 30
th
 October 2009) 
 
 The survey was included as part of the conference pack at the ESEE, CANSEE 
and ANZEE conferences, while the survey was personally administered to USSEE and 
EAERE conference delegates by the author of this thesis.  During all five of the 
conferences a researcher roamed the conference venues proactively encouraging 
delegates to complete and submit the survey.     
 
7.6.2  The conference survey 
The survey asked conference delegates to (i) assess the importance of key 
concepts, (ii) assess the validity of noted works and (iii) to provide information about 
their research field.  The survey included an environmental belief scale that will not be 
analysed in the current chapter.  Finally, the survey also collected some basic 
demographic information from respondents. 
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Rating of key concepts  
The survey asked participants to rate the ―importance‖ of seven key concepts 
that have been applied by economists to ―address environmental problems‖.  These key 
concepts referred to a neoclassical concept (Cost-Benefit Analysis), value pluralism 
concepts (Incommensurability, Post-Normal Science and Non-Utilitarian Ethics), 
pluralism-as-a-methodology concepts (Social Multi-Criteria Analysis and Small Group 
Deliberation) and a biophysical limits concept (Steady-State Economy). 
Participants were asked to rate the importance of each of the seven concepts on a 
7-point Likert scale (1 = ―Not at all important; 4 = Moderately important; 7 = Extremely 
Important).  As it was expected that not all conference delegates would have heard of all 
seven of the concepts, a ―Don‘t know‖ response option was also available. 
 
Assessment of environmental valuation publications 
Participants were asked to read ―short summaries of research reports or articles 
from the environmental literature‖ that addressed measuring environmental value with 
survey methodologies.  These articles were:  
(i) The value of the world‘s ecosystem services and natural capital 
(Costanza, d'Arge et al., 1997) 
(ii) Weak comparability of values as a foundations for ecological 
economics (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998) 
(iii) Using choice experiments to value the environment: Design issues, 
current experience and future prospects (Hanley et al., 1998) 
 
Table 7.1 displays the short summaries of the three publications that were 
presented to participants before they were asked to assess the validity of the 
methodology discussed in the article.  These three articles were chosen because they 
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advocate different methodologies for valuing the environment.   The articles by 
Costanza et al. (1997) and Hanley et al. (1998) both discuss methodologies that 
ultimately seek to value the environment in monetary terms.  The Costanza et al. paper, 
which places a dollar value on the earth by using a benefit transfer methodology, was 
selected because it is both highly cited and extremely controversial.  While the Costanza 
et al. paper has been well received by the E&RE community and policymakers, 
prominent ecological economists have question the scientific validity of the benefit 
transfer methodology that was employed in the paper (e.g. Spash  & Vatn, 2006).  The 
article by Hanley et al. was selected because it is a leading paper advocating choice 
experiements, which represent an alternative methodology to CVM for placing a 
monetary value on a proposed environmental change.  In the last decade the popularity 
of the choice experiment environmental valuation option has rapidly grown, especially 
in the E&RE community.  The article by Martinez-Alier et al. (1998), on the other hand, 
is a leading paper that refers to a methodology that does not seek to reduce 
environmental value into monetary units.  The Martinez-Alier et al. paper was chosen 
because it advocates multi-criteria evaluation techniques that do not aim at simply 
estimating an unbiased monetary value for an environmental change, but rather aims to 
acknowledge incommensurability and explore power relations between stakeholders.    
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Table 7.1:  Summaries of the three publications 
Article Description of environmental valuation publication presented 
to participants filling out the survey 
 
Costanza et al.  
(1997)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hanley et al. 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Martinez-Alier et 
al.  (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
―This paper estimates the value of the world‘s ecosystem 
services and natural capital by transferring values from a 
large number of previously published empirical studies.  
Many, but not all of the studies provided an estimate of the 
‗willingness-to-pay‘ of individuals for a particular ecosystem 
service in a particular biome.  Based on these studies, and 
some new calculations, the per unit area value of 17 biomes 
was estimated and multiplied by the total area of each biome 
on Earth.  All the biomes were then summed to provide a 
global aggregate value.  The authors concluded that the 
current worldwide economic value of the 17 ecosystem 
services for 16 biomes is in the range of US$16-54 trillion 
per year with a best guess of US$33 trillion.‖ 
 
―This paper argues that choice experiments offer a promising 
new way forward in the field of environmental valuation.  
The approach defines the environment as a good which has 
attributes which individual respondents are willing and able 
to trade-off, one against another.  Designing a choice 
experiment requires a careful selection of the attributes 
deemed as policy relevant.  The experiments are concluded 
to be simpler than the contingent valuation method because 
people are asked to make a pair-wise comparison between 
outcomes rather than an ―all‖ or ―nothing‖ decisions about an 
environmental change.  The conclusion is that choice 
experiments allow a superior means of valuing marginal 
changes in specific aspects of the environment (e.g. species, 
aesthetics, water quality) in monetary terms‖. 
 
―This paper argues that environmental change often involves 
conflict between competing values and interests, which 
cannot be addressed satisfactorily by the monetary, 
reductionist, trade-off assumptions of neoclassical 
economics.  In such circumstances the use of a 
multidimensional approach is more desirable.  A specific 
type of multi-criteria approach is advocated.  Rather than 
aiming to find a rational solution that optimises all the 
criteria, a process is suggested in which the decision-maker 
seeks compromise solutions based on criterion of procedural 
rationality.  This is expected to increase the transparency of 
the decision process.  The authors argue that such multi-
criteria evaluation techniques cannot solve all conflicts, but 
they can help to provide more insight into the nature of 
conflicts and means for political compromise.‖ 
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After reading the description of the papers outlined in Table 7.1, participants 
were asked to assess the validity of the survey methodologies discussed in the 
publications.  For each publication they were asked whether: 
(i) ―The methodology presented in this study allows for an accurate assessment 
of the economic value of environmental entities and change‖ 
(ii)  ―The methodology used in this study should be applied to a wide array of 
environmental problems‖  
All responses were on a Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 3 = Undecided; 5 = 
Strongly Agree).   
 
Research field 
 Participants were asked to indicate whether economics was one of their primary 
research disciplines.  Participants who described themselves as being economists were 
then asked to indicate whether their economic approach was ―heterodox‖, 
―neoclassical‖ or ―other‖.  Participants were also asked to indicate their academic 
background if they did not classify themselves as being an economist. 
 
7.6.3  Conference Participants  
 235 participants from the five conferences responded to the survey.  Table 7.2 
displays the economic background of the participants from each conference.  The 
upcoming analysis will compare the survey responses of the economists from EE 
conferences (USSEE, ESEE, CANSEE and ANZEE) with the survey responses of 
economists who participated in the E&RE conference (EAERE). 
 The four EE conferences consisted of a large proportion of heterodox 
economists, while over half the sample from the E&RE conference (EAERE) were 
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identified as neoclassical economists.  Notably only one participant from the EAERE 
indicated that he was a non-economist (but rather a statistician).  In contrast, at the EE 
conferences between 22% and 40% of the survey respondents classified themselves as 
being non-economists.  The background of non-economists who attended the four 
ecological economics conferences was diverse in that it included ecologists, policy 
experts, political scientists, geographers, anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, 
engineers, mathematicians and climate scientists.  
 
Table 7.2:  Number of participants who completed a survey at each the conferences.  
Whether a participants was an economist and if so what type of economist is also 
displayed    
 E&RE 
conference 
 EE Conferences   
  
EAERE 
  
USSEE 
 
 
ESEE 
 
CANSEE 
 
ANZEE 
  
All 
Conferences 
 
Heterodox 
Economists 
 
Neoclassical 
Economists 
 
Other 
Economists 
 
Non-
Economists 
 
Total 
 
11 
(24%) 
 
24 
(53%) 
 
9 
(20%) 
 
1 
(2%) 
 
45 
(100%) 
  
14 
(52%) 
 
1 
(4%) 
 
6 
(22%) 
 
6 
(22%) 
 
27 
(100%) 
 
40 
(42%) 
 
2 
(2%) 
 
22 
(23%) 
 
31 
(33%) 
 
95 
(100%
) 
 
 11 
(37%) 
 
1 
(3%) 
 
6 
(20%) 
 
12 
(40%) 
 
30 
(100%) 
 
9 
(24%) 
 
6 
(16%) 
 
8 
(21%) 
 
15 
(39%) 
 
38 
(100%) 
  
85 
(36%) 
 
34 
(14%) 
 
51 
(22%) 
 
65 
(28%) 
 
235 
(100%) 
 
 
7.6.4   Demographics of economist respondents 
 The following analysis will examine the survey responses of the economist 
sample, while the survey responses of the non-economist sample will not be examined.  
The results section will compare the responses of economists who attended the EE 
conferences with the responses of economists who attended the E&RE conference.  
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Table 7.3 displays the demographics of these two economist groups.  Table 7.3 notes 
that no significant differences in demographics were found, with both economist 
samples consisting of majority males, post-graduates and delegates who were under 56 
years of age.  
 
Table 7.3: Comparison of demographics of the economists who attended the E&RE 
conference and the economists who attended the EE conferences 
 Economists who 
attended the E&RE 
conference  
(EAERE) 
Economists who 
attended the EE 
Conference 
(USSEE, ESEE, 
CANSEE and 
ANZEE) 
 
Comparison of 
Demographics 
 
Number of Surveys 
completed  
 
 
44 
 
126 
 
 
 
Gender 
 
67% Males 
33% Females 
74% Males 
26% Females 
 
Χ2 (1) = 0.60 
Highest 
Educational Degree 
Obtained 
 
 
95% completed 
postgrad  
5% completed 
undergrad  
 
93% completed 
postgrad  
7% completed  
Undergrad 
 
 
 
Age 
 
52%  18-35 years 
41%  36-55 years 
7%  56-75 years 
 
40%  18-35 years 
42%  36-55 years 
18%  56-75 years 
 
Χ2 (2) = 3.72 
* < .05 
Note:  A χ2 test was not performed for the education group as one cell had an expected 
count of less than 5 
 
 
7.7 Results  
The results section will compare survey responses of economists who attended the 
E&RE conference with economists who attended the EE conference.  The first part of 
the results section will employ an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and frequency 
analysis to compare the ratings of importance for the economy-environment interface 
concepts for the two economist groups.  The second part of the results section will use 
an ANOVA to compare the two economist groups‘ validity assessments of 
methodologies discussed in three publications.  The third part of the results section will 
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use correlations and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to examine the relationship 
between the economy-environment interface concept ratings and the validity assessment 
of the methodologies discussed in the three publications. 
 
7.7.1   Rating of importance of economy-environment interface concepts 
Table 7.4 displays the percentages of participants who stated they had not heard 
of the economy-environment interface concepts.  There were two pluralism related 
concepts that participants from the EE conferences where more likely to have heard of 
than participants from the E&RE conference.  The EE conference delegates were more 
likely than the E&RE conference delegates to have heard of the value pluralism 
concepts of post-normal science (χ2 (1) = 18.09, p < .001) and the pluralism-as-a-
methodology concept of small group deliberation (χ 2 (1) = 13.21, p < .001.   
Table 7.4 also displays the mean and standard deviations for the rating of 
importance of the seven economy-environment interface concepts for the two economic 
community samples.  The results of Table 7.4 are consistent with the expected divisions 
between the E&RE community and the EE community.  Levene‘s test revealed that 
there was no significant difference in error variance between the economic community 
samples for any of the concept ratings at a .05 level.  The ANOVAs revealed that the 
concept of CBA was rated as being significantly more important by the E&RE 
community, while the EE community rated the value pluralisms concept, the pluralism-
as-a-methodology concepts and the biophysical limits concept as being more important.   
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Table 7.4:  Response statistics for the ratings of the economy-environment interface 
concepts 
 N# Percentage 
of ―don‘t 
know‖  
or missing 
responses 
Mean 
rating 
score 
SD Between group 
difference test  
Neoclassical Concept 
CBA 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
 
 
44 
123 
 
 
0% 
2% 
 
 
5.36 
3.63 
 
 
 
1.40 
1.70 
 
 
F(1,165) = 36.79*** 
Value Pluralism 
Concepts 
Post-normal science 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
 
 
 
18 
95 
 
 
 
59%*** 
24% 
 
 
 
3.22 
5.19 
 
 
 
2.37 
1.53 
 
 
 
F(1,111) = 20.46*** 
Non-utilitarian ethics 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
 
35 
108 
 
21% 
14% 
 
3.86 
5.39 
 
1.68 
1.56 
 
F(1, 141) = 24.43*** 
Pluralism-as-a-
methodology Concepts 
Social multi-criteria 
analysis 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
113 
 
 
 
 
11% 
10% 
 
 
 
 
4.77 
5.48 
 
 
 
 
1.39 
1.27 
 
 
 
 
F(1, 150) = 8.63** 
Small group 
deliberation 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
 
 
29 
112 
 
 
34%*** 
10% 
 
 
3.59 
4.73 
 
 
1.70 
1.43 
 
 
F(1, 139) = 13.52*** 
Biophysical Limits 
Concept 
Steady-state Economy 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
 
 
 
42 
110 
 
 
 
5% 
12% 
 
 
 
4.19 
5.15 
 
 
 
1.71 
1.66 
 
 
 
F(1,150) = 10.07** 
#N refers to the Number of participants who presented a rating score for the economy-
environment concepts.  Does not include ―don‘t know‖ responses 
* < .05; ** < .01, *** < .001 
 
7.7.2   Assessment of environmental valuation publications   
Table 7.5 displays the validity assessment of the methodologies discussed by the 
three publications for the E&RE sample and the EE sample.  Levene‘s test revealed that 
there was no significant difference in error variance between the economic community 
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samples for any of the journal paper ratings at a .05 level.  An ANOVA revealed that 
the monetary valuation survey studies of Costanza et al. (1997) and Hanley et al. (1998) 
were rated as being more accurate by the E&RE participants than the EE participants.  
The E&RE participants when compared to the EE participants also indicated that the 
monetary valuation methods used by Costanza et al. and Hanley et al. should be applied 
to a wider array of environmental problems.  An ANOVA revealed no significant 
differences between the E&RE participants and the EE participants in the accuracy 
assessments of the multi-criteria analysis methodology discussed by Martinez-Aliers et 
al. (1997). An ANOVA did reveal, however, that the EE participants had higher 
agreement with the proposition that the multi-criteria approach proposed by Martinez-
Aliers et al. should be applied to a wider array of environmental problems.   
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Table 7.5:  Assessment of the validity of the methodology discussed in the three 
environmental valuation publications  
 N Mean  
score 
SD Between group 
difference test  
Survey methodologies designed to 
measure environmental value in 
monetary terms 
    
Costanza et al. (1997) 
Methodology is accurate 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
Methodology should be widely 
administered  
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
 
 
40 
121 
 
 
 
40 
120 
 
 
2.95 
2.12 
 
 
 
3.28 
2.59 
 
 
1.18 
1.05 
 
 
 
1.16 
1.11 
 
 
F (1,159) = 17.86*** 
 
 
 
 
F (1,158) = 10.59*** 
 
Hanley et al. (1998) 
Methodology is accurate 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
Methodology should be widely 
administered  
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
 
 
42 
110 
 
 
 
42 
110 
 
 
 
3.10 
2.66 
 
 
 
3.57 
2.89 
 
 
1.10 
.94 
 
 
 
.97 
1.10 
 
 
F (1,150) = 5.81* 
 
 
 
 
F (1,150) = 12.80*** 
 
 
Survey methodology designed to 
measure pluralistic 
environmental values  
    
Martinez-Aliers et al. (1998) 
Methodology is accurate 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
Methodology should be widely 
administered 
E&RE Conference 
EE Conferences 
 
 
39 
115 
 
 
 
39 
115 
 
 
3.21 
3.53 
 
 
 
3.49 
3.96 
 
 
.95 
.95 
 
 
 
.79 
.82 
 
 
F (1,152) = 3.42 
 
 
 
 
F (1,152) = 9.70** 
 
* < .05; ** < .01, *** < .001 
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7.7.3   Relationship between economy-environment interface concepts and validity 
assessments of the methodologies presented in the environmental valuation 
publications 
The final analysis explores the relationship between the validity assessments of 
the methodologies discussed by the three journal articles and the ratings of importance 
for the economy-environment interface concepts.  Table 7.6 displays the Pearson 
bivariate correlations between the ratings of the economy-environment interface 
concepts and the journal article validity assessments.   
Table 7.6 demonstrates that there were strong positive correlations above a .01 
significance level between assessment of the importance of the CBA and assessment of 
the validity of monetary valuation methodologies discussed by Costanza et al. (1997) 
and Hanley et al. (1998) methodologies.  The more important a participant rated the 
concept of CBA, the more likely they were to rate the papers of Costanza et al. and 
Hanley et al. as being valid.  Table 7.6 also reports some significant negative 
relationships at a .05 level only between the Costanza et al. and Hanley et al. validity 
assessments and the concepts of post-normal science, non-utilitarian ethic, small group 
deliberation and biophysical limitations.   
Table 7.6 also demonstrates the correlations between the ratings of the validity 
of the Martinez-Aliers et al. (1997) pluralism-as-a-methodology paper and the 
economy-environment concepts.  Not surprisingly, there was a strong correlation at a 
.01 level between the accuracy assessment of the Martinez-Aliers methodology and the 
importance rating of the social multi-criteria analysis concept.  There was also a 
significant correlation at a .05 level between the accuracy assessment of the Martinez-
Aliers methodology and the importance ratings of post-normal science and small group 
deliberation.   
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All of the economy-environment concepts, except the concept of steady-state 
economy, had a significant correlation at a .01 level with the rating of how widely the 
Martinez-Aliers et al. methodology should be administered.  The CBA concept 
importance rating had a negative correlation with assessments of how widely the 
Martinez-Aliers et al. should be employed, while the value pluralism concepts and the 
pluralism-as-a-methodology concepts had a positive relationship. 
 
Table 7.6:  Pearson bivariant correlations between ratings of economy-environment 
concepts and environmental valuation publications 
 Costanza et 
al.  method 
is accurate 
Costanza et 
al method 
should be 
widely 
administered  
Hanley et 
al.  method 
is accurate 
Hanley et al 
method 
should be 
widely 
administered  
Martinez-
Aliers et al.  
method is 
accurate 
Martinez-
Aliers et al. 
method 
should be 
widely 
administered 
CBA 
 
.48** 
(n = 158) 
.51** 
(n = 157) 
.37** 
(n = 149) 
.53** 
(n = 149) 
-.11 
(n = 151) 
-.23** 
(n = 151) 
 
Post-
Normal 
Science 
-.23* 
(n = 110) 
-.19* 
(n = 109) 
-.03 
(n = 102) 
-.14 
(n = 102) 
.18* 
(n = 107) 
.32** 
(n = 107) 
 
 
Non-
Utilitarian 
Ethic 
 
-.18* 
(n = 136) 
 
-.20* 
(n = 135) 
 
-.11 
(n = 128) 
 
-.20* 
(n = 128) 
 
.10 
(n = 130) 
 
.27** 
(n = 130) 
 
 
Social 
Multi-
Criteria 
Analysis 
 
-.08 
(n = 143) 
 
-.04 
(n = 142) 
 
.03 
(n = 136) 
 
-.09 
(n = 136) 
 
.34** 
(n = 138) 
 
.48** 
(n = 138) 
 
 
Small 
group 
deliberation 
 
-.18* 
(n = 133) 
 
-.15 
(n = 132) 
 
-.01 
(n = 128) 
 
-.08 
(n = 128) 
 
.17* 
(n = 130) 
 
.39** 
(n= 130) 
 
 
Steady-
State 
Economy  
 
-.11 
(n = 144) 
 
-.01 
(n= 143) 
 
-.14 
(n = 136) 
 
-.18* 
(n = 136) 
 
.09 
(n = 137) 
 
.05 
(n = 137) 
 
* < .05; ** < .01, *** < .001 
 
 
The final set of analyses employed an ANCOVA procedure.  Economy-
environment interface concepts that reported correlations at significant less than a .01 
level in Table 7.6 were included in the ANCOVA as a covariant in a model that 
assessed differences in how the E&RE community and the EE community assessed the 
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validity of the methodologies discussed in the three journal articles (see Table 7.5).  
Each of the ANCOVAs assessed differences in the validity ratings of the journal article 
methodologies by the E&RE community and the EE community after the variance 
associated with the importance rating of a key environment-economy concept was 
accounted for.   
Table 7.6 reported that there was a strong relationship between validity ratings 
of the two monetary valuation papers and ratings of the importance of the CBA concept.  
Four ANCOVAs were performed to determine whether the significant differences 
between the E&RE community and the EE community in the validity rating of the 
Costanza et al. and Hanley et al. articles were still present after importance ratings of 
the CBA concept was accounted for as a covariate.  Table 7.7 demonstrates the results 
of the four ANCOVAs.  Table 7.7 demonstrates that when importance ratings of CBA 
were included as a covariant there was no significant difference in how the E&RE 
community and the EE assessed the validity of the monetary valuation methodologies. 
 
 
Table 7.7:  ANCOVA comparing the rating of monetary valuation articles for the 
E&RE community and the EE community when importance ratings of CBA is included 
as a covariant 
 Costanza et al.  
methodology is 
Accurate 
Costanza et al. 
methodology 
should be 
widely 
administered 
Hanley et al. 
methodology is 
Accurate 
 
Hanley et al. 
methodology 
should be 
widely 
administered 
Intercept 
 
E&RE versus EE 
 
Covariate - CBA 
 
Error df 
 
F (1) = 29.99*** 
 
F (1) = 2.37 
 
F (1) = 29.80*** 
 
155 
F (1) = 35.54*** 
 
F (1) = .04 
 
F (1) = 42.30*** 
 
154 
F (1) = 75.67***  
 
F (1) = .27 
 
F (1) = 16.64*** 
 
146 
F (1) = 66.65*** 
 
F (1) = .69 
 
F(1) = 42.59*** 
 
146 
* < .05; ** < .01; *** <.001 
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Table 7.6 demonstrated that assessments of how widely the multi-criteria 
analysis methodology proposed by Martinez et al. (1998) should be administered had a 
strong relationship with the importance ratings for pluralism concepts and CBA.  An 
ANCOVA was therefore performed to determine whether there were still significant 
differences between the E&RE community and the EE community ratings of the how 
widely the Martinez et al. methodology should be employed when the importance 
ratings of the concepts of CBA, value pluralism and pluralism-as-a-methodology were 
included in the model as covariates.  Table 7.8 displays the results of the five 
ANCOVAs.  Table 7.8 reveals that there was no significant difference in the assessment 
of how widely the Martinez et al. methodology should be administered after accounting 
for CBA, post-normal science, social multi-criteria analysis and small group 
deliberation.  There was only a significant difference between the E&RE community 
and the EE community at a .05 level when importance ratings of the concept of non-
utilitarian ethics were included in the model as a covariate. 
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Table 7.8:  ANCOVA comparing the rating of the Martinez et al. (1998) articles for the 
E&RE sample and the EE sample 
 Martinez et al.  
Wide 
 
ANCOVA with CBA as covariate  
E&RE versus EE 
Covariate - Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
ANCOVA with Post-Normal Science as covariate 
E&RE versus EE 
Covariate – Post Normal Science 
 
ANCOVA with Non-Utilitarian Ethic as covariate 
E&RE versus EE 
Covariate - Non-Utilitarian Ethic 
 
ANCOVA with Social Multi-Criteria analysis as 
covariate 
E&RE versus EE 
Covariate - Social Multi-criteria analysis 
 
ANCOVA with Small Group Deliberation as covariate 
E&RE versus EE 
Covariate - Small Group Deliberation 
 
 
 
F (1) = 3.60 
F (1) = 2.86 
 
 
F(1)  = .08 
      F (1) = 9.87** 
 
 
F (1) = 4.15* 
F (1) = 6.14* 
 
 
 
F (1) = 1.62 
      F (1) = 34.64** 
 
 
F (1) = .41 
        F (1) = 19.45** 
 
 
 
7.8  Conclusions 
An empirical study supported the hypothesis that the E&RE community attaches 
higher importance to the concept of CBA than the EE community, while the EE 
community attaches higher importance to the value pluralism concepts, pluralism-as-a-
methodology and a biophysical limitation concept.  These empirical findings support 
the arguments put forward by various ecological economists (e.g. Funtowicz & Ravetz, 
1990; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Norgaard, 1989; O'Neill, 1992; Røpke, 2004, 2005; 
Söderbaum, 2000; Spash, 1999, 2000a) that the discipline of EE is built upon a different 
economic-environment conceptual framework to the discipline of E&RE.  This finding 
is also consistent with the argument outlined in Chapter 2 that the disciplines of E&RE 
and EE are based upon different ideologies. 
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Contact with the wider scientific community and awareness of concepts may be 
also be a contributing factor to the divergent economy-environment interface ratings by 
the E&RE and EE communities.  Ecological economists were found to be attending 
conferences with delegates from a broad range of non-economic backgrounds, while the 
overwhelming majority of delegates at the E&RE conference considered themselves to 
be economists.  Education and awareness about value pluralism may also be a 
contributing influence to the different ratings of importance, as the EE samples were 
significantly more aware of the concepts of post-normal science and group deliberation 
than the E&RE sample was. 
Survey validity refers to the degree to which the survey measures what it claims 
to measure, and as discussed in Chapter 3 a validity judgement can sometimes be very 
subjective.  The current Chapter assessed perceptions of validity according to two 
criteria, with the first criteria being participant ratings of the perceived accuracy of the 
environmental valuation methodology and the second criteria being an assessment of 
whether the methodology should be applied to a wide array of environmental issues.  It 
should be noted, that although Chapter 7 uses perceptions of accuracy as a proxy for 
validity, accuracy and validity are distinguishable concepts.  For example, a scale with a 
high level of random error could be judged as being valid while simultaneously 
possessing a low level of accuracy.     
The hypothesis that the E&RE community and the EE community offer different 
conclusions about the validity of environmental value survey methodologies was also 
supported.  It was proposed that the E&RE community depends heavily upon measuring 
the value of an environmental change in monetary terms.  The empirical study 
concluded that the E&RE community rated the monetary valuation survey 
methodologies discussed by Costanza et al. (1997) and Hanley et al. (1998) as being 
more accurate than the EE community.  The E&RE community also rated the monetary 
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valuation survey methodologies as being more worthy of being applied to a wide array 
of environmental issues than the EE community.  The differences between these two 
economic communities in the validity assessments of the monetary value survey 
methodologies were found to be dependent upon ratings of importance of the CBA 
concept.  Differences between the economic communities in the validity assessments of 
the two monetary valuation survey methodologies disappeared when ratings of 
importance of CBA was included in the comparison of means model as a covariate.  
This suggests that a belief that CBA is an important economy-environment interface 
concept is a requirement for monetary valuation surveys methodologies to be deemed to 
be valid.   
No significant difference between the E&RE community and the EE community 
were found in the accuracy ratings of the social multi-criteria analysis methodology 
discussed by Martinez-Alier et al. (1998).  The aim of the social multi-criteria analysis 
proposed by Martinez-Alier et al., however, was not to measure an accurate or unbiased 
estimate of environmental value.  The aim of the social multi-criteria approach is to 
allow for the expression of different environmental values rather than being an attempt 
to objectively measure environmental value.  The EE community were found to have 
stronger beliefs that the social multi-criteria analysis method discussed by Martinez-
Aliers et al. should be more widely administered to environmental issues than the 
E&RE community did.  Differences between the economic communities in preferences 
of how widely the social multi-criteria approach should be applied to environmental 
issues disappeared, however, when the importance ratings for the concepts of CBA, 
post-normal science and pluralism-as-a-methodology were taken into account as 
covariates.  This finding supports the hypothesis that economist conclusions about the 
validity of multi-criteria analysis methodologies are dependent upon their general 
worldview assumptions regarding value pluralism and CBA. 
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The original impetus for the ecological economics movement was a new 
economic philosophy put forward by Georgescu-Roegen, Daly and Boulding, who  
proposed that humans live in a world where there are limited resources (Røpke, 2004, 
2005).  While the concept of steady-state economy has been argued to be a foundational 
concept for the field of EE (Røpke, 2004), this biophysical limitation concept was not 
found to have a strong relationship with validity assessments of either the monetary 
reductionism methodology journal papers or the pluralism-as-a-methodology journal 
paper. This suggests that differences in the validity assessments of environmental 
survey methodologies are the result of disagreements about whether environmental 
values can be reduced to a single metric (e.g. CBA suggest that it is possible to compare 
and reduce environmental values to a unifying metric while value pluralism argues the 
opposite), rather than being influenced by worldview opinions about whether the goal of 
economic policy should be sustainable development or a steady-state economy.   
The empirical investigation conducted in this chapter suggests that an 
economist‘s validity assessments of environmental value surveys are heavily influenced 
by their worldview assumptions.  Both the E&RE community and the EE community 
were found to assess the validity of survey methodologies according to content validity 
criterion.  Content validity is established deductively by assessing the match between 
the environmental value survey and the theoretical domain that the researcher is 
interested in.  For example, as monetary reductionism surveys such as CVM are 
explicitly designed for people to make CBA trade-offs, economists who have a strong 
belief that CBA approaches result in the best decisions are more likely to rate CVM as 
being a valid methodology.  The thesis, however, argues that when the results of an 
environmental value survey are to be used for environmental policy, economists should 
also examine the construct validity of their interpretation by examining whether the 
interpretation is empirically supported. 
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For economists to claim that survey results offer a scientific measure of 
environmental value, it is important for economists to demonstrate that their survey 
interpretation also has an acceptable degree of construct validity.  There are reasons 
why economists may not be interested in examining the match between their theoretical 
definition of environmental value and survey response patterns.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, when economists administer environmental value surveys with a quasi-
experimental design there are often inherent threats to construct validity such as mono-
method bias, evaluation apprehension and researcher expectancies (Campbell & 
Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979).  Examining construct validity may also 
highlight problems with the researcher‘s interpretations of the survey results (e.g. 
anchoring bias or hypothetical bias) rather than confirming the researcher‘s 
interpretation. 
If the general public or policy community were informed of such construct 
validity threats or response biases they may be less likely to accept the contribution of 
environmental value survey results to sustainability policy.  Any uncertainty about the 
meaning of the scale will be especially worrisome for policymakers who hold logical 
positivistic assumptions about environmental value and simply expect economics to 
provide them with scientific and objective monetary valuations.  A safer strategy for an 
economist hoping to offer policy relevant findings may be to highlight to policymakers 
and the general community that the survey designed is legitimate because it followed a 
set of endorsed administration guidelines (e.g. CVM guidelines by Arrow et al., 1993; 
Mitchell & Carson, 1989; Payne et al., 1999).   
When economists assess the validity of an interpretation of environmental scale 
primarily with content validity criteria they are highly susceptible to the confirmation 
bias.  The results of the empirical study conducted in this chapter suggest that 
economists do not generally have an interest in environmental survey designs that are 
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not consistent with their worldview assumptions.  When empirically assessing the 
environmental value response patterns, however, if economists are only interested in a 
single interpretation of environmental value that is consistent with their worldview 
assumptions then they are ignoring the possibility that an alternative interpretation may 
better explain survey response patterns.   
The next three chapters will examine the construct validity of CVM by 
simultaneously examining multiple interpretations.  The economic interpretation of 
CVM will be compared to the psychology-based contribution model that proposes that 
CVM responses represent an attitudinal response and a charitable contribution.  The 
value pluralism possibility that both the economic model and the contribution model 
partially explain CVM response motives will also be described. 
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Chapter 8 
Three Possible Interpretations of CVM 
8.1  Introduction     
When economists plan to use CVM survey results as the basis for policy advice 
it is important that empirical evidence exists that supports the validity of the 
economist‘s interpretation of CVM.  There are at least three interpretations, however, 
that have been offered to explain Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) response 
motives.  An approach available to economists interested in learning more about how 
people place an economic value on a proposed environmental change is to 
simultaneously assess the validity of each interpretation against actual CVM response 
data.  The approach to examining more than one interpretation of CVM has rarely been 
employed.  When economists are open to assessing the validity of more than one 
interpretation of CVM they are less susceptible to the confirmation bias.  Chapter 8 will 
outline the three competing interpretations of CVM response motives, which are (i) the 
neoclassical economic interpretation, (ii) the psychological-based contribution model 
interpretation and (iii) the value pluralism interpretation.  The validity of these three 
interpretations of CVM response motives will then be empirically examined in Chapters 
9 and 10. 
 
8.2  The neoclassical economic interpretation of CVM 
The traditional neoclassical economic interpretation of CVM has been termed 
the ―purchase model‖ by Kahneman and colleagues (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; 
Kahneman et al., 1993; Kahneman et al., 1999).  The purchase model interpretation of 
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CVM was originally developed by neoclassical economists to describe motivations to 
acquire personal benefits, but can be taken more generally as a characterisation of an 
economic approach where instrumental value consequences for an individual or 
household causally influence evaluations of an act or behaviour.  In reference to CVM 
participants, the economic model assumes that motivated and rational people will be 
willing to provide a monetary estimation that reflects the personal costs and benefits 
that they expect to derive from a specific environmental proposal.   
The theoretical justification for the CVM approach is the neoclassical 
assumption of preformed stable preferences.  This allows CVM practitioners to assume 
that they can provide an informative descriptions of a proposed environmental change to 
participants who will then in return offer a legitimate environmental valuation of the 
personal costs and benefits of the proposal (Spash, 2008c).  The CVM process is 
therefore assumed to allow for ―stable‖, ―objective‖, ―value-neutral‖ and ―unbiased‖ 
environmental value estimations in monetary terms.  There is, however, a vast amount 
of empirical literature assessing the construct validity of CVM, indicating that CVM 
techniques do not directly measure an individual‘s ―true‖ monetary value.  The 
hypothetical bias literature (Foster, Bateman & Harley, 1997; Gregory & Furby, 1987; 
Seip & Strand, 1992) concludes that hypothetical estimations (e.g. WTP or WTA 
questions) do not correspond with actual payments or compensation.  The embedding 
effects literature (Desvousges et al., 1992; Fischhoff et al., 1993; McFadden & Leonard, 
1993) suggests that people are not sensitive to the magnitude of environmental change 
as WTP estimates for part of a good (e.g. cleaning up a single lake in Canada) are often 
similar to WTP estimates for the whole good (e.g. cleaning up all lakes in Canada).  The 
conceptually related scope/scale insensitivity literature (Baron & Greene, 1996; 
Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992; Schkade & Payne, 1993) suggests that participants can be 
insensitive to enormous differences in the quantitative description of the proposal (e.g. 
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saving 200 versus 200,000 endangered species).  Although CVM is proposed to 
measure stable economic preferences, participants have been found to be sensitive to 
whether they are being asked for a Willingness To Pay (WTP) or a Willingness To 
Accept (WTA), with WTA responses typically being double to five times greater than 
WTP (Knetsch, 1995; Knetsch & Sinden, 1984; Loomis et al., 1998; Thayer, 1981). 
Spash (2008a) suggests that the Resource & Environmental Economics (E&RE) 
community have developed the notion of CVM response ―bias‖ in order to argue that 
there is something obscuring the measurement of ―true value‖.  The E&RE community 
interprets evidence that people are not offering an economic response to CVM 
instruments as being a problem of survey design rather than reflecting a problem with 
the neoclassical interpretation of survey data.  The E&RE community has developed 
guidelines that are proposed to help overcome response biases (Arrow et al., 1993; 
Fischhoff et al., 1999; Mitchell & Carson, 1989; Payne et al., 1999).  These guidelines 
add an air of rigour and objectivity to the CVM process (Spash, 2008b).  For example, it 
has been proposed that proper pre-testing and explicit instructions can overcome the 
embedding effect (Mitchell & Carson, 1989) and the hypothetical bias (Smith, 1994).  
The NOAA panel has ruled that WTP is a superior measure of economic value than 
WTA (Arrow et al., 1993).  ―Cheap talk‖ scripts have been also been developed to 
reduce hypothetical bias (Cummings & Taylor, 1999; Murphy, Stevens & Weatherhead, 
2005).  Proponents of CVM argue that when people are administered CVM under the 
right methods, they will provide an economic assessment that is meaningful and does 
not suffer from systematic distortion or serious incompleteness (Carson et al., 2001).   
As CVM guidelines have become more accepted within the E&RE and policy 
community, many CVM practitioners have turned their research energies to ensuring 
that their CVM designs follow the recommended procedures rather than spending 
research energy on empirically examining whether their neoclassical assumptions 
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validly describe CVM response data.  The existence of CVM guidelines reduces the 
onus on CVM practitioners to empirically examine construct validity and increases the 
likelihood of CVM practitioners falling victim to the confirmation bias. 
 
8.3 The contribution model interpretation of CVM   
Kahneman and colleagues (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1993; 
Kahneman et al., 1999) propose an alternative interpretation of WTP which they 
theoretically contrast with the economic ―purchase model‖.  They label their 
interpretation the ―contribution model‖ and assert that it is a psychologically more 
plausible interpretation of a hypothetical monetary offer to pay towards the provision of 
a public good than the mainstream economic interpretation.  The contribution model 
portrays positive WTP bids under the CVM as being motivated by the perception that a 
positive environmental proposal represents a good cause that needs supporting 
(Kahneman & Ritov, 1994).  Respondents are deemed to be fully aware that any 
monetary amount that they personally offer will be insufficient to realise the type of 
societal projects to which CVM is applied (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al., 
1993).  The contribution model posits that the spirit of donation, rather than acquisition, 
is the primary motivation underlying a positive WTP response.  The contribution model 
denies that a positive WTP is representative of the monetary value of the welfare 
benefits arising from an environmental improvement, and points out that some people 
are willing to pay something towards social and environmental changes from which 
they expect to derive no personal utility. 
While many economists acknowledge that actual donations towards public 
goods under CVM are not fully demand revealing, the inferences made by Kahneman 
and colleagues contribution model are far more damning.  The core component of the 
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contribution model is that in a CVM survey, rather than assessing the worth of public 
goods provision, participants are offering a donation that simply reflects their attitudes 
towards the proposed change.  Kahneman and Ritov (1994, p. 28) put forward an 
exclusive attitudinal hypothesis when they state that ―WTP is a measure of attitude on a 
scale of hypothetical dollars‖.  They believe that ―a favourable attitude to an object is 
usually correlated with favourable attitudes to actions that will protect that object from 
harm, or restore it if it has been harmed‖ (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994, p. 7), and suggest 
that a positive WTP bid represents a favourable attitude supporting a proposed societal 
change.  They go on to draw upon Andreoni‘s (1989) warm glow hypothesis and state 
that ―an individual who has a favourable attitude to a cause derives utility from 
contributing to it‖ (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994, p. 8).  Kahneman et al. (1999, p. 207) 
further clarify this by explaining that ―attitudes can be expressed on a scale of dollars, as 
well as on rating scales‖.  This attitudinal hypothesis predicts that WTP responses will 
correlate with a range of attitude measures in social psychology.  The more positive an 
attitude towards an environmental change the greater should be the stated WTP, 
although Kahneman et al. (1999) also argue that the WTP money scale is a 
psychometrically inefficient measure of attitudes.  Kahneman and colleagues therefore 
claim that CVM should be replaced by psychometrically superior attitudinal scales 
(Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1993).   
As the contribution model conceptualises WTP as being a measure of attitude, 
CVM responses are proposed to be a constructed psychological assessment rather than 
an objective economic assessment.  The constructionist psychological approach is able 
to make sense of findings that are anomalies under orthodox economic interpretations.  
For example, the psychological literature acknowledges that attitudinal scales can be 
extremely sensitive to context effects, such as framing and anchoring, while also being 
insensitive to seemingly vital information, such as embedding effects (Fischhoff, 1991; 
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Payne et al., 1999; Schwarz, 2007a, 2007b; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001).  Attitudes 
toward richly experienced psychological ―objects‖, such as family members, one‘s own 
nation and familiar environments, can be particularly vulnerable to context effects 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 2007).  This implies that responses to attitudinal scales 
employed in the context of assessing social and environmental projects can be heavily 
influenced by contextual factors related to measurement design.  Kahneman et al. 
(1999) argue that the nature of cognitive and evaluative processes make context 
dependence an unavoidable aspect of the CVM, and this is not a result of defective 
procedures, nor will changing survey design remove the issue. 
 
8.4 The pluralistic interpretation of CVM 
The third interpretation of CVM is based upon a pluralistic interpretation of 
environmental value.  Value pluralists (e.g. Norgaard, 1989; Söderbaum, 1999) are 
critical of the neoclassical reliance on Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) on philosophical 
grounds and therefore have not traditionally been particularly interested in empirically 
examining CVM response data.  Rather than simply denying CVM as being a legitimate 
valuation methodology, however, it may be possible to find evidence of value pluralism 
in the responses to neoclassical survey designs (Lockwood, 1998; Spash, 1998, 2000b).  
The pluralistic interpretation of CVM proposes that there are different types of decision-
making criteria that people can draw upon when responding to CVM.  Under the 
pluralistic interpretation no single motive interpretation, such as the economic model 
interpretation or the contribution model interpretation, can satisfactorily explain CVM 
response patterns.  Finding evidence of value pluralism in CVM requires taking the 
middle ground proposed by Vatn (2004) in being sensitive to CVM response patterns, 
and by examining more than one interpretation of CVM. 
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An example of a pluralistic interpretation of CVM is the hypothesis that the 
ethical position of the CVM respondents influences their motive for WTP bidding 
behaviour (Spash, 2002b, 2006).  For example, participants with a utilitarian 
environmental ethic may be offering positive WTP bids based upon economic motives, 
while participants with a deontological ethic may be offering positive WTP bids based 
upon contribution motives.  Spash (2008d) notes that if incommensurable and plural 
values arise in a value articulating process of CVM, then this should bring into question 
the neoclassical belief in monetary reductionism. A body of literature is emerging that 
suggests that there are a range of motives for WTP bids including income, economic 
purchase motives, attitudes, perceived control, norms and ethical motives (see Ajzen et 
al., 2000; Brown et al., 1996; Jorgensen & Syme, 2000; Schkade & Payne, 1994; Spash, 
2006; Spash et al., 2009).   
As the E&RE community and the Ecological Economics (EE) community offer 
different definitions of environmental value, these two economic schools of thought 
demonstrate different responses to evidence supporting the pluralistic interpretation of 
CVM.  A typical position put forward by the E&RE community when faced with 
evidence of multiple CVM response motives is to develop techniques for validating bids 
(Ajzen, Brown & Carvajal, 2004; Champ & Bishop, 2001; Champ, Bishop, Brown & 
McCollum, 1997).  CVM responses that are deemed to reflect non-economic motives 
are bounded, segregated or excluded for the CVM analysis (Spash, 2008b).  The domain 
of EE, however, offers value pluralism theories to that are consistent with individuals 
having incommensurable motives when valuing an environmental change or there being 
incommensurability in the environmental motives of different stakeholder groups 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990, 1991; Spash, 2000a).  Ecological economists have 
developed pluralism-as-a-methodology methods such as social multiple criteria analysis 
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(Martinez-Alier et al., 1998) and deliberate monetary valuation (Spash, 2007a, 2008c) 
in order to provide insights into issues where there are multiple environmental values.   
 
8.5 Prelude to two empirical studies   
The majority of CVM studies have only examined the mainstream economic 
interpretation of CVM responses.  Although a handful of papers by Kahneman and 
colleagues on the contribution model have been highly cited, and in many respects 
influential, the attitudinal hypothesis that underpins this model has not yet been 
adequately examined or empirically compared with the economic CVM interpretation.  
Chapter 9 will review the role of attitudes and the evidence for interpreting WTP as an 
attitudinal measure, and point out that empirical evidence used to support the attitudinal 
hypothesis has been of poor empirical standards.  A research design will be employed 
that is potentially able to offer more valid conclusions about the relationship between 
attitudes and WTP responses than previous studies conducted by Kahneman and 
colleagues. 
This design will examine whether (i) the decision to offer a positive WTP bid 
and (ii) the amount offered by positive bidders simply reflects an attitudinal responses 
or whether there is also evidence of economic motivation.  By simultaneously 
examining the economic interpretation and the contribution model, the empirical study 
undertaken in Chapter 9 will be open to the possibility that either the economic model 
or contribution model interpretation of CVM responses is superior, or that the value 
pluralism position that both interpretations partially explains CVM response patterns.  It 
is proposed that if CVM responses are found to be motivated by economic and non-
economic motives, then this would support the argument for value pluralism and the 
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administration of pluralism-as-a-methodology options measuring environmental 
valuation for complicated social policy issues.  
Chapter 10 will examine the pluralistic CVM interpretation that posits there are 
fundamentally different motives for offering a positive WTP bid.  Chapter 10 will 
examine the hypothesis that participants with incommensurable environmental ethics 
will respond to the CVM monetary scale with fundamentally different motives.  
Specifically, participants with a utilitarian environmental ethic are hypothesised to 
respond to the CVM monetary scale with economic motives, while participants with a 
deontological environmental ethic are proposed to respond with a bid that represents a 
general contribution as proposed by Kahneman and colleagues‘ contribution model.  As 
a side note, the design presented in Chapter 10 is consistent with the organismic 
framework approach used by conservation psychologists, as this framework is open to 
the possibility that CVM bids motives can be influenced by higher-order environmental 
ethics.  If participants with different environmental ethics are found to have different 
CVM response motives, this would also support the argument for value pluralism and 
the application of pluralism-as-a-methodology options. 
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  Chapter 9 
Is WTP an Attitudinal Measure or a Measure of 
Economic Value? 
9.1    Introduction 
Chapter 9 will empirically examine the attitudinal hypothesis that underpins the 
contribution model interpretation of Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) put forward 
by Kahneman and colleagues (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1993; 
Kahneman et al., 1999).  The attitudinal hypothesis suggests that Willingness To Pay 
(WTP) bids are the result of just an attitudinal assessment rather than being an 
economic valuation.  The previous empirical studies that have provided the evidence 
supporting the attitudinal hypothesis will be examined, with major flaws in research 
designs assessing the attitudinal hypothesis being noted.  An improved empirical design 
will then assess the attitudinal hypothesis, while also being open to other factors 
influencing WTP responses.  The empirical study will assess whether the economic 
variable of ability to pay also influences WTP responses, thus also providing an 
examination of the economic interpretation of CVM.  Two aspects of WTP responses 
will also be examined:  (i) tendency to offer a positive bid and (ii) the amount offered 
by positive bidding participants. 
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9.2    The empirical basis for the contribution model and the 
attitudinal hypothesis 
Kahneman and colleagues (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1993; 
Kahneman et al., 1999) put forward an exclusive attitudinal hypothesis holding that 
WTP is simply a measure of attitude on a scale of hypothetical dollars.  Kahnmen draws 
upon a definition of attitudes put forward by Eagly and Chaiken (1993) that defines 
attitudes as being an evaluative tendency which can be favourable or unfavourable.  
Psychologists such as Kahneman conceptually distinguish attitudes from other 
psychological variables.  For example, the theory of planned behavior (TPB) identifies 
attitudes as being only one out of three main influences on behavioural intentions 
(Ajzen, 1991, 2001), the others being subjective norms and perceived behavioural 
control.  Subjective norms and perceived behavioural control are defined as being non-
attitudinal psychological variables that independently influence behavioural intentions 
above and beyond the influence of attitudes.   
A study by Ajzen et al. (2004), on a small convenience student sample, found 
that subjective norms and perceived behavioural control provided additional 
explanatory variance to attitude scales in explaining offers to donate to a university 
scholarship fund for needy students.  If these non-attitudinal psychological variables are 
found to have an independent and significant relationship with WTP responses from 
CVM surveys, then this would suggest such surveys are measuring a broader 
psychological evaluation than offered by an attitudinal assessment.  Jorgensen and 
Syme (2000) also found that both attitudes and economic variables (price and income) 
influence WTP responses.  Yet non-attitudinal psychological variables, including 
variables that would support the economic interpretation of CVM, have been absent 
from the empirical studies by Kahneman and colleagues that have specifically examined 
the attitudinal hypothesis. 
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Evidence supporting the attitudinal hypothesis is primarily based upon three 
published journal articles that administered the headline method (Kahneman & Knetsch, 
1992; Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1993).  The headline method asks 
participants to assess a list of solutions to public problems (e.g. species protection 
problems, ecological damage problems, miscellaneous public good problems and public 
health issues).  While some of the participants assess the public problems on a WTP 
scale, other participants respond on an attitudinal scale.  For each scale the list of 
solutions to public problems are ranked according to their mean or median scores.  A 
rank correlation assessing the degree of similarity in the ordering of the public 
problems—based on mean/median scores of attitude scale and WTP—is then reported.  
As shown in Table 9.1, the headline method studies have reported some very strong 
rank correlations between WTP and a number of single item attitudinal scales.  
Kahneman et al. (1999) also note supporting results from an experimental study by 
Kahneman, Schade and Sunstein (1998) that employed the headline method to look at 
punitive damages in a product liability case.  Furthermore, Payne et al. (1999) found 
high rank correlations between attitudinal measures and stated WTP using a similar 
design. 
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Table 9.1: Reported rank correlations from three headline method studies 
Study and Scale  
Rank 
Correlations 
  
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992)  
Moral satisfaction (group 1) & WTP 
0.78 
Moral satisfaction (group 2) & WTP 
0.62 
  
Kahneman et al. (1993)  
Rating of political support for intervention & WTP 
0.75 
Rating of personal satisfaction expected from making a voluntary 
contribution of time or money to the intervention & WTP 
0.79 
Rating of how upsetting it would be to read the story announced 
by the headline or to watch the item on television & WTP 
0.52 
Rating of the importance of the problem & WTP 
 
0.72 
Kahneman and Ritov (1994)  
Rating of political support for intervention & WTP 0.84 
Rating of political support for intervention & % WTP 0.82 
Rating of political support for intervention & N (WTP) 0.81 
 
Rating of personal satisfaction expected from making a voluntary 
contribution of time or money to the intervention & WTP 
 
0.84 
Rating of personal satisfaction expected from making a voluntary 
contribution of time or money to the intervention & % WTP 
0.80 
Rating of personal satisfaction expected from making a voluntary 
contribution of time or money to the intervention & N (WTP) 
0.88 
Rating of the importance of the problem & WTP 0.76 
Rating of the importance of the problem & % WTP 0.66 
Rating of the importance of the problem & N (WTP) 0.83 
  
Notes:   %WTP = percentage of positive responses 
N (WTP) = WTP response for each individual divided by the mean contribution 
from that individual 
 
 
Kahneman and Ritov (1994) note the importance of investigating the mean 
scores of a specific proposal because many public decisions are based on aggregated 
data and average CVM scores are used by economists rather than individual scores.  
However, the literature presented in Table 9.1 also claims that the high rank correlations 
are indicative of a psychological process operating at an individual level.  Based on the 
rank correlations the authors have concluded that attitudinal scales and WTP are almost 
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interchangeable measures of the same attitude, with the rank correlations being 
interpreted as representing ―an idealised subject‖ or person (Kahneman et al., 1993). 
Nickerson (1995) has criticised such an approach, arguing that an intrinsically 
within-respondent hypothesis cannot be tested by correlation analysis based on means 
or medians, except in some special and restricted cases.  A more appropriate hypothesis 
test would be to simultaneously collect attitudinal ratings and a WTP value from each 
respondent.  Nickerson (1995) describes the headline study approach as an example of a 
subtle and insidious methodological problem known as ―cross-level inference‖.  This is 
defined as instances where data are organised or aggregated in one way, but the 
conclusions drawn from the analysis of those datasets assumes that the data are 
organised or aggregated in some other way.  A good example of cross-level inference is 
the following quote by Kahneman et al. (1993): ―our main finding was that correlations 
between the rankings of environmental issues by different response measures were high 
suggesting that the WTP to make a personal contribution of money, support for political 
action and a simple rating of the importance of the problem are almost interchangeable 
measures of the same attitude‖ (p.314).  Nickerson (1995) demonstrates that there is no 
necessary mathematical relationship between the correlation of the group means and the 
mean within-respondent correlation.  
Monin and Oppenheimer (2005) provide a simple example that demonstrates the 
dangers in mixing-up correlated averages with averaged correlations.  Table 9.2 
displays the scores of two judges who each rate four stimuli: a, b, c, and d on two 
separate dimensions A and B.  The within-respondent level proposed by Nickerson 
(1995) correlates the two dimensions for each of the judges and reports a strongly 
negative correlation (r = -0.80).  In contrast an approach, analogous to the headline 
method, which correlates the rankings of mean scores for each of the four stimuli, 
reports a perfectly positive rank correlation (r = +1.00).  While Monin and 
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Oppenheimer‘s example of cross-level inference is extreme, this clearly explains why 
the onus of proof lies with Kahneman and colleagues to demonstrate that within-
respondent correlations can be extrapolated from their rank correlations of the 
―average‖ or ―idealized‖ respondent.  Kahneman and Ritov (1994) comment that while 
they are aware that Nickerson considers cross-level inference to be a serious concern, 
they do not.  Kahneman et al. (1999) suggest that any major differences between rank 
correlations and within-respondent correlations will be due to the group scores being 
dominated by a few individuals.  They point out that the headline studies assessed the 
effects of standardising the data of each individual and conclude that the data set did not 
contain atypical patterns of responses that would be indicative of individuals behaving 
inconsistently with the rank correlation conclusions.  However, even if there are no 
worrisome outliers, there may still be fundamental differences between how people 
respond to WTP scales and attitudinal measures that cannot by identified with a rank 
correlation approach. 
 
Table 9.2: Disjunction between rank and within-respondent correlations 
  Stimulus  
  A b c d  
Judge 1 Dimension A 0 2 4 6  
 Dimension B 
 
6 2 4 0 r = -0.80 
Judge 2 Dimension A 6 2 4 0  
 Dimension B 
 
0 2 4 6 r = -0.80 
Mean scores Dimension A 3 2 4 3 Rank = +1.00 
 Dimension B 
 
3 2 4 3 Within-respondent = -0.80 
Source: Monin and Oppenheimer (2005) 
 
 
Kahneman and colleagues argue that a WTP money scale is psychometrically a 
poor measure of attitudes.  The headline studies demonstrated the statistical inefficiency 
of the open-ended WTP scale by analysing: (i) the variance between the different issues 
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that are presented, (ii) the variance associated with individual differences and (iii) the 
noise variance.  A good scale should be able to differentiate between various issues, but 
should also have a low variance between individuals and a low noise variance.  
Kahneman et al. (1993) and Kahneman and Ritov (1994) found the proportion of 
problem-related variance to be larger for the attitudinal scales, while the variance for 
individual differences was much larger for the WTP scale.  Based on this evidence, they 
conclude that attitudinal scales are statistically more efficient than the WTP scale.  
Kahneman and Ritov (1994) and Kahneman et al. (1999) claim that the poor properties 
of the WTP scale are due to: (i) a lack of common modulus and (ii) the skewed 
distribution of WTP scale responses. 
As the money scale fails to provide respondents with a common modulus, this is 
proposed to lead to large differences in how individuals interpret the WTP survey 
question.  A common modulus refers to the scale being formally standardised for all 
participants.  This term is borrowed from the field of psychophysics, which is where 
Economic Nobel Prize winner and prominent psychologist Daniel Kahneman began his 
research career.  Psychophysicists are interested in how an individual experiences a 
sensation (e.g. the intensity of a sound).  Common practice in psychophysics 
experiments is to administer participants with a specific standard stimulus (the modulus) 
and then ask them to assess other stimuli relative to the standard stimuli.  The modulus 
that each WTP participant uses is claimed by Kahnman et al. (1999) to be arbitrary.  
Context effects in CVM questionnaire designs are argued to lead not only to individual 
differences in the evaluation of the proposed environmental change, but also to 
individual differences in the responses to the WTP survey question.   
Attitudinal scales, on the other hand, are regarded as being bounded, 
psychologically meaningful response scales.  Kahneman et al. (1999) suggest that most 
people have an intuitive and common understanding of the meaning of the attitudinal 
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response scales administered by psychologists.  For example, that most people would 
have a basic agreement on the difference between ―extremely important‖, ―very 
important‖, ―moderately important‖, ―not very important‖ and ―not at all important‖.  
Survey participants are argued to share a common definition as to what constitutes a 
certain response range.  Kahneman and Ritov (1994) suggest that as a result attitudinal 
measures should replace WTP questions when the goal is to assess the value of public 
project proposals.  Kahneman and colleagues suggest that a money value could be 
assigned to an attitudinal score based on reference to a standard scale.  
Kahneman et al. (1999) also point out that most open-ended WTP distributions 
have a large positive skew that degrades the statistical efficiency of the scale.  They 
comment that logarithmic transformations improve the statistical efficiency of the 
money scale.  An explanation as to why open-ended WTP scales are positively skewed 
is that the coins and notes of monetary systems increase exponentially.  For example, 
the UK has four denominations of exponentially increasing pound notes in circulation: 
£5, £10, £20, £50.  Requesting monetary expression of environmental values may 
encourage a WTP response that reflects the standardised currency amounts because 
people are unaccustomed to thinking about environmental proposals in terms of 
monetary values.   
Studies have found that certain WTP numbers are significantly over-represented 
amongst valuations elicited from the general population (Whynes, Frew, Philips, Covey 
& Smith, 2007; Whynes, Philips & Frew, 2005).  Hertwig, Hoffrage and Martignon 
(1999) argue people are unable to make valuations based on the full continuum of a 
money scale and therefore rely on a few numbers.  This suggests that rather than 
responding on an arbitrary continuous scale, as proposed by Kahneman et al. (1999), 
many participants may only consider a WTP valuation that is based upon a handful of 
numbers.  If denominations from the monetary system are over-represented in WTP 
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response distributions, this would suggest a lack of variation in how people interpret the 
money scale rather than a large arbitrary variation as suggested by Kahneman and 
colleagues.  
 
9.3 Study overview 
The upcoming study will examine the relationship between attitudinal scales and 
WTP response, while also examining the relationship between non-attitudinal measures 
and WTP offers.  One of these non-attitudinal measures will assess the economic 
variable of ability to pay.  The economic model proposes that the higher an individual‘s 
ability to pay, the more likely it is that they will support a proposed environmental 
change and the higher their bids will be.  The other non-attitudinal scale will assess 
perceived behavioural norms, which is a TPB variable that can be conceptually 
distinguished from the variables of attitudes and ability to pay (Ajzen, 1991).  The 
upcoming study will examine whether ability to pay and perceived behavioural norms 
have an influence on WTP responses that is independent to the influence of attitudes. 
In the following sections two datasets will be examined.  Both of these datasets 
were collected by projects headed by Clive Spash, who granted the author of this thesis 
access to the data.  The first dataset is from a CVM design that asked participants their 
maximum willingness to pay into a trust fund for a wetland re-creation project.  The 
second dataset is from a CVM design that asked the maximum WTP for an increase in 
electric utility bills to improve the biodiversity of a catchment subject to hydro-electric 
schemes.  Both payment mechanisms and other basic design features are typical of 
those used in CVM studies.  The objective is to examine whether WTP responses, 
following a normal CVM survey design, are explicable as a quantitative summary of 
attitudes about an environmental proposal.  If this proposition is not supported 
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Kahneman and colleagues are unjustified in arguing that CVM simply produces a 
psychometrically inferior attitudinal scale. 
 
9.4    Research design and method 
The current study investigates the attitudinal hypothesis via a within-respondent 
design, analysing the two datasets from different open-ended CVM surveys.  
Participants in each of the CVM studies were administered a WTP question and 
attitudinal scales.  One of the administered scales measured specific attitudes about an 
environmental change proposal, while another scale measured general attitudes about 
environmental protection.  In each study participants were presented with a single 
environmental change proposal.  Therefore, unlike the headline method studies, 
conclusions are not based upon the hypothesis of process continuity that proposes errors 
and biases affecting quick intuitive judgements should also affect more slowly formed 
judgements (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994).  Data was collected from representative 
samples without monetary incentives to participate, unlike some of the headline method 
studies.  Finally, rather than measuring attitudes with a single item, robust multiple item 
attitudinal scales were administered.  The methodology and sample used are therefore 
better suited to investigating the attitudinal hypothesis than the headline method studies. 
The attitudinal hypothesis is tested by examining whether there is a strong 
within-respondent relationship between attitudinal scales and WTP.  Kahneman and 
Ritov (1994), noting the findings by McFadden and Leonard (1993), point out that the 
propensity to make positive contributions and the size of these contributions may be 
essentially independent characteristics of respondents.  Brown et al. (1996) also note 
that most of the explanatory power of the independent variables in explaining open-
ended WTP could be attributed solely to the binary distinction between a $0 payment 
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and a positive payment.  They discuss the possibility that the more difficult task 
required of open-ended (compared to dichotomous choice) responses causes additional, 
or random, factors to play a role in determining WTP.  Separate investigations will 
assess whether attitudinal measures are able to predict: (i) the two bid-type 
classifications of zero and positive, and (ii) the amount offered by positive bidders.  
In addition, the upcoming analysis will examine whether the psychologists‘ 
definition of attitudes as being an evaluative tendency which can be favourable or 
unfavourable is broad enough to be able to adequately classify WTP as being an 
attitudinal scale.  The hypothesis here is that there is more to WTP responses than a 
pure attitudinal measure.  Factors from the TPB that represent non-attitudinal 
psychological variables will be analysed.  Two aspects of the TPB are then added, 
namely, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control.  Perceived behavioural 
control will be related to an economic decision: ability to pay. 
Three different scales were administered to measure attitudes about 
environmental protection.  The TPB model recommends scales that measure specific 
attitudes towards a behaviour.  In one of the studies a scale developed on TPB 
recommendations was administered.  In addition, two general attitudinal measures were 
employed.  The Awareness of Consequence (AC) scale was also administered, although 
the current chapter will make use of only the ―beliefs supportive of environmental 
action‖ (BSEA) items that were identified in Chapter 6 (also see Ryan & Spash, In 
Press) as these items form the most reliable and interpretable sub-scale from the original 
AC scale.  The BSEA assesses whether a respondent believes that environmental 
protection is beneficial (e.g. ―Environmental protection will provide a better world for 
me and my children‖) or whether a lack of action to protect the environment has costs 
(e.g. ―Pollution generated here harms people all over the earth‖).   
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The second general attitude scale is the Political Action (PA) scale (Stern et al., 
1993).  The PA scale (see appendix 1) asks participants whether they would partake in 
political action supporting various environmental causes (demonstrating, signing a 
petition, refusing a job at a company harming the environment, volunteering to work for 
nature conservation).  If both specific attitudes regarding a CVM proposal and general 
environmental protection attitudes are found to positively correlate with WTP for an 
environmental improvement, then this would support the hypothesis that positive WTP 
bids are motivated by general contributory and political motives rather than representing 
an assessment of the specific economic benefits to be derived from the proposal. 
The datasets were collected from two different CVM surveys designed to 
measure two different environmental proposals which were actually being considered 
by community planners.  Both surveys were administered by a market research 
company employing a stratified random sampling procedure.  Market research 
representatives recruited participants by door-knocking designated locations.  Each 
market research representative verbally administered consenting participants a face-to-
face interview which initially involved the presentation of a case study scenario that 
outlined the environmental proposal in need of funding.  The final versions of the 
surveys were based upon pretesting and stakeholder consultation. 
Study 1 overview:  713 UK residents were recruited for Study 1.  Participants 
were asked to consider a proposal regarding the possible purchase by an existing 
regional charity of a one square mile site in Eastern England currently used for crop 
farming.  They were told the charity was interested in transforming the farming site into 
a wetlands site, with a major aim stated as providing a sanctuary for endangered species 
of birds such as Bewick‘s Swan, the pintail, and the gadwall.  A request was made for a 
one-off payment to a charitable trust fund established specifically for the project, with 
participants being asked the maximum they would be ―willing to pay as a one-off 
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contribution to the trust fund to help create an extra square mile of wetland in The 
Fens‖.  The focus on the behaviour of participants willingness to respond to the 
monetary scale meant that 218 participants were excluded because they either chose the 
―don‘t know‖ option or refused to provide a response to the WTP question.  495 
participants were classified as giving a WTP bid (207 positive bids and 288 zero bids).  
Study 1 also administered two general environment protection attitudinal measures that 
were responded to on a 4-point scale.  These were the PA scale (see Appendix 1) and 
the BSEA scale (see Appendix 2).  The PA scale reported a Cronbach α of 0.65.  The 
BSEA scale reported a Cronbach‘s α of 0.83. 
Study 2 overview:  1069 Scottish residents were recruited to participate in a 
CVM survey assessing a proposal for the Tummel catchment region in Scotland.  The 
introduction of a conservation biology flow regime from dammed lochs was being 
considered in order to mimic a more natural flow for some rivers.  The aim of the 
proposal was to restore the diversity and abundance of species and habitats in the river 
catchment.  Increasing river flows from the hydro-system would potentially reduce 
electricity generation and increase costs for the hydro-power companies.  Such costs 
would then be transferred to electricity consumers.  The WTP question asked 
participants: ―What is the maximum additional amount you would be willing to pay 
each quarter on your electricity bill over the next year to restore biodiversity in the river 
Tummel and its surrounding area from 14% to 70%?‖.  In the current analysis 336 
participants were excluded, answering ―don‘t know‖ or refusing to respond to the WTP 
question.  733 participants were classified as WTP bidders (322 positive bidders and 
411 zero bidders). 
In Study 2, participants were administered two attitude scales.  The first was the 
BSEA scale administered in Study 1.  The BSEA scale for Study 2 was answered on a 
7-point scale and reported a Cronbach‘s α = 0.88.  The second assessed specific 
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attitudes about the benefits arising from paying more for electricity in order to fund the 
Tummel catchment scheme and the likelihood of such benefits.  This scale was 
designed according to TPB considerations (Ajzen, 2006) and asked seven paired 
questions or items (see Appendix 3).  One of the paired items asked participants to 
assess whether a proposed outcome for the project is good or bad (e.g. ―Enhancing 
water quality in the Tummel area is [1=extremely bad; 7=extremely good]‖).  The other 
paired item asked participants to assess the likelihood of the proposed outcome (e.g. 
―Paying more for electricity to restore biodiversity will enhance water quality in the 
Tummel area [1=extremely likely; 7=extremely unlikely]‖).  The attitude score for each 
item pair was based on a product score.  The TPB attitude scale reported a Cronbach‘s α 
of 0.88. 
Participants were also asked paired TPB subjective norm items (see Appendix 
4), which were based on assessing beliefs about the expectations of significant others.  
One of the paired items asked if the significant other expected them to offer a positive 
WTP bid (e.g. ―My friends would think that I [1=should; 7=should not] pay more for 
electricity to preserve biodiversity in the Tummel area‖).  The other paired item asked 
the degree to which the respondent felt pressured by the significant other (e.g. 
―Generally speaking, how much do you want to do what your friends think you should 
do?‖).  The subjective norm score for each item pair was based on a product score.  The 
TPB subjective norm scale reported a Cronbach‘s α of 0.73.  A large portion of the 
study participants did not have children, a partner or a parent who was alive.  A decision 
was made to average the score over the questions that were answered.  If a participant 
answered only 4 pairs of questions, their total score was divided by 4.  If only 3 pairs 
were answered, the total score was divided by 3.  Twenty participants who answered 
only 2 or less pairs of items were treated as missing data.  Participants were also asked a 
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perceived behavioural control item about their ability to pay (―I can easily afford to pay 
more for my electricity‖) on a 7-point scale. 
 
9.5    Results 
As is usually the case, the open-ended WTP distributions for Study 1 and Study 
2 demonstrated a large positive skew.  To improve the normality of the distribution, 
positive bids were transformed using the log (WTP+1) formula, which resulted in the 
LNWTP variable.  In Study 1 the maximum WTP bid was £200, which was transformed 
to a value of 5.3 (just over 3 standard deviations from the mean LNWTP value).  In 
Study 2 the maximum WTP bid was £300, which was transformed to a value of 5.7 (just 
under 4 standard deviations from the mean LNWTP value).  Table 9.3 displays the 
summary statistics for the PA, TPB and BSEA scales, as well as WTP responses. 
 
Table 9.3:  Summary Statistics 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Study 1      
PA scale 441 2.79 0.49 1.0 4.0 
BSEA scale 448 3.24 0.40 1.6 4.0 
Positive LNWTP 207 2.36 0.89 0.7 5.3 
 
Bid decision  
 
495 
 
207 positive bids 
 
288 zero bids 
      
Study 2      
BSEA scale 730 5.69 0.99 2.2 7.0 
TPB Attitude scale 719 24.34 10.39 3.0 49.0 
TPB Norm scale 713 13.57 6.72 1.0 40.6 
TPB PBC item 731 4.21 1.78 1.0 7.0 
Positive LNWTP 322 2.35 0.88 .14 5.7 
 
Bid decision  
 
733 
 
322 positive bids 
 
411 zero bids 
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For both studies moderate correlations between the attitude scales were found.  
In Study 1 the correlations between the PA and BSEA scale was 0.57, while in Study 2 
the correlation between the TPB attitude scale and the BSEA scale was 0.53.  This 
supports the speculation that both attitude scales measure an underlying latent attitude 
variable.  Table 9.4 displays the correlations between the psychological scales and the 
three indicators of WTP.  The ―zero or positive bid‖ variable forms a point biserial 
correlation with the psychological scales.  The results presented in Table 9.4 clearly 
indicate that attitudinal scales had a moderate relationship with the dichotomous ―zero 
or positive bid‖ variable, while also demonstrating that the ―zero or positive bid‖ 
variable had a moderate significant correlation with perceived behavioural control and 
subjective norms.  In contrast, the correlation between LNWTP for positive bids and the 
attitude scales were found to be weak.  Three of these correlations were only significant 
at a 0.05 level, while one was not significant.  For the non-attitudinal scales, LNWTP 
for positive bids had a very weak but significant relationship with perceived behavioural 
control at a 0.05 level, and had zero relationship with subjective norms. 
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Table 9.4:  Correlations between indicators of WTP and psychological scales 
 WTP Zero/Positive
1
 Positive LNWTP  
Study 1 
  
BSEA Scale 0.34
***
 0.01 
 (N= 448) (N=198) 
PA Scale 0.39
***
 0.15
*
 
 (N=441) (N=188) 
Study 2 
  
BSEA Scale 0.44
***
 0.12
*
 
 (N= 730) (N=321) 
TPB Attitude Scale 0.54
***
 0.09
*
 
 (N=719) (N=314) 
TPB Norm Scale 0.34
***
 -0.01 
 (N= 713) (N=310) 
TPB PBC Scale 0.36
***
 0.12
*
 
 (N=731) (N=321) 
   
Notes: 
1
 Point biserial correlation 
*
 Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**
 Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
***
 Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
 
A logistic regression was run to test the influence of psychological variables in 
predicting WTP bid type (positive or zero).  Table 9.5 displays the results of the logistic 
regression for Study 1 and Study 2.  In both cases, all of the psychological scales 
(attitudinal and non-attitudinal) were found to have a significant and independent 
contribution to predicting whether participants offer a positive or a zero bid.  The 
Nagelkerke R
2
 and χ2 suggest a good model fit for a logistic regression based on only 
attitudinal measures (Study 1), and an even better model fit for a logistic regression 
based on combined psychological variables, which included attitudinal and non-
attitudinal measures. 
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Table 9.5:  Logistic Regression of WTP Bid Type on Psychological Scales 
 B SE B e
B 
Study 1
1
 
   
Constant -8.06
***
 1.08 0.00 
BSEA Scale 1.17
**
 0.34 3.22 
PA Scale 1.42
***
 0.30 4.15 
    
Study 2
2
 
   
Constant -8.43
***
 0.73 0.00 
BSEA Scale 0.62
***
 0.12 1.86 
TPB Attitude Scale 0.09
***
 0.01 1.09 
TPB Norm Scale 0.08
***
 0.02 1.08 
TPB PBC Item 0.36
***
 0.06 1.43 
    
Notes: 
**
 Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
***
 Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
1
 N = 411; χ2 (2) = 80.20; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.24; 
2
 N = 701; χ2 (2) = 327.03; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.50 
 
 
An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was run to analyse the influence of 
attitudes to LNWTP for positive bids, as shown in Table 9.6.  The overall model for 
Study 1 was not found to be significant, F (2,180)
 
= 2.44, p > 0.05.  The overall model 
for Study 2 was significant at a 0.05 level, F (4,299) = 2.99, p < 0.05, but not at a 0.01 
level.  The Adjusted-R
2
 for both models is extremely low, suggesting that attitudinal 
scales cannot be used to explain a significant portion of variance in the amount offered 
by positive bidders.   
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Table 9.6:  OLS Regression of Positive LNWTP on Psychological Scales 
 B SE B t-Ratio
 
Study 1
1
 
   
Constant 1.95
**
 0.61 3.17 
BSEA Scale -0.20 0.20 -0.99 
PA Scale 0.37 0.17 2.20 
    
Study 2
2
 
   
Constant 1.12
**
 0.44 2.57 
BSEA Scale 0.16
*
 0.08 2.18 
TPB Attitude Scale 0.02 0.01 0.27 
TPB Norm Scale -0.01 0.01 -1.01 
TPB PBC Item 0.06* 0.03 1.99 
    
Notes: 
**
 Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
***
 Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
1
 N = 183; R = 0.16; R
2
 = 0.03; Adjusted R
2
 = 0.02 
2
 N = 304; R = 0.20; R
2
 = 0.04; Adjusted R
2
 = 0.03 
 
 
The weak correlations between attitudinal measures and WTP for positive 
bidders might be taken as support for the hypothesis that the monetary scale is a 
psychometrically poor measure.  The question then is: how sensitive are people to the 
monetary scale?  Table 9.7 displays the percentage of responses that correspond with a 
currency value.  This shows that 84% of the positive bidding participants in Study 1 
offered a contribution that had a corresponding currency denomination.  A χ2 test found 
that significantly more participants presented numbers that corresponded to a currency 
denomination than expected by chance, χ2 (1)=96.04, p<0.001.  Furthermore, 64% 
provided a £5 or £10 estimate.  A χ2 test found that significantly more participants 
offered a £5 or £10 bid than any other numerical option on the continuous money scale, 
χ2 (1)=14.61, p<0.001. 
In Study 2 a total of 67% of the positive bidding sample offered a currency 
based denomination for their WTP estimate.  A χ2 test found that significantly more 
participants used currency denominations compared to any other numerical option, χ2 
  
228 
 
(1)=38.96, p<0.001.  In this case 48% offered either a £5 or a £10 WTP bid.  However, 
a χ2 test found that there was no significant difference in the number of participants 
providing a £5 or £10 bid than any other positive bid number, χ2 (1)=0.45, p>0.05. 
 
 
Table 9.7:  Responses Relative to Currency Denominations 
 Bid Category (£) 
 <1 1 >1<5 5 >5<10 10 >10<20 20 >20<50 50 >50 
Study 1 
           
(%) 0 4 5 34 1 30 1 10 4 6 4 
Study 2
1            
(%) 1 3 13 18 2 30 6 13 8 3 4 
Notes: 
1
 Adds to 101 due to rounding error 
 
 
9.6    Discussion and conclusions 
The within-subjects methodological design is better suited to examining the 
attitudinal hypothesis than the headline method employed by Kahneman and colleagues.  
Both CVM designs investigated two separate topics (converting farmland to a wetland 
and increasing in-stream flows from hydro-dam regulation) and had different payment 
mechanisms (a single payment into a trust fund and an increase in electricity bills).  
These studies were also administered to different general public populations.  That 
consistent patterns were found across two very different studies adds to the robustness 
of the results.  
Kahneman and colleagues argue that responses to CVM surveys, requesting a 
payment towards the provision of a public good, have a psychological interpretation as 
a social contribution motivated by attitudes.  The results reported here partially support 
this attitudinal hypothesis.  Notably there was a moderate relationship between attitude 
scales and the type of bid offered (positive or zero bid).  However the significance of 
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non-attitudinal variables suggests that the choice between offering a zero or positive bid 
can be considered to represent a behaviour, or behavioural intention, that is influenced 
by more than just attitudes.  Kahneman and colleagues argue that attitudes are a concept 
which has a considerably broader range of application than the standard concept of 
economic preferences.  Yet, the results of the analysis suggest that the concept of 
attitudes is not broad enough to adequately describe WTP response motives.   
Other non-attitudinal psychological variables such as norms and ability to pay 
appear to enhance prediction of whether a zero or positive WTP bid is offered.  The 
significant influence of the ability to pay construct suggests that the tendency to offer a 
WTP bid based upon economic motives cannot be dismissed.  The studies reported here 
produced evidence in favour of the contention that WTP is a contribution motivated by 
a combined mixture of supporting a good cause and social responsibility while also 
accounting for personal finances.  As all general psychological evaluations are 
presumed to be constructed, it is suggested that a respondents‘ choice of WTP bid is 
heavily influenced by contextual effects that are not the result of defective 
methodological procedures as proposed by then neoclassical economic community. 
The weak or non-significant relationship between attitudinal scales and the 
amount offered by positive bidders, as found in the OLS models, suggests that the 
money scale is not a sensitive measure of attitudes, supporting the argument by 
Kahneman and colleagues that this is psychometrically inferior.  Although the money 
scale is technically a continuous variable bounded by a zero, the majority of positive 
bidding participants in both CVM studies offered a standard currency amount, which 
suggests that they employ a categorical rather than a continuous scale.  The finding that 
a large portion of participants offered either £5 or £10 suggests that people are either 
offering very crude WTP estimations or are offering a charitable contribution.  
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Therefore the suggestion by Kahneman and colleagues that there are large arbitrary 
individualistic differences in how people interpret the money scale was not supported. 
If using a monetary scale results in crude estimates or standardised amounts then 
economists should question the ability of respondents to be able to perform an economic 
trade-off to the point of indifference.  The amount bid by such CVM participants is, at 
best, a statistically inefficient or blunt measure of economic welfare benefits.  If those 
demanding CVM studies are satisfied with a very rough estimate of how much people 
will volunteer to pay for an environmental project then the approach might be deemed 
of interest.  However, presenting the results of the current WTP study as representing a 
precise economic estimate of the environmental value the proposed environmental 
change would be highly misleading. 
While the majority of positive bidders demonstrated an extreme lack of 
sensitivity, a minority (18% in Study 1 and 33% in Study 2) provided bids that did not 
reflect a standard currency amount.  Thus, some participants appear more sensitive to 
the variance of the monetary scale, that is, they interpret the scale as being continuous.  
The monetary scale may then be statistically inefficient not only because a large number 
of participants are offering a standardised amount, but also because there are differences 
in how people address environmental change using a monetary scale.  The findings here 
show that while differences occur, as suggested by Kahneman and colleagues, these are 
not arbitrary individual differences in how people respond to the monetary scale, but 
rather a choice between continuous and discrete interpretation of the WTP scale.  This 
does, however, create problems for the standard economic interpretation of the money 
scale which only assumes a single interpretation of the monetary scale. 
Whether WTP bids are based upon economic rather than contributory motives 
remains an open question.  The results here suggest that both economic measures and 
attitudinal measures explain independent variance of WTP responses, supporting the 
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pluralistic interpretation of CVM.  It is also possible that the contribution model validly 
describes the behaviour of some CVM participants, while the behaviour of others is 
more consistent with an economic model.  This suggests fundamental individual 
differences in how participants respond.  Participants interpreting the money scale as 
being continuous appear to follow the economic model in terms of behaviour consistent 
with making consequential trade-offs, while those focusing on standardised currency 
amounts may be offering a fixed standardised payment regardless of consequences.  The 
latter is in accord with non-utilitarian perspectives on charitable giving (Spash, 2000).  
This current chapter was not concerned with directly addressing this issue, but rather 
has questioned the sole dominance of attitudes in either case.  Chapter 10 will examine 
the issue of different interpretations of the monetary scale in greater depth.   
Understanding more about the strengths and limitations of monetary and non-
monetary scales can help guide the assessment of community perceptions regarding 
social and environmental proposals.  There are a number of practical implications of the 
findings of the current chapter.  First, the findings are consistent with many people 
struggling to convert their environmental values into a monetary amount.  Thus, money 
appears to be a poor scale for summarising environmental values.  Second, as the choice 
of a WTP bid is based upon a general psychological appraisal, rather than just an 
attitudinal assessment, using a procedure to obtain a monetary value from attitudinal 
scales, as proposed by Kahneman and colleagues, seems inappropriate.  Indeed, such an 
approach ignores non-attitudinal factors.  Converting attitude scores to a money amount 
based on a standardised procedure would be as blunt an approach to environmental 
valuation as the current CVM approach.  In Kahneman et al. (1999, pp. 204-205) the 
conclusion was that ―on current evidence it is possible to accept an attitude model for 
hypothetical CV responses‖.  The results presented here suggest that the attitudinal 
model cannot be accepted without being expanded to incorporate a general 
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psychological appraisal that is consistent with the pluralistic CVM interpretation.  The 
findings are consistent with people holding multiple motives when responding to the 
CVM request for valuing an environmental change. 
Evaluations of the value of environmental changes seem to involve more than 
can be obtained from an attitude scale or a stated preference money scale.  Thus, 
interdisciplinary research on economics and psychology reveals that neither discipline 
alone has yet offered a full picture of human behaviour in the context of environmental 
valuation.  Pluralism-as-a-methodology approaches may be better suited to providing 
the policy community with the broader contexts and multiple meanings of community 
environmental values (e.g. non-aggregated social multi-criteria analysis or forms of 
deliberative monetary valuation).  Offering the policy community aggregated attitudinal 
scores or intentions to pay money, as summaries of public concern or environmental 
value, gives little insight to the range of motives that underlie assessments of 
environmental value by the population at large.  The value pluralism approaches suggest 
the policy community should be provided with a descriptively richer account of how the 
general public perceives and economically evaluates an environmental change. 
  
9.7 Prelude to next empirical study   
The current chapter found that both economic and non-economic motives were 
able to explain a large amount of variance relating to whether a positive or zero WTP 
will be offered.  Attitude scales and ability to pay variables, however, provided poor 
predictive power of the amount of money offered by positive WTP bidders.  The next 
chapter will use an organismic framework to explore further the motives for positive 
CVM bidders.  The organismic framework will examine the hypothesis that CVM 
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participants with different higher-order goals (e.g. different environmental ethics) will 
have different motives for offering a positive WTP bid. 
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Chapter 10 
A Value Pluralism Examination of the Contingent 
Valuation Method:  An Economic Valuation for Some, a 
Symbolic Offer to Contribute to a Good Cause for 
Others? 
10.1  Introduction 
Chapter 9 concluded that there are economic and non-economic motives for 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) participants offering a zero or positive bid.  A 
weak or non-significant relationship, however, was found between the amount offered 
by positive bidders and economic/non-economic motives.  The current chapter will 
therefore provide an additional examination of positive bidding behaviour.  A major 
stumbling block of CVM is that a significant proportion of respondents do not seem to 
trade-off income with improvements in environmental quality (Jorgensen, 2009).  The 
possibility that participants with different environmental ethics offer positive bids for 
fundamentally different reasons will be explored using an organismic framework.  
Specifically it will be proposed that participants with a utilitarian environmental ethic 
offer positive bids for economic reasons, while participants with a deontological rights-
based environmental ethic offer a WTP that represents a charitable contribution.      
If the economic model or contribution model interpretation of CVM is only able 
to validly depict the response motives of some CVM participants, then research relying 
solely on one interpretation and sold to policy makers as being scientifically objective, 
may in fact be discriminatory against members of society who assess environmental 
issues with a non-utilitarian ethic.  Environmental surveys that are not sensitive to the 
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possibility of different stakeholders holding fundamentally different environmental 
perceptions are also ignoring the possibility that environmental values may be in dispute 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; Jorgensen & Syme, 2000; Spash, 2006).  CVM 
practitioners must be extremely careful that their methodological designs do not 
marginalise or misrepresent the economic valuations of a significant proportion of 
citizens.  Decision-makers may greatly benefit from a value pluralism assessment of 
CVM response motives that is able to formally explain fundamental differences in how 
different environmental stakeholders economically can place a value on an 
environmental change.   
 
10.2  Are there pluralistic motives for responses to the 
monetary scale? 
Spash (2000a) suggests that a new interpretation of CVM responses could 
formally acknowledge that a significant portion of participants formulate CVM bids 
based on economic trade-off motivations, while other responses are the result of non-
utilitarian motives.  This meta-theoretical account is supported by the findings of 
Schkade and Payne (1993) who asked participants to think aloud when formulating 
WTP responses.  Schkade and Payne found that some participants mentioned that it was 
inevitable that the consumer would have to pay higher prices and then verbalised a 
utilitarian-based reasoning as to how this would work, while other participants 
described non-utilitarian motives such as offering a charitable contribution.  A range of 
other arguments have been put forward suggesting that people are able to assess 
proposals with either economic or social contribution motives (Nyborg, 2000; O'Neill & 
Spash, 2000; Sagoff, 1988; Spash, van der Werff ten Bosch, Westmacott & Ruitenbeek, 
2000), however, these studies lack empirical verification.   
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An example of non-utilitarian motives for CVM is found in the deontological 
ethics literature.  An individual with a deontological ethic is concerned about the 
intrinsic value of features of an act rather than consequences.  Spash (1997) argues that 
it is common for a significant portion of CVM participants to demonstrate deontological 
reasoning, and that this is especially so when the survey population consists of a large 
number of people who identify with the environmental movement.  Böhm (2003) 
suggests that deontological worldviews are incommensurable with utilitarian 
worldviews and that communication between individuals holding these two ethics often 
results in conflict.  The deontological literature has put forward a plausible explanation 
for CVM non-responses, which is an issue not adequately addressed in the mainstream 
economic literature.  It has been proposed that participants with a deontological ethic 
will reject the commodification of what they believe to be intrinsic environmental 
rights.  If a person believes that it is not appropriate to treat the environmental good as a 
commodity it makes sense for them to refuse to provide a monetary response rather than 
participating in a process which implicitly buys and sells improvement in biodiversity.  
Refusal to participate is even more likely, and is some senses more rational, when a 
person is aware of the potential for economists to misconstrue their monetary scale 
response.  A number of empirical studies (Spash, 2000c, 2002b; Spash et al., 2000) have 
concluded that participants who refuse to provide a WTP bid are better classified as 
having lexicographic (where respondents prefer environmental protection regardless of 
monetary cost) rather than utilitarian preferences (where respondents are willing to trade 
off environment protection against monetary cost). 
The deontological literature, however, has yet to produce an empirically 
validated argument for the response motives of positive CVM bidders, even though a 
significant proportion of positive bidders identify themselves as holding a deontological 
ethic (Spash, 2000c, 2002b).  It was originally proposed that individuals with a 
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deontological ethic would bid all of their non-necessary income to support species 
rights (Spash, 2000a, 2000c).  Empirical results have not supported this explanation, 
with most CV studies only reporting that a very small number of people offer extreme 
amounts (Schkade & Payne, 1993; Spash, 2000c; Spash et al., 2009; Spash et al., 2000).   
The current chapter proposes that the contribution model may provide a better account 
of the motives of positive bidding participants who hold a deontological ethic.  This is 
consistent with the proposal of Spash & Hanley (1995) and Spash (2000b) that under a 
deontological framework a positive bid may represent a contribution offering or token 
of support. 
 
10.3  Criteria to differentiate between economic motives and 
contributory motives 
A dataset collected as part of a project headed by Clive Spash (who granted the 
author of the thesis access to the data) will be analysed to examine the hypothesis that 
participants identified as holding a utilitarian ethic respond to CVM surveys with 
economic motives, while participants with a deontological ethic respond with 
contribution motives.  It is proposed that the mainstream economic model and the 
contribution model put forward different hypothesis for (i) the influence of income on 
CVM bids and (ii) the attitudes of positive bidders. 
 
10.3.1  Income   
The essence of the neoclassical economic model is that individuals express 
desires when distributing their income to obtain various goods and services.  
Economists propose that individuals make consequentialist trade-offs when distributing 
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income in order to derive satisfaction from the last unit of expenditure.  Diamond, 
Hausman, Leonard & Denning (1993) define environmental protection as being a 
―luxury good‖ as spending money on environmental projects is more likely to displace 
basic needs for food and shelter in poorer families, but is more affordable for more 
wealthy families.  The mainstream economic model therefore hypothesises that the 
amount offered by positive CVM bidders should be influenced by their income level 
(McFadden, 1994).   
WTP studies generally report low income elasticity (Diamond & Hausman, 
1994; McFadden, 1994; McFadden & Leonard, 1993).  Schläpfer (2006) conducted a 
meta-analysis of the relationship between income level and stated WTP for 
environmental goods and found that a surprisingly large portion of CVM studies did not 
report a significant relationship between income and WTP.  For researchers who apply 
the utilitarian economic interpretation, such findings suggest respondents are not 
seriously considering their budgetary constraints.  Some utilitarian researchers have 
attempted to explain away such findings.  For example, it has been proposed that 
income under some circumstances should be disregarded in explaining WTP responses, 
as typical WTP bids normally represent a relatively low amount of household wealth or 
income (Mitchell & Carson, 1989)  It has also been argued, however, that discretionary 
budgets are much less than household wealth and income since many kinds of 
expenditures are fixed in the short run (Veisten, Hoen, Navrud & Strand, 2004), which 
suggests that WTP bids on average should increase with income.  What is clear is that 
significant income effect findings in CVM studies provide weighty support for the 
economic interpretation.   
As the contribution model construes WTP bids as being a general offer or a 
symbolic gesture rather than an economic measure, a strong relationship between 
income and WTP is not hypothesised.  Kahneman et al. (1999) suggest that income 
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should be less influential if a WTP is a token offering and argue that the poor 
correlation between income and WTP responses is evidence of the inadequacy of the 
economic interpretation and is supportive of the contribution model.  Blamey, Common 
and Quiggin (1995) also note that insensitivity to income and price variables is more 
consistent with citizen choice model than with a consumer choice model.  It is proposed 
that the weak income effects in CVM studies may be indicative of only some 
participants offering WTP bids based upon economic motives, while other participants 
are offering a WTP bid that is symbolic and therefore not strongly influenced by income 
level.  While CVM studies have reported low income effects, empirical studies have 
found that a significant portion of CVM participants verbally report that their WTP is 
influenced by income level (Schkade & Payne, 1993; Spash, 2000c, 2006).  The studies 
conducted by Spash (2000, 2006) concluded that utilitarian ethic participants are more 
likely than deontological ethic participants to report income as influencing their WTP 
response.  It is therefore hypothesised that the relationship between income and WTP 
bid will be much greater for participants with a utilitarian environmental ethic than for 
participants with a deontological environmental ethic.   
 
10.3.2  Attitudes 
Attitudes are defined as being an evaluative tendency, which can be favourable 
or unfavourable (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  Although participants with a deontological 
environmental ethic and participants with a utilitarian ethic who conclude 
environmental action is worthwhile are both predisposed to caring for the environment, 
it is posited that the deontological group will hold more positive attitudes because of the 
strong focus of deontological participants on the intrinsic features of environmental 
protection.  O‘Neill and Spash (2000) note that while an individual with a deontological 
ethic may accept a role for consequences, the primary emphasis is whether the act is 
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categorically good or not.  Deontological participants are likely to define projections 
and actions that support sustainability as simply being good.  Utilitarian participants, on 
the other hand, would be expected to consequentially weigh up good and bad 
consequences.   
The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991, 2001) provides a 
multidimensional definition of the attitude construct, proposing that attitudes consist of 
both (i) beliefs about the likelihood of the event given that a certain action is carried out 
and (ii) a subjective evaluation as to whether the event is good or bad.  It is proposed 
that both deontological ethic and utilitarian ethic participants will only give money 
when they believe it is likely that the monetary offer will bring about an environmental 
change. Therefore these two ethical groups should not demonstrate differences in 
responses to a psychological scale that assesses the likelihood of their payment bringing 
about the desired environmental change.  As the deontological group is concerned about 
the intrinsic value of environmentalism, however, deontological participants should rate 
proposals that protect the environmental as possessing a higher level of ―goodness‖ than 
utilitarian participants.  Therefore, it is hypothesised that score on a psychological scale 
that assesses whether a proposed environmental change that protects species is good or 
bad should be rated more positively by the deontological group when compared to the 
utilitarian group. 
 
10.4  Study Overview 
The core hypothesis is that utilitarian participants will offer positive WTP bids 
in a manner consistent with the mainstream economic model, while the motives of 
positive bidding deontological participants are better described by the contribution 
model that suggests participants are offering support for a good cause.  The current 
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study will investigate the behaviour of positive bidding WTP survey participants who 
identify themselves as having a deontological ethic supporting species rights with 
participants who identify as being utilitarians who assess cost and benefits of protecting 
species as being more important than looking after humans.  Participants from these two 
ethical groups should both be naturally predisposed to offer positive bids, but it is 
hypothesised for different reasons.  In previous studies these two ethical groups have 
made up a significant portion of the positive bidders (Spash, 2000c, 2002b).   
 
10.5  Method 
10.5.1  The dataset 
The Tummel catchment dataset will be used to compare the income effect and 
attitudes of participants with a deontological ethic and participants with a utilitarian 
ethic.  The Tummel catchment dataset was analysed in Chapter 6 (study 1) and Chapter 
9 (study 2).  The 1069 participant Tummel catchment dataset that was examined in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 9 will be combined with a 1012 participant sample who were 
administered the Tummel catchment dataset without being administered the AC scale.  
The 1012 participant dataset was not analysed in Chapter 6 or Chapter 9, as both these 
chapters only analysed datasets that administered the AC scale. 
The Cambridgeshire wetland proposal dataset in Chapter 6 (study 2) and 
Chapter 9 (study 1) will not be analysed due to its sample size being too small for the 
upcoming design.  Only 157 participants from this dataset were positive bidders and 
classified as having either a deontological environmental ethic or a utilitarian 
environmental ethic.  Only 22 positive bidding participants classified as having a high 
income and deontological environmental ethic and only 26 participants as having a high 
income and utilitarian environmental ethic.   
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10.5.2  The Tummel Catchment Case Study Scenario 
The location of the case study selected for the survey was the 1713 km
2 
Tummel 
catchment that flows into the River Tay in the Grampian Highlands of Scotland.  At the 
time of the study, the Tummel catchment was provisionally designated as a heavily 
modified water body under the Water Framework Directive, which was reviewing the 
ecological potential of the river catchment.  A number of environmentally friendly 
implementation measures were being considered.  One of these was the introduction of 
a compensation flow regime from the dammed lochs to mimic the natural flow in some 
of the rivers within the catchment; the aim being to restore the diversity and abundance 
of species and habitats in the river catchment.  Increasing river flows from the hydro-
system would potentially reduce electricity generation and increase costs for the hydro-
power companies.  Such costs would then be (wholly or partially) transferred to 
electricity consumers.  This scenario presented a case for a CVM study with a payment 
vehicle in the form of increased energy bills.   
The CVM design involved administering three short presentations that were 
related to a Tummel catchment scenario.  The first presentation discussed biodiversity 
in general, aquatic biodiversity and the web of life.  Background information on the 
decline in biodiversity due to hydro-power and the potential to increase biodiversity was 
also provided.  Figures were used to graphically represent the web of life and how its 
structure would be affected by changes due to altering in-stream flows.  The first 
presentation fed into the second set of information, which concerned the Tummel 
catchment and hydro-power schemes along with details of the decline in biodiversity 
due to these specific schemes.  The third presentation familiarised respondents with two 
scenarios.  The ―business as usual‖ scenario described biodiversity as being at 14% of 
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natural levels due to reduced water flow in the catchment.  The ―alternative scenario‖ 
involved increasing water flows which would result in an associated increase in 
biodiversity within the catchment to 70% of natural levels at the expense of reduced 
energy generation and increased electricity bills.  
 
10.5.3  Participants and procedure 
2081 Scottish participants were administered the Tummel catchment CVM.  A 
market research company, utilising a stratified random sampling procedure, recruited 
participants by employing representatives to door-knock designated locations.  The 
market research representative via a face-to-face interview verbally administered 
consenting participants the Tummel catchment case study.  This presentation was 
followed up by a questionnaire that was based on a specific format that has been 
developed over several years and several studies (Spash, 1993b, 1997, 1998, 2000c, 
2002b; Spash & Hanley, 1995).  The survey administered a WTP question, an ability to 
pay item, an attitudinal scale and an ethical choice question.  Participants were also 
asked to supply demographic information.   
 
10.5.4  Survey design    
Ethical category question 
Participants were categorised into an environmental ethical group based upon a 
classification method developed by Spash (1998, 2000c).  This classification method 
involved informing respondents that ―A major aim of maintaining natural flows of 
water is to provide habitat for endangered wildlife species such as otters and 
kingfishers‖.  They were then asked which of the statements displayed in Table 10.1 
most closely matched their opinion about the scheme to get hydro-power companies to 
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release more water to the rivers to mimic a natural flow.  The two ethical categories of 
particular interest to the current study are ―deontological environmental ethic‖ group 
and the ―utilitarian environmental ethic‖ group.  Participants were categorised into the 
deontological environmental ethic category if they selected the option ―Such 
endangered species need protection because they have a right to life which cannot be 
traded against economic considerations‖ and then indicated in a follow-up question that 
they would defend these rights at an extreme personal cost.  Participants were classified 
as having a utilitarian environmental ethic if they chose the option: ―Protection of such 
endangered species must be weighed against economic considerations, but in this case, 
the endangered species should come first‖.   
 
 
Table 10.1: Position statements used to classify participants into ethical beliefs 
categories   
 Position statement in survey 
Deontological 
environmental ethic 
 
―Such endangered species need protection because they have 
a right to life which cannot be traded against economic 
considerations‖   
Plus right defended in the face of extreme personal costs: ―I 
would protect their right to life at the expense of my standard 
of living‖ 
 
Utilitarian environmental 
ethic 
 
―Protection of such endangered species must be weighed 
against economic considerations, but in this case, the 
endangered species should come first‖ 
 
Mixed 
deontological/utilitarian 
environmental ethic 
 
―Such endangered species need protection because they have 
a right to life which cannot be traded against economic 
considerations‖   
Plus right withdrawn in face of extreme personal costs:  
If standard of living is affected ―I would be prepared to see 
some species become extinct‖ 
 
Utilitarian human ethic 
 
―Protection of such endangered species must be weighed 
against economic considerations, and in this case, people‘s 
livelihoods come first‖ 
 
Deontological human 
ethic 
 
―Too much concern is shown for birds and not enough for 
humans, so I would rather see the resources used to help 
humans‖ 
 
Don’t know ―Can‘t Answer this is too complicated‖ 
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Willingness to pay monetary scale 
Participants were asked ―What is the maximum additional amount you would be 
willing to pay each quarter on your electricity bill over the next year to restore 
biodiversity in the river Tummel and its surrounding area from 14% to 70%?‖.  As is 
usually the case, the WTP distribution demonstrated a huge positive skew, with the 
skewness statistic being 63 times the skewness standard error.  To improve the 
normality of the distribution, positive bids were transformed using the log (WTP + 1) 
formula, which resulted in the LNWTP variable.  The ―+1‖ in the formula was added to 
avoid bids under £1 being transformed into a negative value.  The transformation 
resulted in a greatly improved distribution with the skewness statistic of the LNWTP 
variable being only 4 times the skewness standard error, which is acceptable. 
 
Income Category 
Respondents were asked to indicate which income category represented their 
personal annual income before tax.  Participants who estimated their personal income to 
be greater than £14,400 per annum were categorised into the ―high income‖ group.  
Participants who estimated their personal income to be less than or equal to £14,400 per 
annum were categorised into the ―low income‖ group.  Unfortunately a large number of 
participants refused to provide information about their income.  For the two ethical 
categorises of interest 230 participants were classified into the low income group (115 
deontological environmental ethic; 115 utilitarian environmental ethic), while 136 (62 
deontological environmental ethic; 74 utilitarian environmental ethic) were classified 
into the high income group.    
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Perceived ability to afford electricity 
Participants were asked to respond to the following item: ―I can easily afford to 
pay more for my electricity‖ (1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree).  In the results 
section scores on this item were reversed.  Only one participant did not answer this 
question.   
 
Attitude scale 
The attitude scale based on the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991, 2006) 
was administered after the WTP question.  Seven pairs of TPB attitude items were 
administered (see Appendix 3) that assessed (i) beliefs about the likelihood of payment 
bringing about an environmental change and (ii) a subjective evaluation of whether the 
environmental change is good/bad.  An example of an item assessing the beliefs of the 
likelihood of an outcome is: ―Paying more for electricity to restore biodiversity will 
increase the diversity and abundance of plant and animal species in the Tummel area‖.  
This was evaluated from 1 = extremely unlikely to 7 = extremely likely.  Items 
assessing likelihood of outcome were paired with the subjective evaluation items such 
as: ―Increasing the diversity and abundance of plant and animal species in the Tummel 
area is [1 = extremely bad to 7 = extremely good]‖.  For each attitude pair, the product 
of the likelihood item and the subjective evaluation item formed an overall attitudinal 
score.  Product scores of each of the 7 pairs of attitudinal items were then summed to 
form the overall attitude scale.  Only 5 participants from the two ethical groups of 
interest provided missing values for the attitudinal scale and the reliability of the 
attitude scale (Cronbach‘s α = .88) was excellent.  Combining the 7 likelihood items 
(Cronbach‘s α = .84) and the 7 subjective evaluation items (Cronbach‘s α = .87) also 
resulted in two scales with high reliability coefficients.   
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10.6  Results  
The results section will initially examine whether the two ethical groups of 
interest are relevant for the current focus of analysis.  The next section will then 
investigate whether environmental ethic moderates the relationship between income and 
WTP.  The final section will compare the attitude scores for positive bidding 
deontological environmental ethic participants and positive bidding utilitarian 
environmental ethic participants.    
 
10.6.1  Relevance of ethical groups to CVM results    
As previously mentions, both the deontological environmental ethic group and 
the utilitarian environment ethic group should be predisposed to offer a positive WTP 
bid.  Table 10.2 demonstrates that over half of the total sample consisted of participants 
classified into these two ethical categories.  Table 10.2 also demonstrates that 
individuals from these two ethical groups are more likely to give a positive bid than 
other ethical category participants.  Over 81% of the total amount bid was from 
deontological environmental ethic participants or utilitarian environmental ethic 
participants.  These results strongly indicate that it is worthwhile investigating 
differences between these two ethical categories.  If the positive bidding CVM response 
motives of these two groups are fundamentally different, then applying a single CVM 
interpretation may result in the response motives of a significant portion of the 
population being ignored or misinterpreted.   
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Table 10.2:  WTP Bids amounts for each ethical category 
 N % of 
respondents 
within ethical 
category 
giving a 
positive bid 
Highest 
positive 
bid 
Lowest 
positive 
bid 
Mean 
LNWTP* 
 
SD 
LNWTP* 
Sum of 
bids 
 
Deontological 
environmental 
ethic 
 
 
504 
 
44.6% 
(N = 225) 
 
£120 
 
£1 
 
2.41 
 
.90 
 
£3,689 
 
Utilitarian  
environmental 
ethic 
 
 
621 
 
40.7% 
(N = 253) 
 
£300 
 
£0.15 
 
2.34 
 
.80 
 
£3,639 
 
Mixed 
environmental 
ethic 
 
 
130 
 
 
25.4% 
(N = 33) 
 
£60 
 
£2 
 
2.32 
 
.89 
 
£475 
 
Utilitarian 
humans ethic 
 
 
418 
 
17.2% 
(N = 72) 
 
£50 
 
£1 
 
2.28 
 
.72 
 
£855 
 
Deontological 
human ethic 
 
 
123 
 
4.1% 
(N = 5) 
 
 
£36 
 
£1 
 
2.41 
 
1.40 
 
£93 
Don‘t know 
 
285 5.6% 
(N = 16) 
 
£120 £1 2.47 .91 £273 
Total 2081 29% 
(N = 604) 
 
£300 £0.15 2.36 .85 £9,025 
* LNWTP includes positive bidders only 
 
 
A χ2 analysis was performed comparing the number or positive and non-positive 
bidders for the two ethical groups of interest.  This analysis found no significant 
difference in the likelihood of participants from these two ethical categories offering a 
positive bid, χ2(1) = 1.73, p > .05.  A one-way ANOVA was used to compare the 
LNWTP means for these two ethical groups.  Table 10.2 displays the LNWTP means 
and standard deviations for the positive bidding participants.  No significant difference 
between the LNWTP scores for the two ethical categories was found, F(1, 476) = .89, p 
> .05.  This suggests that deontological environmental ethic participants and utilitarian 
environmental ethic participants are two influential groups in the Tummel catchment 
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CVM study that are not distinguishable by simple analysis.  This of course does not 
mean that these two groups are not responding based on fundamentally different 
response motives. 
 
10.6.2  Income effect comparisons 
This section examines the income effect for the 366 participants who (i) 
provided an estimate of their income; (ii) were positive WTP bidders and (ii) were 
categorised as having either a deontological environmental ethic or a utilitarian 
environmental ethic.  The variable ―perceived ability to afford electricity‖ is also 
analysed as a manipulation check to ensure that participants in higher income groups 
believe that they have higher purchasing power than lower income groups.  Out of the 
366 participants of interest to the current study, 177 participants were classified as 
having a deontological environmental ethic, while 189 participants were classified as 
having a utilitarian environmental ethic.   
A univariate ANOVA was used to investigate the hypothesis that ethical outlook 
moderates the relationship between income and LNWTP.  There were ambiguities in 
interpreting the main effects because more participants were categorised into the low 
income group than the high income group.  As it is assumed that this difference in 
sample size occurs because of natural differences in the sample populations, a decision 
was used to select the Method 2 sum of squares option in SPSS to analyse the main 
effects.  Method 2 is normally employed in a non-experimental design in which sample 
size reflects the importance of cells.  This method imposes a hierarchy of testing where 
the main effects are adjusted for each other and have equal priority.  The choice of the 
sum of squares method, however, will not influence the interaction statistic, which is the 
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primary focus of the analysis.  A significant interaction would suggest different income 
effects for the two ethical categories of interest.   
Table 10.3 displays the means and standard deviations for LNWTP.  A Levene‘s 
test revealed that there was no significant difference in the error variance of LNWTP, F 
(3,362) = 1.89, p > .05.  A univariate ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for 
the ethical categories, F(1, 362) = 0.03, p > .05, which is a finding consistent with the 
conclusion that there is no simple difference in LNWTP for the two ethical groups.  A 
main effect, however, was found for income category, F(1, 362) = 6.38, p < .01, 
suggesting that higher income individuals have higher LNWTP scores, which is 
consistent with the income effect hypothesis.   
  
Table 10.3:  Means and standard deviations for ethical and income categories 
 LNWTP Perceived Ability to Pay 
Deontological Environmental 
Ethic & Low Income 
M = 2.44 
SD = .94 
N = 115 
 
M = 4.24 
SD = 1.92 
N = 115 
Deontological Environmental 
Ethic & High Income 
      M = 2.39 
     SD = .75 
N = 62 
 
M = 5.10 
SD = 1.71 
N = 62 
Utilitarian Environmental Ethic 
& Low Income 
M = 2.15 
SD = .75 
N = 115 
 
M = 3.65 
SD = 1.81 
N = 114 
Utilitarian Environmental Ethic 
& High Income 
M = 2.65 
SD = .79 
N = 74 
 
M = 4.70 
SD = 1.74 
N = 74 
 
 
Notably, a significant interaction was found between the ethical and income 
categories, F(1, 362) = 9.87, p < .01.  This suggests that the two ethical categories 
demonstrated a significantly different relationship between income and LNWTP.  
Figure 10.1 displays this interaction effect, with the utilitarian environmental ethic 
group reporting a strong positive relationship between income and LNWTP, while this 
was not the case for the deontological environmental ethic group.  The bivariate 
correlation between income and LNWTP for the deontological environmental group 
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was -.08, which was not found to be significant.  The bivariate correlation for the 
utilitarian environmental ethic group was .27, which is significant at a 0.001 level.  
Therefore the significant main effect for income in the univariate ANOVA was driven 
entirely by the utilitarian environmental ethic respondents. 
  
 
Figure 10.1:  Estimated marginal means for LNWTP for the income categories and the 
ethical categories 
 
 
To ensure that the interaction effect was not due to differences in perceived 
purchasing power, a univariate ANOVA was performed, with perceived ability to pay 
being the dependent variable.  Once again income and ethical group were the 
independent variables.  Table 10.3 displays the means and standard deviations for the 
groups of interest.  Levene‘s test found no significant difference in the variance of 
perceived ability to pay, F(3,361) = 1.00, p > .05.  A significant main effect was found 
for the ethical category groups, F(1, 361) = 6.29, p < .01, where the deontological ethic 
group were found to have on average a higher perceived ability to pay.  There was also 
a very large significant main effect for income groups, F(1, 361) = 23.41, p < .001, 
which is consistent with the economic assumption that people with higher income have 
a greater ability to pay for economic goods.  Importantly, no significant interaction was 
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found, F(1, 361) = 0.26, p > .05.  Figure 10.2 displays the significant influence of 
income on perceived ability to pay for electricity.   
 
 
Figure 10.2:  Estimated marginal means for perceived ability to pay for the income and 
ethical groups 
 
10.6.3  Attitude score comparisons 
Table 10.4 displays the attitude scale means and standard deviations for the two 
ethical groups.  A Levene test found a significant difference in the homogeneity of 
variance, Levene statistic (1, 467) = 5.76, p < .05.  An analysis of the distribution also 
found a skewness statistic/standard error of skewness ratio of over seven.  A decision 
was made to test differences in the attitude scale means using the Brown-Forsythe 
statistic, which is an asymptotically F distributed test, and is a robust test of equality of 
means.  The Brown-Forsythe statistic has also been found to be a more robust test for 
skewed distributions than the Welch statistic (Mendes, 2007).  Scores for the 
deontological environmental ethic group were found to be significantly higher than the 
utilitarian environmental ethic group, Brown-Forsythe statistic (1,441.60) = 6.21, p < 
.05. 
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Table 10.4 also displays the means and standard deviations for the subjective 
evaluation scale and the likelihood scale.  For the subjective evaluation scores [Levene 
statistic (1, 470) = 3.24, p > .05] and the likelihood scores [Levene statistic (1, 470) = 
3.24, p > .05] no significant difference was found in the homogeneity of variance.  
Therefore a one-way ANOVA was employed to examine for differences in the mean 
scores of these two scales.  No significant differences in the mean likelihood scores was 
found when the two ethical groups were compared, F (1, 472) = 1.85, p > .05.  The 
deontological environmental ethic group, however, were found to have significantly 
higher scores for the subjective evaluation scale, F (1, 470) = 5.98, p < .05. 
 
Table 10.4:  Attitude scale means and standard deviations for the two ethical groups 
 Deontological environmental 
ethic group 
Utilitarian environmental 
ethic group 
 
Attitude scale 
(Subjective evaluation 
× likelihood) 
 
Subjective evaluation 
scale 
 
 
Likelihood scale 
 
 
 
M = 231.83 
SD = 72.95 
N= 222 
 
M = 35.83 
SD = 9.27 
N= 223 
 
M = 44.88 
SD = 5.66 
N= 224 
 
 
M = 215.99 
SD = 63.74 
N = 247 
 
M = 33.86 
SD = 8.25 
N= 249 
 
M = 44.23 
SD = 4.69 
N= 250 
 
 
 
10.7  Conclusion  
The hypothesis that CVM participants with a utilitarian environmental ethic 
offer positive bids based on mainstream economic motives, while participants with a 
deontological environmental ethic offer positive bids based on contribution model 
motives was supported.  An examination of the income effect and attitude scale 
responses found theoretically expected differences between the two environmental ethic 
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groups of interest.  Utilitarian environmental ethic participants and deontological 
environmental ethic participants were found to account for the overwhelming majority 
of positive bidders in the Tummel catchment CVM study.  Therefore misinterpreting the 
response motives of participants who hold either of these ethical stances could result in 
spurious conclusions about how the community economically values the proposed 
Tummel catchment environmental change.  
Consistent with the organismic hypothesis a significant income effect was found 
for the utilitarian environmental ethic group only.  An additional analysis concluded that 
the different income effects for the two environmental ethic groups could not be 
explained by the differences in the perceived ability to pay of the two ethical groups.  
When these ethical groups were combined a small effect of income was found that was 
similar to many other CVM studies (see Schläpfer, 2006), but when only the utilitarian 
environmental ethic group alone was analysed the income effect was very strong.  This 
suggests that positive bids are a function of budgetary constraints for the utilitarian 
group, but not the deontological group who appear to be offering a standardised bid 
amount.   
Both the deontological environmental ethic group and the utilitarian group who 
indicated support for environmental protection were expected to report positives 
attitudes about the proposed environmental change.  It was hypothesised, however, that 
participants with a deontological ethic should report more positive attitudes about a 
change beneficial to the environment.  Consistent with the notion that people who hold 
an intrinsic environmental ethic are more committed towards sustainability, the 
deontological group rated the environmentally friendly Tummel catchment change as 
being more positive on a ―good-bad‖ scale than the utilitarian group.  This finding is 
consistent with the argument that the deontological group uphold their belief that some 
aspects of the environment have an intrinsic right to be protected and that the goodness 
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of such actions are not moderated by other factors.  It was also hypothesised that both 
environmental ethic groups would recognise that a positive WTP offer would only be 
worthwhile if the environment was actually improved by the payment.  Therefore a 
positive bid was only expected if participants believed that the payment would likely 
lead to a positive environmental change.  The current study supported the hypothesis, 
finding no difference in the perceived likelihood of WTP resulting in environmental 
change for the two ethical groups.   
The current chapter proposed that the contribution model is able to account for 
the positive bidding behaviour of deontological ethic participants.  If deontological 
participants are only offering a contribution then they are not offering an estimated 
exchange price for a welfare change.  If, on the other hand, the estimates of the 
utilitarians are based upon economic motives then the WTP bids of the utilitarian 
participants represent a monetary price estimate for the perceived costs and benefits of 
the proposal.  Aggregating the responses of the utilitarian and deontological bidders 
under such circumstance would result in a meaningless representation of economic 
value as the motives of these two groups are not commensurable.   
It is proposed that a more scientific and descriptively accurate approach for 
revealed preferences methods might be to provide summary information about each of 
these groups to decision makers.  Providing environmental decision-makers with such a 
summary would allow them to assess the appropriateness of the proposal based on more 
information than just a mere monetary estimate.  The summary may allow decision 
makers to develop deeper awareness of community differences concerning the proposal 
and may even highlight the potential for the proposal to be rejected or supported by the 
community.  A summary of different response motives would be especially valuable if 
it also included information about participants who have a deontological environmental 
ethic and refuse to offer a CVM bid. 
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The current chapter supports the pluralistic interpretation of CVM.  Despite the 
best efforts on the part of economists, it may also be extremely difficult to encourage 
the majority of participants to respond with solely mainstream economic model 
motives.  Although the design of the CVM may help some participants focus on 
marketplace incentives, for other participants it may be simply more natural to apply a 
deontological or contributory perspective when assessing a non-market environmental 
proposal.  If citizen stakeholders do hold incommensurable economic perceptions of an 
environmental change it may also be worthwhile to look at methodologies that are able 
to provide a broader context and meaning to environmental values (e.g., non-aggregated 
social multi-criteria analysis or forms of deliberative monetary valuation).  Decision 
makers may greatly benefit from pluralistic methodologies that offer a more 
descriptively rich summary of how a community perceives a proposed environmental 
change.   
 
10.8  Summary of the two empirical studies  
The results of the two empirical studies that examined the validity of CVM 
interpretations both provided evidence that the economic interpretation and the 
contribution model partially explain CVM response motives.  It should be noted that 
Kahneman and colleagues did not empirically examine for the possibility of economic 
and attitudinal influences on WTP responses.  CVM practitioners, on the other hand, 
rarely examine for the possibility of non-economic motives and when such studies are 
conducted any empirical results that question the neoclassical interpretation are 
classified as being the result of a methodological design bias.  If both the contribution 
model interpretation and the economic interpretation offer partially valid descriptions of 
CVM response motives, then the confirmation bias literature (Nickerson, 1998; Wason 
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& Johnson-Laird, 1972) would suggest that researchers who only examine a single 
interpretation of CVM may be able to find enough evidence to claim that their 
hypothesis has been supported.   
The results of both empirical studies suggest that neither the economic 
interpretation nor the attitude hypothesis interpretation offer a satisfactory or complete 
explanation of CVM responses.  Evidence was presented that both interpretations 
partially explained motives for offering a positive or zero WTP.  Evidence was also 
presented that the environmental ethic of positive WTP bidders influences the type of 
bid (e.g. economic bid or contributory bid) that is offered.  It is concluded, based upon 
two empirical studies, that the pluralistic interpretation which acknowledges both 
contributory and economic motives provides the most descriptively accurate 
interpretation of CVM bidding behaviour.   
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Section 5 
 
Thesis Conclusions 
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Chapter 11 
Overall Conclusions 
11.1  Thesis summary   
Environmental policymakers are expected to make transparent decisions for a 
variety of high-stakes public and private sustainability issues that are inherently 
complex and hotly contested (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991).  Environmental value 
indicators are able to simplify the sustainability problem, while also offering an 
increased level of accountability and transparency for decisions that allocate public 
funds (Failing & Gregory, 2003).  Furthermore, environmental policy is more 
defensible to criticism when it is possible to claim that the policy was developed based 
upon independently administered and scientifically accepted measurements.  When 
quantitative indicators included within environmental policy frameworks are claimed to 
be scientific measurements, the integrity of the policy framework requires the 
interpretation of the indicator to possess an acceptable level of validity.  This thesis 
analysed three topics that explored the challenges facing economists and conservation 
psychologists who contribute to the sustainability policy domain by measuring 
community environmental values with quantitative survey methodological designs. 
This final thesis chapter will revisit the main research topics and will summarise 
the conclusions for each research question.  The main research questions for this thesis 
were:    
Research Question 1: How do the disciplines of economics and psychology define 
environmental value? 
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Research Question 2:  What are the challenges to assessing the descriptive validity of 
an environmental value survey interpretation?  
Research Question 3: How can the descriptive validity of environmental value surveys 
interpretations be improved?  
 
In order to examine Research Question 3, three empirical studies were presented 
that examined two additional research questions.  These additional research questions 
were:    
Additional Research Question 1:  How valid is the trait-based interpretation of the 
Awareness of Consequence scale that is commonly employed by conservation 
psychologists?  Is there a more valid interpretation of this scale?  
Additional Research Question 2: How valid is the economic interpretation and the 
contribution model interpretation of CVM surveys?  Can the descriptive validity of 
CVM surveys be improved?  
 
11.2  Research Question 1:  How do the disciplines of 
economics and psychology define environmental value?   
Research Question 1 examined different assumptions of environmental value put 
forward by conservation psychologists, environmental & resource economists and 
ecological economists.  Differences in the definition of environmental value between 
research disciplines and within each research community highlight the inherent 
ambiguity of the environmental value concept.  A review of these three sustainability 
disciplines concluded that the level of analysis, the researchers guiding 
ideology/worldview assumptions and policy objectives influence not only how a 
  
261 
 
research community defines environmental value, but also whether a survey is 
concluded to be a valid measure of environmental value.  This is a significant finding 
because applied economists and psychologists, who define themselves as knowledge 
seekers, often refer to the results of environmental value surveys as if they represent an 
objective and ideology-free scientific measurement of environmental value.   
Conservation psychologists, environmental & resource economists and 
ecological economists apply different levels of analysis when examining the concept of 
environmental value.  The conservation psychology programme defines environmental 
value in terms of the perceptions of individual actors, and examines the concept of 
environmental value by referring to cognitions and/or emotions.  The discipline of 
economics, on the other hand, is concerned with issues related to the production and 
distribution of environmental resources.  It is possible to differentiate between the level 
of analysis employed by the Environmental & Resource Economics (E&RE) 
programme and the Ecological Economics (EE) programme.  The E&RE community is 
interested in examining the market value of an environmental change and therefore 
explores environmental value at the level of aggregated monetary preferences.  The EE 
community is made up of a range of researchers from various backgrounds (e.g. 
neoclassical economics, heterodox economists, ecologists, physical scientists, 
sociologists, geographers).  Unlike the more homogenous conservation psychology and 
E&RE communities, the EE community is not united by a formalised level of analysis.  
For example, economical economists define environmental value in terms of market 
value (e.g. Costanza, d'Arge et al., 1997; Kuosmanen et al., 2009), wider societal 
concerns (e.g. Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991), environmental ethics (e.g. Söderbaum, 1999; 
Spash et al., 2009) and biospheric limitations on economic activity (e.g. Daly, 1990; 
Hannon, 1998; Wam, 2010).  In order to have a degree of unity within such a diverse 
field some ecological economists have developed value pluralism philosophies (e.g. 
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Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Norgaard, 1989; Spash, 2009; Spash & Simpson, 1993) in 
order to formally explore the concept of environmental value at different levels of 
analysis.   
While the policy community fund economists and psychologists to undertake 
supposedly ―objective‖ and ―independent‖ measurements, the definition of 
environmental value put forward by conservation psychologists, environmental & 
resource economists and ecological economists is clearly influenced by ideology.  
Conservation psychologists are united by the guiding principle that people should be 
given incentives to enact sustainable behaviour and should be encouraged to support 
environmental causes.  While neoclassical economists sometimes draw upon positivistic 
arguments to claim that they are able to offer ideology-free scientific conclusions (see 
critics of neoclassical approach by Boldeman, 2007; Davis, 2004; Norgaard, 1989; 
Söderbaum, 1999), it is clear that the neoclassical E&RE programme is based upon an 
utilitarian ideology that prescribes market-based mechanisms and the efficient 
distribution of environmental resources.  The E&RE guiding philosophy proposes that 
an environmental change is only good if positive instrumental value is derived from 
making the change.  Unlike the other two sustainability disciplines, the EE community 
is not dominated by a single guiding philosophy (Faber, 2008; Røpke, 2005).  For, 
example, ecological economists can explore the concept of environmental value 
according to either pragmatic, economic efficiency-based or social-based criteria (see 
Spash, 2009).  Furthermore, researchers within the EE community formally explore 
how values, ethics and ideology allow for different definitions of environmental value.  
For example, some prominent ecological economists explore the philosophical 
implications of there being an interconnected relationship between the human economy 
and the biophysical world (e.g. Brand, 2009; Costanza, Cumberland et al., 1997; Daly & 
Townsend, 1993; Wam, 2010).  Other prominent ecological economists make sense of 
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the concept of environmental value by exploring ethics, social justice and intrinsic value 
(e.g. Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991; Norgaard, 1989; Sagoff, 1998; Söderbaum, 1999; 
Spash, 1997). 
An empirical study was presented that supported the hypothesis that the E&RE 
community and the EE community are centred upon different ideological perspectives 
and worldview assumptions.  This study examined responses to a questionnaire that was 
administered to delegates at an E&RE conference and delegates at EE conferences.  It 
was proposed that because the guiding principle of the field of E&RE is a utilitarian 
philosophy, that environmental & resource economists will rely heavily upon the 
concept of Cost-Benefit-Analysis (CBA).  An analysis of the conference survey 
responses concluded that the E&RE sample, when compared to an EE sample rated the 
concept of CBA as being more important.  Furthermore, literature reviews that have 
described the emergence of the EE programme (e.g. Røpke, 2004, 2005; Spash, 1999) 
suggest that the field of EE has differentiated itself from the E&RE programme by 
accepting biophysical limitations and value pluralism as being key concepts.  As 
hypothesised, an analysis of the conference survey responses concluded that the EE 
conference sample rated value pluralism concepts, pluralism-as-a-methodology 
concepts and a biophysical limitations concept as being more important, when 
compared to the E&RE conference sample.    
Conservation psychologists can also conceptualise environmental value with 
different worldview assumptions.  A meta-framework of environment-person 
assumptions originally put forward by Altman and Rogoff (1987) suggests that 
environmental value can be defined with a trait-based framework, an interactional 
framework, an organismic framework or a transactional framework.  The thesis 
proposed that each of these four frameworks can be used to examine different kinds of 
environmental policy objectives, while policy objectives can also influence how 
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conservation psychologists choose to define the concept of environmental value.  
Conservation psychologists interested in offering advice on how to strategically modify 
or influence perceptions of environmental value will draw upon interactional worldview 
assumptions.  The interactional framework hypothesise lawful relationships between 
context and perceptions of environmental value, and these hypothesised lawful 
relationships can be used to provide policy advice related to modifying educational 
setting, marketing contexts and behavioural incentives.  Other sustainability policies 
(e.g. market segmentation, early educational curricula) require that perceptions of 
environmental value be conceptualised as being a stable trait.  When conservation 
psychologists are interested in designing behaviour change models, trait-based variables 
can be incorporated into an interactional framework where stable perceptions of 
environmental value are hypothesised to incrementally influence sustainability 
behaviour.   
For some contested environmental issues, the environmental values of 
competing stakeholder groups cannot be reconciled because different stakeholder 
groups define environmental value according to fundamentally different higher-order 
principles.  Conservation psychologists interested in learning more about how ideology 
or higher-order goals influence the way in which different stakeholder groups define 
environmental value can draw upon the organismic framework.  Conservation 
psychologists interested in learning more about the environmental values of specific 
individuals and communities, while also avoiding the pitfalls of generalisation or 
stereotyping, on the other hand, are able to draw upon the transactional worldview.  The 
transactional worldview explores the way in which unique historical events influence 
how a particular individual or a specific stakeholder group values the environment.     
The primary goal of conservation psychologists, environmental & resource 
economists and ecological economists who administer surveys to the community is to 
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gather an understanding of how the general public perceive environmental value.  While 
it is important to outline the concept of environmental value with a theoretical 
definition, when interpreting the survey responses of community members it is just as 
important to understand the concept of environmental value from the perspective of 
respondents.  The goal of the survey interpretation should be to match the response 
patterns from the general public surveys with the environmental value assumptions put 
forward by researchers.  If survey response patterns are consistent with the worldview 
assumptions, ideology or the policy framework of the researcher, but not with 
community perspectives, then the interpretation of survey responses cannot be claimed 
to be a valid or scientific measure.  Research Question 2 explored the challenges facing 
psychologists and economists who aim to assess the validity of an environmental value 
survey interpretation with empirical evidence.    
 
11.3  Research Question 2:  Challenges to empirically 
assessing the descriptive validity of environmental value 
survey interpretations 
The goal of exploring Research Question 2 was to outline validity assessment 
challenges faced by researchers who administer environmental value surveys with 
quasi-experimental designs.  Applied researchers seeking to contribute to policy often 
administer surveys in quasi-experimental settings.  Cook and Campbell (1979) noted 
that quasi-experimental designs are often subject to construct validity threats (e.g. 
inadequate preoperational explication of constructs, mono-method bias, evaluation 
apprehension and researcher expectancies), internal validity threats (e.g. maturation, 
history effects, attrition), external validity threats (e.g. between selection and treatment, 
interaction between setting and treatment) and statistical validity threats (low statistical 
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power, random heterogeneity of respondents, and the reliability of the measures).  The 
limitations imposed by a quasi-experimental design can result in researchers not being 
able to gather adequate information to make an informed conclusion about the validity 
of their particular survey interpretation. 
Another barrier to examining the descriptive validity of environmental value 
survey interpretations is the subjective nature of validity assessments.  The very act of 
assessing validity involves making subjective decisions as to what evidence to consider 
and how to weigh up the body of evidence.  For example, the environment-person 
worldview assumptions put forward by Altman and Rogoff (1987) were argued to 
influence how conservation psychologists go about the business of assessing the validity 
of environmental value survey instruments.  For instance, the transactional worldview 
concludes a priori that quantitative environmental value surveys lack validity as the 
complexity of the environmental value construct can only be adequately understood 
with qualitative survey designs.  Trait-based validity assessments focus on finding 
evidence of stable survey response patterns, while evidence of temporary context 
influencing survey responses challenges the validity of trait-based interpretations.  
Some interactional framework interpretations of environmental value scale, on the other 
hand, will be empirically supported by evidence of temporary context influencing 
survey responses.  The organismic framework validates environmental value survey 
responses by looking for between-group differences in survey responses that are 
consistent with survey responses being influenced by higher-order goals or ethical 
principles.   
Validity assessments can sometime be influenced by social and political 
pressures.  Economists and psychologists are less likely to conduct research that 
influences policy and to attract funding if their research designs are incompatible with 
the policy framework.  Therefore, researchers who examine the validity of an 
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environmental values survey may not have incentives to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
responses that fall outside their conceptual framework.  For example, a policy 
framework may require that the costs and benefits of an environmental change be 
assessed in monetary terms.  The proposed trade-offs in a CVM survey, however, may 
break sacred taboos of some community groups (e.g. the commodification of the 
environment by CVM surveys may be a taboo for some environmentalists), resulting in 
protest actions (e.g. rude comments or refusal to answer questions).  It is common 
practice for researchers to declare protest survey response motives as being irrational 
and to exclude such responses from the final conclusions (Jorgensen et al., 1999; Spash, 
2008b).  If economists or psychologists exclude survey responses that cannot be 
described as being rational under their conceptual framework, this may reflect an 
insensitivity to the possibility that people can have legitimate environmental values that 
fall outside the researcher‘s worldview or the policy framework.  Survey conclusions 
that misinterpret the environmental value response motives of some key stakeholders 
can also be discriminatory.   When researchers are funded by powerful environmental 
stakeholder groups, survey interpretation strategies that only acknowledge response 
motives compatible with a specific interpretation of environmental value may 
discriminate against already marginalised environmental stakeholders.  
When the validity of survey responses are assessed against only a single 
interpretation of environmental value, the combination of the subjective nature of 
assessing validity, pressures to be policy relevant and the validity threats due to reduced 
experimental control can result in researchers being more determined to find evidence 
that supports their particular interpretation than being open to learning more about 
survey responses from the participant‘s perspective.  The confirmation bias literature 
suggests that when researchers only examine a single interpretation of survey data they 
can be highly susceptible to selectively giving undue weight to evidence that supports 
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their position while neglecting to gather or discounting evidence that does not support 
the proposed interpretation (Nickerson, 1998; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).  If 
conservation psychologists or economists fall victim to the confirmation bias by only 
acknowledging empirical evidence consistent with their ideology/worldview 
assumptions, then the scientific legitimacy of their survey interpretation is questionable.   
A review of the trait-based scale literature concluded that conservation 
psychologists who assume that a latent trait construct exerts a strong influence over how 
participants respond to survey items are vulnerable to ignoring evidence that imply that 
an alternative interpretation possesses higher construct validity.  A literature review 
concluded that the reported dimensionality statistics of five widely administered trait-
based environmental scales was not consistent with the mainstream scale 
interpretations.  These five environmental value scales were the widely administered 
NEP scale (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap et al., 2000), the CN scale (Mayer & 
Frantz, 2004), the anthropocentric/eccocentric scales (Thompson & Barton, 1994), EC-2 
scale (Schultz, 2000) and the AC scale (Stern et al., 1993).  Many conservation 
psychologists, however, are satisfied to simply interpret environmental value scales 
according to mainstream interpretations.  As described by Kuhn (1962), these 
researchers may be in a normal science stage and most concerned with following the 
approach of their dominant scientific paradigm.   If conservation psychologists, 
however, do not question mainstream methodological and theoretical approaches, they 
may be highly susceptible to misinterpreting environmental scale responses and be 
closed to the possibility of more appropriate survey interpretations.   
The worldview assumptions/ideology of the E&RE and EE communities was 
found to influence validity assessments of environmental value surveys administered by 
economists.  The survey administered at E&RE and EE conferences asked delegates to 
assess the validity of survey-based methodologies critiqued by three well known journal 
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articles (Costanza et al., 1997; Hanley et al., 1998; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998).  The 
E&RE sample, compared to EE sample, was found to rate the CVM methodology 
discussed by the two CVM related journal papers (Costanza et al., 1997; Hanley et al., 
1998) as being more accurate.  The E&RE sample, when compared to the EE sample, 
also indicated that the methodology referred by the two journal CVM-related articles 
should be more widely applied to an array of environmental issues.  When the analyses 
that compared the E&RE sample and the EE sample validity ratings of the methodology 
outlined by the CVM-related two journal papers included the conference delegates 
ratings of the importance of CBA as a covariate, no significant difference between the 
E&RE and EE sample was found.  This suggests that the E&RE community rated the 
CVM methodologies outlined in the CVM journal papers as being more valid (i.e. more 
accurate and should be more widely applied) because the E&RE community deem the 
concept of CBA to be more important.  This finding supports the argument that 
economists rely heavily upon ideology/worldview assumptions when assessing the 
validity of CVM.     
An analysis of the conference survey responses found no significant difference 
in how the E&RE sample and the EE sample rated the accuracy of the multi-criteria 
analysis methodological approach critiqued by the third journal paper.  The EE sample, 
when compared to the E&RE sample, however, suggested that the multi-criteria 
analysis methodology critiqued by the third journal paper should be more widely 
applied to an array of environmental issues.  When the analysis, that examined the 
conference delegate assessment of whether the multi-criteria analysis methodology 
critiqued by third journal paper should be applied to an array of environmental 
problems, included the participant‘s ratings of the importance of CBA concepts and 
pluralism concepts as a covariate, no significant difference between the E&RE and EE 
samples was found.  This finding is also consistent with the argument that 
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ideology/worldview assumptions influence the validity assessments of multi-criteria 
analysis designs.   
It is a major problem if the results of environmental value survey methodologies 
presented by conservation psychologists and economists to the policy community are 
interpreted primarily according to worldview and ideology, while the body of empirical 
evidence is not seriously examined.  A major challenge facing applied researchers who 
administer policy relevant surveys is not to fall prey to the confirmation bias by 
selectively presenting evidence that supports the researcher‘s assumptions and ideology.  
For Research Question 3, the thesis proposed that when researchers are open to 
examining more than one possible interpretation of environmental value survey 
responses they will become less susceptible to the confirmation bias.   
 
11.4 Research Question 3:  How can the descriptive validity of 
environmental value survey interpretations be improved? 
Research Question 3 explored the possibility of improving the interpretation of 
environmental value survey responses by simultaneously assessing the descriptive 
validity of more than one interpretation.  Simultaneously exploring more than one 
interpretation can improve the descriptive validity of an environmental value survey by 
finding evidence that (i) a combined interpretation provides the best explanation, (ii) 
one interpretation is superior and the other interpretation has poor descriptive validity or 
(iii) one interpretation explains the survey responses of population A while the other 
interpretation explains the survey responses of population B.   
In order to examine Research Question 3, two additional research questions were 
proposed.  Additional Research Question 1 focused on empirically examining the 
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validity of AC scale (Stern et al., 1993) interpretations.  Additional Research Question 2 
empirically explored the validity of three interpretations of CVM.  
11.4.1  Additional Research Question 1:  A validity assessment of AC scale 
interpretations 
The widely administered AC scale (Stern et al., 1993) was initially interpreted 
according to the assumption that egoistic, altruistic and biospheric value orientations 
influences beliefs about adverse environmental consequences.  This assumption has 
become institutionalised in the VBN model (Stern et al., 1999) despite the lack of 
evidence that responses to the AC scale are influenced by value orientations.  An 
alternative interpretation of the AC scale is the General Awareness of Consequences 
(GAC) interpretation put forward by Stern et al. (1995a).  An empirical study 
employing an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) examined AC scale datasets, as this 
technique allows for the examination of unexpected response patterns.  The EFA was 
conducted on two samples and compared against the results of a previous 
dimensionality analysis reported in the literature.  The EFA identified an interpretable 
response pattern that was not consistent with the value orientation or GAC 
interpretations.  The alternative interpretation of the AC scale was proposed to be 
measuring ―beliefs supportive of environmental action‖ and ―beliefs supportive of 
environmental inaction‖.  A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and the pattern of 
correlations supported beliefs supportive of environmental action/inaction interpretation 
as being superior to the value orientation interpretation and the GAC interpretation.  
Figure 11.1 diagrammatically depicts the validity of the three mutually exclusive 
interpretations.  The ―belief supportive of environmental action/inaction‖ interpretation 
of the AC scale suggests that the VBN model should also be modified.  An example of a 
modification of the VBN model was also presented in the end of Chapter 6 in Figure 
6.5.   
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Figure 11.1:  Diagrammatic depiction of the ―beliefs supportive of environmental 
action/inaction‖ interpretation being superior to the ―value orientation‖ interpretation 
and the ―general awareness of consequences interpretation‖ 
 
 
11.4.2  Additional Research Question 2:  A validity assessment of CVM 
interpretations 
The interpretation of CVM responses was explored by comparing the descriptive 
validity of the economic model interpretation of CVM with a psychological 
interpretation labelled the contribution model put forward by Kahneman and colleagues 
(Kahneman and Ritov 1994; Kahneman et al., 1993; Kahneman, Ritov and Schkade 
1999).  A value pluralism interpretation, which hypotheses that both the economic 
model and contribution model interpretation of CVM are partially valid, was also 
considered.  Two empirical studies were presented that assessed the validity of each of 
these three CVM interpretations.   
The first CVM empirical study assessed the assumption put forward by the 
contribution model that CVM is an attitudinal rather than an economic measure.  The 
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attitudinal hypothesis underpins the contribution model interpretation put forward by 
Kahneman and colleagues.  The attitudinal hypothesis predicts that Willingness To Pay 
(WTP) responses and attitude scale responses should share a high level of variance, as 
WTP is proposed to be an attitudinal measure.  A methodology examining within-
subject variance was employed which was superior to the between-group design 
employed by Kahneman and colleagues.  Both attitudes and the economic measure 
―ability to pay‖ were found to share a significant proportion of variance with the 
decision to offer either a zero or positive WTP bid.  This finding suggests that a positive 
WTP bid is a measure of both attitudes and economic considerations.  A corollary of 
this finding is that both the economic model and contribution model interpretation of 
WTP responses are too narrow when considered in isolation.  Therefore, the value 
pluralism interpretation was supported, with the decision to offer a zero or positive 
WTP bid being the result of more than one motive.  As depicted in Figure 11.2, an 
interpretation that includes attitudes and ability to pay provides the more descriptively 
valid interpretation of positive/zero WTP bidding behaviour.          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.2:  A diagram that depicts a combination of two interpretations explaining a 
higher portion of the variance of responses to whether a positive or zero WTP bid is 
offered in a CVM survey 
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While the first empirical study was able to explain a significant proportion of 
variance of positive/zero WTP bids, both attitudes and ability to pay were found to be 
poor predictors of the amount of WTP offered by positive bidders.  This finding 
suggests that the decision whether to offer a positive or negative WTP bid is different to 
the decision of deciding how much to bid, and contradicts the economic model 
interpretation that people weigh up specific costs and benefits associated with a 
proposed environmental change and will pay to the point of indifference.  The existence 
of a high proportion of standard currency WTP bids is also consistent with the 
contribution model assumption that people are offering a general contribution rather 
than offering an economic valuation.  
The second empirical CVM study assessed the organismic hypothesis that 
participants with an intrinsic ethic offer a general contribution, while participants with a 
utilitarian ethic offer an economic assessment.  Consistent with this hypothesis, a strong 
income effect was found for utilitarian participants, while no income effect was found 
for deontological participants.  This income effect could not be explained by differences 
in ability to pay.  Deontological participants were also expected to have stronger 
environmental attitudes because they are more dedicated towards protecting the 
environment.  The results of the second empirical CVM study support the organismic 
hypothesis that participants with different environmental ethics will have fundamentally 
different motives for offering positive bids.  Figure 11.3 diagrammatically depicts this 
finding.  If the positive WTP bids for participants with different ethical perspectives are 
not commensurable, then the validity of the E&RE approach of aggregating all positive 
WTP bids should be questioned.  Empirical evidence that CVM measures 
incommensurable motives also provides empirical support for the philosophy of value 
pluralism put forward by some ecological economists. 
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Figure 11.3:  WTP bids represent a good cause for participants with a deontological 
ethic and represent an economic valuation for participants with a utilitarian ethic 
 
11.5 Overall conclusions & suggestions 
Environmental value survey instruments will not be a bridge between 
knowledge and policy if the interpretation of the survey is not reflective of the 
participant‘s response motives.  Unfortunately the need to simplify complex problems 
with a manageable conceptual framework has resulted in the policy community 
preferring information that is consistent with the needs of their policy framework (e.g. 
simplified numbers that are easily understood and monetary estimations), while being 
less inclined to be receptive of alternative interpretations that possess a higher degree of 
descriptive validity.  Conservation psychologists, economists, the policy community 
and the general public should be aware of the limitations and pitfalls of environmental 
value survey interpretation.  While it is clear that interpretations of environmental 
survey results are not value free or independent of ideology, it should also be 
acknowledged that carefully interpreted survey result can provide simplified and 
legitimate insights into how a community values the environment.   
Conservation psychologists, environmental & resource economists and 
ecological economists take pride in being able to provide scientific-level policy advice.  
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The thesis concludes that economists and psychologists conducting applied survey 
research are more likely to make a positive contribution to environmental policy if they 
are explicitly aware of their own environmental value assumptions and the possibility 
that there may be a more descriptively valid interpretation of environmental value 
survey data.  An awareness of the scope and ambiguity of the environmental value 
concept is likely to encourage psychologists and economists to be open to examining 
the descriptive validity of more than one interpretation of an environmental value 
survey.  When economists or psychologists are willing to examine the validity of more 
than one possible interpretation of survey results, they become less susceptible to the 
confirmation bias.   
Conservation psychologist, environmental & resource economists and ecological 
economists should also develop a peer review culture where the validation of an 
environmental value survey instrument involves an assessment of the quality of 
evidence provided combined with a validity assessment of more than one possible 
interpretation.  Such a peer review culture would be more likely to be cultivated if social 
researchers have easy access to an information source (e.g. a ―survey evaluation‖ 
website or a regularly updated printed ―survey evaluation‖ booklet) that lists the 
possible interpretations of prominent environmental value survey methodologies.  The 
proposed ―survey evaluation‖ information sources could outline the possible 
interpretations for various economic (e.g. CVM, choice experiments and pluralism-as-a-
methodology options) and conservation psychology survey methodologies (e.g. AC 
scale) that are designed to measure environmental value, while also summarising the 
degree of empirical support for each interpretation.  If ―survey evaluation‖ was widely 
accessible to the research community it could openly discourage researchers from 
repeatedly applying interpretation that are not supported by empirical evidence (e.g. the 
mainstream NEP scale or AC scale interpretations).  Furthermore, new theories of 
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environmental value may emerge if conservation psychologists and economists are 
actively encouraged to examine the validity of more than one survey interpretation.     
A ―survey evaluation‖ information source may also reduce the ability of the 
policy community to pressure researchers to focus only on interpretations that are policy 
relevant and to pressure researchers to overlook evidence that questions policy relevant 
interpretations of environmental value survey instruments.  For some members of the 
policy community, access to information that questions the validity of the policy 
relevant interpretation could be seen as a negative, as without access to ―objective‖ and 
―scientific‖ environmental value metrics compatible with the policy framework, the job 
of formulating policy can become much more difficult to justify to the general public.  
It is concluded, however, that the benefits of the environmental policy community being 
encouraged to know more about which environmental value survey interpretations are 
legitimate outweigh the costs.  Access to empirically-based ―survey evaluation‖ 
information could actively encourage the policy community to rely more heavily on the 
empirically supported interpretations of environmental value surveys and to avoid 
formulating policy based upon spurious survey interpretations.   
The policy community employs psychologists and economists to administer 
environmental value surveys under the mandate that the survey conclusions actually 
reflect community perceptions of environmental value.  Issues of construct validity are 
paramount, but are, unfortunately, often glossed over by conservation psychologists and 
economists who are responsible for interpreting the environmental value surveys.  In 
order to adequately assess the construct validity of an environmental value survey, it 
should be formally acknowledged that measuring perceptions of environmental value 
with survey designs is as much an art as it is a science.   Unless conservation 
psychologists and economists explicitly recognise that the concept of environmental 
value is ambiguous and the interpretation of environmental value surveys is subjective 
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(the art of interpreting environmental value surveys), they will not fully appreciate that 
it is possible to gather empirical evidence that some environmental value interpretations 
are more valid than others (the science of interpreting environmental value surveys).       
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Political action (PA) attitude scale 
Item 1:  I would participate in a demonstration against companies that are harming the 
environment 
Item 2:  I would sign a petition in support of tougher environmental laws 
Item 3:  I would take a job with a company I knew was harming the environment 
Item 4:  I would never do voluntary work for nature conservation 
Item 5:  Environmental activists are a public nuisance whom I would never support 
 
Appendix 2  Beliefs supportive of environmental action 
(BSEA) attitude scale 
Item 1: Environmental protection will provide a better world for me and my children 
Item 2: Environmental protection is beneficial to my health 
Item 3: A clean environment provides me with better opportunities for recreation 
Item 4: Environmental protection benefits everyone 
Item 5: Environmental protection will help people have a better quality of life 
Item 6: Tropical rain forests are essential to maintain a healthy planet earth 
Item 7: The effect of pollution on public health are worse than we realise 
Item 8: Pollution generated here harms people all over the earth 
Item 9: Over the next several decades, thousands of species will become extinct 
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Appendix 3  Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) attitude 
scale  
Item 1a   Paying more for electricity to restore biodiversity will increase the diversity 
and abundance of plant and animal species in the Tummel area (1 = 
extremely likely; 7 = extremely unlikely). 
Item 1b  Increasing the diversity and abundance of plant and animal species in the 
Tummel area is (1 = extremely bad; 7 = extremely good). 
 
Item 2a Paying more for electricity to restore biodiversity will increase genetic 
diversity in the Tummel area (1 = extremely likely; 7 = extremely unlikely). 
Item 2b Restoring genetic diversity in the Tummel area is (1 = extremely bad; 7 = 
extremely good). 
 
Item 3a Paying more for electricity to restore biodiversity will increase river flows in 
the Tummel area (1 = extremely likely; 7 = extremely unlikely). 
Item 3b Increasing river flows in the Tummel area is  (1 = extremely bad; 7 = 
extremely good). 
 
Item 4a Paying more for electricity to restore biodiversity will help restore the web of 
life in the Tummel area (1 = extremely likely; 7 = extremely unlikely). 
Item 4b Restoring the web of life in the Tummel area is (1 = extremely bad; 7 = 
extremely good). 
 
Item 5a Paying more for electricity to restore biodiversity will enhance water quality 
in the Tummel area (1 = extremely likely; 7 = extremely unlikely). 
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Item 5b Enhancing water quality in the Tummel area is (1 = extremely bad; 7 = 
extremely good). 
 
Item 6a Paying more for electricity to restore biodiversity will teach people to think 
more about the environmental impacts of industry (1 = extremely likely; 7 = 
extremely unlikely). 
Item 6b Teaching people to think more about the environmental impact of industry is 
(1 = extremely bad; 7 = extremely good). 
 
Item 7a Paying more for electricity to preserve biodiversity will restore the Tummel 
area to its natural state (1 = extremely likely; 7 = extremely unlikely). 
Item 7b Restoring the Tummel area to its natural state is (1 = extremely bad; 7 = 
extremely good). 
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Appendix 4  Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) Subjective 
Norm Scale  
Item 1a My spouse/partner would think that I  (1 = should; 7 = should not) pay more 
for electricity to preserve biodiversity in the Tummel area. 
Item 1b Generally speaking, how much do you want to do what your spouse/partner 
thinks you should do? 
 
Item 2a My work colleagues would think that I (1 = should; 7 = should not) pay more 
for electricity to preserve biodiversity in the Tummel area. 
Item2b Generally speaking, how much do you want to do what your work colleagues 
think you should do? 
 
Item 3a My children would think that I (1 = should; 7 = should not) pay more for 
electricity to preserve biodiversity in the Tummel area. 
Item 3b Generally speaking, how much do you want to do what your children think 
you should do? 
 
Item 4a My parents would think that I (1 = should; 7 = should not) pay more for 
electricity to preserve biodiversity in the Tummel area. 
Item 4b Generally speaking, how much do you want to do what your parents think 
you should do? 
 
Item 5a My friends would think that I (1 = should; 7 = should not) pay more for 
electricity to preserve biodiversity in the Tummel area. 
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Item 5b Generally speaking, how much do you want to do what your friends think you 
should do? 
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